Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.     

IPO first-day returns,offer price revisions,volatility, and form S-1 language

Form S-1 is the first SEC filing in the initial public offering (IPO) process. The tone of the S-1, in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm’s business strategy and operations, should affect investors’ ability to value the IPO. We find that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions, and subsequent volatility. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty, bookbuilding, and prospect theory.     

Leverage, excess leverage, and future returns

We examine the cross-sectional relation between leverage and future returns while considering the dynamic nature of capital structure and potentially delayed market reactions. Prior studies find a negative relation between leverage and future returns that contradicts standard finance theory. We decompose leverage into optimal and excess components and find that excess leverage tends to drive this negative relation. We also find that excess leverage predicts firm fundamentals and that the negative relation between excess leverage and future returns may be explained by investors’ failure to react promptly to information contained in excess leverage about future financial distress and asset growth.     

Time-varying moments, idiosyncratic risk, and an application to hot-issue IPO aftermarket returns

This paper proposes time-varying idiosyncratic risk as a component driving conditional abnormal returns and outlines a corresponding Engle et al. [Econometrica 55 (1987) 391] ARCH-M market model. An application is given to initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket stock returns, where a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and returns is consistent with young issues’ equity as a contingent claim on firm assets. The empirical results for an illustrative sample of German Neuer Markt stocks traded during the first two years after initial listing indicate pronounced skewness as well as a positive relation between conditional idiosyncratic risk and expected returns. Conditioning aftermarket performance on risk yields much lower levels of abnormal return significance than a standard approach.     

IPO underpricing,signaling, and property returns

This paper investigates whether IPO signals reveal proprietary information about the prospects of an issuing firm’s underlying industry. By analyzing a sample of European property company (EPC) IPOs from 1997 to 2007, we take advantage of a heterogeneous set of industry performance measures, i.e., yields and total returns of direct property investments in various European property markets that can be clearly assigned to each individual IPO. The results reveal that the main signal of interest, underpricing, is in fact positively related to average property yields for a 12-month post-IPO period; a result that supports our assumption. Other signals, as proposed in previous research, do not appear to contain any information about the prospects of the IPO firm’s target property investment market. We also show that total returns seem to be a biased measure for direct property performance. Further tests for the signaling model’s preconditioned presence of information asymmetry among EPCs reveal that underpricing levels are a function of company-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies. In contrast, property-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies do not explain underpricing levels.     

Systematic consumption risk in currency returns

We sort currencies into portfolios by countries’ past consumption growth. The excess return of the highest- over the lowest-consumption-growth portfolio – our consumption carry factor – compensates for negative returns during world-wide downturns and prices the cross-section of portfolio-sorted and of bilateral currency returns. Empirically, sorting currencies on consumption growth is very similar to sorting currencies on interest rates. We interpret these stylized facts in a habit formation model: sorting currencies on past consumption growth approximates sorting on risk aversion. Low (high) risk-aversion currencies have high (low) interest rates and depreciate (appreciate) in times of global turmoil.     

Operating leverage,financial leverage,and equity risk

The analysis investigates the combined leverage effect of a fixed capacity decision (fixed cost) plus debt on the risk of equity returns. It is argued that the traditional DOL-DFL calculation is incorrect. A correct calculation is given, using the fact that the capacity decision is endogenous to the firm's decision process. The analysis reveals that the capacity decision partially offsets the effect on equity risk of increasing business risk or debt. However, this ability is lost at high levels of debt.     

Systematic risk,total risk and size as determinants of stock market returns

This paper studies the historical relationship for the period 1962–1981 between stock market returns and the following variables: beta, residual standard deviation (or total variance), and size. We conclude that neither the traditional measure of risk (beta) nor the alternative risk measures (variance or residual standard deviation) can explain the cross-sectional variation in returns; only size seems to matter. When January returns are eliminated, even the size variable loses its statistical significance.     

Endogenous leverage and expected stock returns

This note clarifies conditions under which endogenous choice of debt induces a negative relation between leverage or default risk and expected stock returns. In the context of the model of George and Hwang [2009. Journal of Financial Economics 96, 56–79], we correct the contention that variation in bankruptcy costs across firms is sufficient. Variation in asset risk parameters can lead to the desired relation, but may not when also controlling for variation in book-to-market ratios. A simple parameterization of cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk and profitability implies a negative association of expected return with leverage and distress risk and a positive association with book-to-market.     

