Do CLMV countries catch up with the older ASEAN members in terms of income level?

This article examined whether Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam were catching up in terms of real per capita Gross Domestic Product with the older six Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The findings indicated that Cambodia succeeded in reaching Indonesia’s income level and Vietnam was catching up with Indonesia and the Philippines. However, the income gap between Laos and Myanmar and the older ASEAN members was not reduced. These findings have some policy implications.     

Policymakers’ Coalitions and Stabilization Policies in the EMU

A highly integrated area like the EMU features a large amount of interactions between the participating countries. In this context the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies are a crucial issue. This paper focuses on how coalitions among policymakers are formed and discusses their effects on the stabilization of output and price. We emphasize the role played by the institutional design of cooperation forums (as, e.g., the ECOFIN). If the coalition formation game is played without communication among the policymakers, full cooperation is an unlikely outcome. On the other hand, if policymakers can communicate, full cooperation becomes a possible equilibrium, while the complete non-cooperative solution is, in general, not a stable equilibrium. This supports the view that institutions for discussions can play a crucial role in achieving international cooperation even when these institutions are not endowed with enforcement powers.revised version received August 1, 2003     

The Euro and Internal Economic Policy Coordination

This paper reviews, mainly from an institutional angle, the objectives, forms, scope, levels, implementation and challenges involved for internal economic policy coordination after the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. In particular, it identifies six different aspects of coordination (procedures, exchange of information, analytical framework, monitoring, policy interactions and joint determination of policies) and analyses the rationale for coordination in eight different policy areas. After presenting some of the challenges lying ahead, the paper concludes that although an appropriate institutional framework seems in place, it still has to undergo its baptism of fire.     

Better Than the Euro? The European Monetary System (1979–1998)

ABSTRACT

The euro crisis has provoked a debate on the pros and cons of adjustable exchange rate regimes that enable their participants to negotiate nominal de- and revaluations. To evaluate the functioning of such regimes, we revisit the EMU’s predecessor, the European Monetary System (EMS). We show that in the EMS, devaluations did indeed help more than revaluations did hurt. Assuming that the political-economic heterogeneity of the Eurozone will not vanish in the foreseeable future, the move to a more flexible exchange rate regime might therefore be economically advantageous. However, a purely economic view ignores the huge political ‘maintenance costs’ of negotiable realignments, costs that the EMS members aimed at overcoming when they opted for the euro. The re-politicization of nominal exchange rate policy in today’s Eurozone would therefore not end transnational political conflicts in the Eurozone but fuel new ones.     

Is There a Link Between Exchange Rate Pass-Through and the Monetary Regime: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

This paper investigates the relationship between the monetary regime: pegged, currency board, dollarization, and the exchange rate pass-through for a sample consisting of 15 Sub-Saharan Africa countries and 12 Latin American countries. The research findings about pass-through rates will shed light on the feasibility of a monetary union for Sub-Saharan Africa. The inclusion of the latter country group was deemed desirable to explore pass-through behavior in several monetary regime options not often used in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

东盟区域经济一体化——基于边境效应的实证分析

本文通过计算边境效应来测定自由贸易区与其他国家（地区）的贸易程度。通过2000-2009年这10年的面板数据,在理论上验证了以下结论：东盟区域内部各国之间的贸易壁垒和边境效应普遍降低;东盟作为一个整体对于世界其他主要贸易国家的边境效应却在不断提升,这反映出东盟的一体化进程在不断提高。此外,在本文的研究中还发现另外一个值得关注的情况：与其他自由贸易区的国家同质化结构不同,东盟区域内既有发展程度较高的国家,也有依然被联合国定义为贫穷、欠发达的国家,这样的国家结构必然会造成贸易层面上的分化,折射出东盟在内部融合的过程中出现的一些不协调和分化     

Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.     

Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.