Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?

This paper examines how the information quality of ratings from an issuer-paid rating agency (Standard and Poor's) responds to the entry of an investor-paid rating agency, the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR). By comparing S&P's ratings quality before and after EJR initiates coverage of each firm, I find a significant improvement in S&P's ratings quality following EJR's coverage initiation. S&P's ratings become more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes incorporate higher information content. These results differ from the existing literature documenting a deterioration in the incumbents' ratings quality following the entry of a third issuer-paid agency. I further show that the issuer-paid agency seems to improve the ratings quality because EJR's coverage has elevated its reputational concerns.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Does the Dodd-Frank Act reduce the conflict of interests of credit rating agencies?

I compare issuer-paid ratings, represented by Standard & Poor's (S&P) to investor-paid ratings, represented by Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. My results show that S&P ratings are lower than EJR ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, especially for firms able to generate revenue to credit rating agencies (CRAs); i.e., firms with a large bond issuance, larger firms, and low-performing firms. Further, I find evidence of a greater accuracy of S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings in the post-Act period as shown by the lower probability of large credit rating changes and rating reversals. Finally, I show that issuer-paid ratings are more concerned about providing timely ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, thus protecting their reputation as leading information providers, than investor-paid ratings. My results are robust to a wide battery of robustness tests.     

The economic function of credit rating agencies – What does the watchlist tell us?

Credit rating agencies do not only disclose simple ratings but announce watchlists (rating reviews) and outlooks as well. This paper analyzes the economic function underlying the review procedure. Using Moody’s rating data between 1982 and 2004, we find that for borrowers of high creditworthiness, rating agencies employ watchlists primarily in order to improve the delivery of information. For low-quality borrowers, in contrast, the review procedure seems to have developed into an implicit contract á la Boot et al. (2006), inducing the companies “on watch” to abstain from risk-augmenting actions. The agencies’ economic role hence appears to have been enhanced from a pure information certification towards an active monitoring function.     

Is less information better information? Evidence from the credit rating withdrawal

This paper examines the stock market reaction to two different types of credit rating withdrawals by Moody’s. The first type of withdrawal occurs when a firm stops being rated. This happens, for example, when firms choose to no longer pay for a rating. We find that the stock market reaction depends on the information which remains available. The second type of withdrawal is due to Moody’s policy of removing the issuer rating and keeping the corporate family rating for the same firm. The corporate family rating is usually more favorable than the issuer rating. The paper shows that the removal of the issuer rating leads to positive stock market reaction. We conclude that lower disclosure of rating information is not necessarily associated with higher cost of equity. Instead, our findings emphasize the incentive for firms to engage in ratings shopping by publishing only the most favourable ratings.     

Did investors outsource their risk analysis to rating agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs

Based on a sample of 3254 floating rate tranches from 617 ABS-CDOs (collateralized debt obligations backed by asset-backed securities), this paper tests the “rating overdependence” hypothesis – i.e., that ratings of structured products are a sufficient statistic (in terms of predicting future credit performance) for yield spreads at origination. The paper’s findings are fourfold. First, yield spreads at issuance predict future performance of ABS-CDO tranches even after controlling for the information contained in ratings. Second, the ability of yield spreads to predict future performance, however, is driven exclusively by ratings below AAA (and, to a lesser extent, also by the lowest priority AAA tranches), whereas spreads of super senior AAA tranches show no information content. Third, the predictive ability of yield spreads is lower for tranches from later vintages and for tranches from deals with more complex collateral pools. Fourth, the conditional correlation between ratings and spreads, in turn, is increasing in time and higher for tranches from complex deals. In sum, the evidence indicates that investors in (especially AAA) tranches from later and more complex deals have avoided performing costly due diligence on the securities they bought.     

Can rating agencies look through the cycle?

Rating agencies claim to look through the cycle when assigning corporate credit ratings, which entails that they are able to separate trend components of default risk from transitory ones. To test whether agencies possess this competence, I take market-based estimates of 1-year default probabilities of corporate bond issuers and estimate their long-run trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, local regression, or centered moving averages. I find that ratings help identify the current split into trend and cycle. In addition, rating stability is similar to the one of hypothetical ratings based on long-term trends. The results are robust to the use of different filter techniques. They are confirmed by a model-free analysis, which shows that ratings predict future changes in market-based default probability estimates. Since the examined trends are forward-looking in the sense that the trend filtering algorithms use future data, agency ratings exhibit important characteristics one would expect from ratings that see through the cycle.     

Do credit commitments compromise credit quality?

This paper focuses on banks’ risk-taking arising from potentially excessive growth of loans and off-balance sheet credit commitments. Credit quality is investigated both in macro and micro context, using a panel of 28 European countries over 2004–2014 and a panel of 478 European banks over 2004–2013. The dynamic panel data estimation results confirm that an increase in the ratio of credit commitments to total assets is a two year ahead warning indicator of growth in the ratio of non-performing loans and loan loss reserves. Simultaneous equation estimation exemplifies that the adverse effect of credit commitments on credit quality stems from the credit boom-bust context. As the economic impact of credit commitments to credit quality is significant compared to that of traditional credit quality determinants (real GDP growth and real growth in loans), the consideration of a credit commitments measure may improve timely recognition of credit risk accumulation episodes.     