Systematic risk and the cross section of hedge fund returns

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.     

A resolution of the distress risk and leverage puzzles in the cross section of stock returns

We revisit findings that returns are negatively related to financial distress intensity and leverage. These are puzzles under frictionless capital markets assumptions but are consistent with optimizing firms that differ in their exposure to financial distress costs. Firms with high costs choose low leverage to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states. Empirical results are consistent with this explanation. The return premiums to low leverage and low distress are significant in raw returns, and even stronger in risk-adjusted returns. When in distress, low-leverage firms suffer more than high-leverage firms as measured by a deterioration in accounting operating performance and heightened exposure to systematic risk. The connection between return premiums and distress costs is apparent in subperiod evidence. Both are small or insignificant prior to 1980 and larger and significant thereafter.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

An examination of IPO secondary market returns

IPO stock prices increased approximately 2.3% on the first day of secondary market trading over the period 1993 through 2003. While these aftermarket returns are accentuated during 1999 and 2000, they persist after the bubble burst and even increase as a percentage of total underpricing. We explore several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain our findings including price support, laddering, retail sentiment, and information asymmetry. Our results are most consistent with the view that higher secondary market returns accrue to IPOs with more information asymmetries possibly due to price and aggregate demand uncertainty.     

Employee well-being,firm leverage,and bankruptcy risk

Employees of liquidating firms are likely to lose income and non-pecuniary benefits of working for the firm, which makes bankruptcy costly for employees. This paper examines whether firms take these costs into account when deciding on the optimal amount of leverage. We find that firms with leading track records in employee well-being significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios. Moreover, we observe that firms with better employee track records have better credit ratings, even when we control for differences in firm leverage.     

Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns

The Chinese stock market with its unique institutions is rather different from western stock markets. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a supply-demand analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China's primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1377 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1992 and 2004. We find that Chinese IPO underpricing is principally caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the control of IPO share supplies. Besides the regulatory underpricing, this paper also documents some specific investment risks of IPOs in China's stock market.     

Cash holdings,risk, and expected returns

In this paper I develop and empirically test a model that highlights how the correlation between cash flows and a source of aggregate risk affects a firm's optimal cash holding policy. In the model, riskier firms (i.e., firms with a higher correlation between cash flows and the aggregate shock) are more likely to use costly external funding to finance their growth option exercises and have higher optimal savings. This precautionary savings motive implies a positive relation between expected equity returns and cash holdings. In addition, this positive relation is stronger for firms with less valuable growth options. Using a data set of US pubic companies, I find evidence consistent with the model's predictions.     

What comprises IPO initial returns: Evidence from the Chinese market

We studied the IPO price and long-term performance in China after the adoption of the book-building pricing mechanism. Using comparable firm value, we separated the IPO initial returns into pre-market deliberate underpricing and aftermarket overpricing. This separation enables us to clearly test different theories regarding high IPO initial returns. We find little evidence supporting the classic information theory on IPO underpricing but strong evidence supporting the behavioral arguments regarding IPO overpricing. Even though the results are specific to the Chinese market, we find some general results on what composes and drives IPO initial returns that have been lacking in the IPO literature.     

Litigation risk and IPO underpricing

We examine the relation between risk and IPO underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis: (1) firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance (insurance effect) and (2) higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs (deterrence effect). To adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies, we use a simultaneous equation framework. Evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis.     

Value at risk,mispricing and expected returns

This study investigates how the relation between value-at-risk (VaR) and expected returns differs under different mispricing statuses. We find that a significantly negative VaR-return relation, defined as the VaR effect, is observed only for overpriced stocks, but not for underpriced stocks. Moreover, VaR has an amplification effect on mispricing, indicating that VaR captures risk that deters arbitrage and thus leads to an increase in mispricing. Our results are robust to alternative VaR definitions, subperiod analysis, different market states, and after controlling for other firm characteristics, well-known risk factors, and those variables that have been shown to have amplifying effects on mispricing. Finally, this study also examines the pricing effect of short sale constraints on the VaR effect under different mispricing statuses. Our findings suggest that the VaR effect observed in overpriced stocks becomes more severe as short sales are more constrained.