Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate regulation: the case of China

Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform promoted bank competition in most mature and emerging economies. However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure competition have concluded that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, despite progressive reforms implemented since the 1980s. We show that this apparent contradiction is the result of flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar–Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of interest rate regulation. By contrast, the profit elasticity (PE) approach does not suffer from these shortcomings. Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 1996–2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the PE indicator is used.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

The effect of higher capital requirements on bank lending: the capital surplus matters

Empirica - The existing literature has displayed mixed results in terms of the relationship between tighter bank capital regulation and lending, which may be due to poor approximation of capital...     

Central bank reserve management: Aggregate targets and interest payments on reserves

Tindall and Spencer [1997] presented a dynamic stochastic theory of borrowed reserves that explained the observed nonlinear relationship between borrowing and the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. It showed that borrowed reserves are a function of deposit variation. This paper extends that research, providing a general dynamic model of all key bank reserve aggregates. Nearly all reserve aggregates, which can be used as operating targets by the Federal Reserve, are subject to the influence of deposit variation and are nonlinearly related to the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate, complicating their use as targets. Additionally, it is found that the Federal Reserve's proposal to pay interest on bank reserves could generate substantial distortions in reserve aggregate behavior where interest is paid on excess reserves as well as required reserves, effectively resulting in potentially large discount-window policing problems.     

Biodiversity conservation, loss of natural capital and interest rates

It is argued that there is neither regular relationship between changes in the level of the market rate of interest and variations in the rate of biodiversity loss nor does such a regular relationship occur between alterations in the market rate of interest and changes in the rate of natural resource extraction. However, some texts suggest otherwise. Microeconomic examples are given in which a rise in the market rate of interest results in increased biodiversity loss and others in which it does not. It is also posited that the rate of biodiversity loss (as well as the rate of natural resource extraction) tends to rise with the level of aggregate investment and aggregate economic activity. It is demonstrated, using macroeconomic models, that the market rate of interest can increase or decrease with a rise in aggregate investment and also with an increase in the level of aggregate economic activity. Therefore, changes in biodiversity loss (and in the rate of natural resource extraction) are independent of variations in the market rate of interest in macroeconomic models.     

Ex ante capital position,changes in the different components of regulatory capital and bank risk

We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk-taking behaviour from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes depend on banks’ ex ante regulatory capital position. Second, we consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks’ risk changes. We find that, for highly capitalized, adequately capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase in equity or in subordinated debt positively affects risk. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital or subordinated debt. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments.     

Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.     

Undiscounted optimal growth with consumable capital and labor-intensive consumption goods

This paper presents a complete characterization of the optimal policy in a two sector undiscounted growth model. The model is an extension of the Leontief two sector model, which analyzes the optimal allocation of capital and labor to a consumption good sector and an investment good sector. The paper extends this framework to include consumable capital. Thus, the planner has preferences over the consumption good and the consumable capital. Future welfare levels are treated equally as current ones. Geometric techniques are applied to characterize the optimal policy if the consumption good is labor-intensive. The results suggest that if the initial capital stock is above a threshold level, that depends upon the consumption of capital, every optimal program is monotonic, converges to the golden rule stock in a finite number of periods, and undergoes either unemployment or excess capacity of capital.     

Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation

The call options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to narrow-banking contingent claims of one bank, while the cap options theory is applied to synergy-banking contingent claims of another bank. This article investigates efficiency gains specified as equities of scope associated with the likelihood of the two banks involved in merger under capital regulation. We find that merger incentives are encouraged when the narrowing banking is conducted by the consolidated bank, whereas discouraged when the synergy banking is conducted. Raising bank capital requirement leads to an increased interest margin of the consolidated bank with the narrow banking valuation; however, to a decreased margin of the consolidated bank with the synergy banking valuation. An increase in the capital regulation reduces the merger incentives in the narrow banking valuation whereas increases the merger disincentive in the synergy banking valuation. These findings are consistent with the organizational theory that predicts a comparative advantage of narrow banking proposals in bank mergers.     

Concealment of risk and regulation of bank risk taking

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of banking regulation when risk can be concealed from the regulator. Three banking regimes are considered: regulation with direct controls, incentives-based regulation, and laissez-faire banking. The relative performance of the three regimes depends on the effectiveness of monitoring. Regulation with direct controls is superior when monitoring effectiveness is low, while incentives-based regulation is superior when monitoring effectiveness is high. Laissez-faire banking is equivalent to incentives-based regulation if market analysts and the regulator have access to the same information. When monitoring effectiveness is low, a regulator with direct controls can better restrain banks' risk taking than can the market; this result applies when banks can conceal much of their risk from the regulator.     

Capital regulation, bank competition, and financial stability

We analyze capital requirements if banks compete for loans and deposits. Banks and firms are subject to a risk-shifting problem. The ambiguous effect of competition on banks’ risk-taking translates into an ambiguous effect of capital requirements on financial stability.     