Does media coverage deter firms from withholding bad news? Evidence from stock price crash risk

Spurred by the informational and disciplinary roles that the media fulfils, this study provides initial evidence on how higher media coverage is associated with a lower tendency of firms withholding bad news, proxied by stock price crash risk. Our main findings are robust to a battery of tests that account for endogeneity concerns including a difference-in-differences analysis based on newspaper closures that exogenously reduce media coverage and a regression-discontinuity design analysis based on the top band of Russell 2000 and lower band of Russell 1000 index stocks. Additional tests reveal that the negative relation between media coverage and stock price crash risk is concentrated within firms with more negative and novel news coverage and firms with higher litigation or reputation risks. We also find that media plays an important role in reducing future stock price crash risk when there is reduced monitoring by other external monitoring mechanisms such as external auditors, financial analysts, and institutional shareholders.     

How do sovereign credit rating changes affect private investment?

Sovereign credit rating changes have an influence on real private investment of re-rated countries. We find significant increases in private investment growth following upgrades in sovereign ratings. These increases, however, are transitory. We also find significant, temporary declines in private investment growth following sovereign rating downgrades. The results hold after accounting for re-rated countries’ growth opportunities, endogeneity, and other factors that could affect private investment. The irreversible nature of investment may be the explanation for the temporary changes in the growth rates of physical capital investment associated with revisions in sovereign credit ratings.     

Does social media coverage deter firms from withholding bad news? Evidence from stock price crash risk

Using a comprehensive dataset for listed companies between 2010 and 2020, we document that social media coverage can reduce managers' incentives and capabilities to withhold bad news (i.e., reduce stock price crash risk). The results remain robust in the test of solving endogenous problems. Compared with other external governance mechanisms (other media sources, external auditors, financial analysts, and institutional shareholders), social media coverage plays a complementary role in reducing stock price crash risk when there is increased monitoring by other external monitoring mechanisms. Additional tests show that social media coverage reduces crash risk when managers have greater incentives to hoard bad news.     

Retirement income adequacy: good news or bad?

Estimating replacement rate targets, and using them to assess the current state of retirement savings adequacy, has been the focus of much attention and analysis. Building on his earlier work published in Benefits Quarterly, the author conceptually defines retirement income adequacy, estimates replacement rate targets and reviews research on the current state of baby boomers' retirement savings. He concludes that, despite existing data limitations, researchers have made considerable strides in recent years in thinking about saving for retirement and the adequacy of workers' preparation for it. These advances suggest that singular rules of thumb for replacement rates are naive and that estimates should take into account the unforeseen risks that individuals face.     

Are managers strategic in reporting non-earnings news? Evidence on timing and news bundling

Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 2005 to 2013, we examine whether firms strategically report mandatory and voluntary news. In particular, we examine whether firms report negative news when investor attention is low and whether they bundle positive and negative news. Our findings support the notion that managers believe in the existence of investor inattention and strategically report negative news after trading hours. These results particularly apply to public firms, where equity market pressures provide stronger incentives to mitigate market reaction to news by exploiting investor inattention. Further analysis of the market reaction to strategic disclosure uncovers no evidence of investor inattention, consistent with market efficiency. We also observe that public firms are more likely to strategically disclose through news bundling and that the likelihood of this increases with the likelihood of strategic disclosure through timing.     

Do managers seek control and entrenchment?

A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt crises?

We revisit the question whether sovereign ratings predict financial crises. In line with previous studies, we find that ratings do not predict currency crises and are instead downgraded ex-post. However, the likelihood of currency crisis and the implied probability of sovereign default are not closely linked in emerging markets post-1994. When debt crises are defined as sovereign distress – when spreads are higher than 1000 basis points or 10 percentage points – we find that access to international capital markets is reduced by half. In addition, although sovereign distress events last for typically 5.2 consecutive months, they can persist for longer periods up to nine quarters. Finally, lagged ratings and ratings changes, including negative outlooks and credit watches, are useful in anticipating sovereign distress.     

Do some lenders have information advantages? Evidence from Japanese credit market data

Using detailed Japanese credit data, we test for the existence of a credit market hierarchy. Empirical tests indicate that firms with information problems are more likely to carry higher proportions of relationship loans from main banks than non-main banks, holding constant risk and control factors. We further examine credit specialization on the part of lenders by testing the relationship between client firms' information and risk characteristics and the concentration of loans obtained from depository institutions versus other financial institutions. However, no significant differences in information superiority between these two types of financial institutions are found. We conclude that our evidence supports the credit market hierarchy hypothesis for Japanese main banks in particular but not depository institutions in general.     

Do sovereign rating changes trigger spillover effects?

This paper examines whether changes in a particular country's sovereign ratings provided by Standard and Poor's and Moody's trigger a spillover effect on other countries. The analysis focuses on two sets of countries namely where there are trade links between the countries and where there are links between the financial markets of each country. The findings indicate that there are more significant results when the links in financial markets are analysed compared to trade links. Moreover, the results are dependent on which rating is under analysis, that is, Standard and Poor's Local Currency, Standard and Poor's Foreign Currency, Moody's Bank Deposit or Moody's bonds and notes. Finally, there does appear to be a contamination effect for both upgrades and downgrades among the countries.