The distributional effects of selection and capital accumulation on firm productivity under imperfect capital markets

In this evolutionary model, random shocks create differences in the rate of return on capital, while individual saving and investment behavior can reduce these differences over time. Firms with either low total factor productivity (TFP) or a low average return on capital are selected for exit, and new firms enter to take their place. As would be expected, a higher turnover rate improves TFP and reduces its variation. While we show that a higher turnover rate would result in a more positively skewed TFP distribution if exit selection is based directly upon TFP, we find that when we select firms for exit based on their average product of capital, the marginal impact of a higher turnover rate is to more negatively skew the TFP distribution. Overall, our simulations highlight the importance of considering the role selection may play in shaping the distribution of productivity when econometricians seek estimates of firm inefficiency.

Endogenous inflows of speculative capital and the optimal currency appreciation path

Abstract This paper examines the optimal appreciation path of an undervalued currency in the presence of speculative capital inflows that are endogenously affected by the appreciation path. A central bank decides its appreciation policy based on three costs: (i) misalignment costs associated with the gap between the actual and long‐run equilibrium exchange rates, (ii) short‐term adjustment costs due to resource reallocation, and (iii) capital losses due to speculative capital inflows. Our model finds (1) when speculators face no liquidity shocks, the central bank tends to appreciate the currency quickly to discourage speculative capital; (2) when speculators face liquidity shocks, the central bank optimally pre‐commits to a slower appreciation path, and the appreciation takes the longest time when the probability of liquidity shocks takes intermediate values; (3) the central bank tends to appreciate the currency more quickly when it conducts discretionary policy.     

Risk forecasting models and optimal portfolio selection

This study analyses, from an investor's perspective, the performance of several risk forecasting models in obtaining optimal portfolios. The plausibility of the homoscedastic hypothesis implied in the classical Markowitz model is dicussed and more general models which take into account assymetry and time varying risk are analysed. Specifically, it studies whether ARCH-type based models obtain portfolios whose risk-adjusted returns exceed those of the classical Markowitz model. The same analysis is performed with models based on the Lower Partial Moment (LPM) which take into account the assymetry in the distribution of returns. The results suggest that none of the models achieve a clearly superior average performance. It is also found that models based on semivariance perform as well as those based on the variance, but not better than, even if the evaluation criterion is based on the Reward-to-Semivariance ratio. When attention turns to the analysis of worst case performance, the results are clearly different. Models which employ LPM with a high degree of risk aversion (n>2) as the risk measure are consistently superior to those which employ a symmetric measure, either homoscedastic or heteroscedastic.     

Analyzing the role of mutual guarantee societies on bank capital requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises

This paper analyzes the impact of the guarantee provided by mutual guarantee societies (MGSs) on the risk premium that banks should charge for small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans under the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel II and III). We also examine whether the foreseeable decrease in the theoretical credit risk premium would be compensated by the cost of the MGS guarantee. To do so, we develop a rating system for SMEs that uses a large sample of Spanish firms over the period from 2005 to 2009. We find that the final effect of the guarantee on the SME risk premium depends on the values taken by the credit variables of the MGS (essentially, the probability of default).     

Heterogeneous capital stocks and the optimal timing for CO2 abatement

Some recent research suggests benefits to a delayed CO₂ emission reduction strategy. If the target level of atmospheric CO₂ concentration can be achieved in spite of delay, several factors suggest economic benefits to a delay strategy. However, the analyses that lead to these conclusions typically ignore or underestimate the significant heterogeneity in the turnover rate of society's capital stock. This research explores the relationship between the turnover rate of capital stocks and the delay decision using a model and empirically estimated abatement costs. The results suggest that under many different assumptions, an early start at CO₂ abatement for long-lived capital stocks would be economically optimal.     

Recursive utility and optimal capital accumulation II: sensitivity and duality theory

Summary This paper provides sensitivity and duality results for continuous-time optimal capital accumulation models where preferences belong to a class of recursive objectives. We combine the topology used by Becker, Boyd and Sung (1989) with a controllability condition to demonstrate that optimal paths are continuous with respect to changes in both the initial capital stock, and the rate of time preference. Under convexity and an interiority condition, we find the value function is differentiable, and derive a multiplier equation for the supporting prices. Finally, under some mild additional conditions, we show that supporting prices obeying the transversality and multiplier equations are both necessary and sufficient for an optimum.Robert Becker acknowledges the research support of National Science Foundation Grant SES 85-20180. We also thank Gerhard Sorger and the participants at the Northwestern Summer Workshop in Capital Theory and Monetary Economics for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Government spending, interest rates, and capital accumulation in a two-sector model

This paper investigates dynamic impacts of a temporary fiscal expansion in a two-sector growth model. If the expansion falls on consumption-investment commodities, capital accumulation can be either promoted or reduced and the short-term interest rate unambiguously rises. If the expansion falls on consumption commodities, capital accumulation is crowded out and the short-term interest rate declines during the period of the fiscal expansion. It is also shown that fiscal spending on the consumption commodity can move the short- and long-term interest rates in opposite directions. JEL Classification: E43, E62, O41