COVID-19, policy interventions and credit: The Brazilian experience

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a global health and economic crisis to which governments responded with massive policy interventions. Using Brazil as a testing ground, we investigate the influence of the pandemic and ensuing policy interventions on local credit markets. First, we find that the pandemic has a significantly negative impact on local credit. Second, using a novel manually collected database on the staggered municipal government policy interventions, we show heterogenous effects of interventions: positive effects of soft interventions (e.g., social distancing and mass gathering restrictions) and late reopening, and negative effects of hard interventions (e.g., closure of non-essential services) and early reopening. Third, we find that state-owned banks grant more local credit than privately owned banks during the COVID-19 crisis but this difference is less pronounced than it was in the 2008 Financial Crisis. We confirm our results using pre-pandemic local political preference as instrument for policy interventions and orthogonalized policy intervention indicators, and in placebo tests.     

Market liquidity, asset prices, and welfare

This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.     

Monetary Policy and Inequality

We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household-level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long-standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality.     

Tax multipliers: Pitfalls in measurement and identification

To analyze the pitfalls in measuring and identifying tax shocks, we build a novel value-added tax rate dataset for the period 1980–2009. The problem of identification (i.e., changes in tax policy not triggered by output fluctuations) is clearly disentangled from the problem of measurement (i.e., finding a tax policy variable under the direct control of policymakers). On the identification front, our results favor the use of narratives à la Romer and Romer (2010). On the measurement front, our findings support the use of tax rates as the true measure of tax policy as opposed to revenue-based measures, such as cyclically adjusted revenues.     

Corporate risk management and dividend signaling theory

This article investigates the effect of corporate risk management on dividend policy. We extend the signaling framework of Bhattacharya [1979. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270] by including the possibility of hedging the future cash flow. We find that the higher the hedging level, the lower the incremental dividend. This result is intuitive. It is in line with studies suggesting that cash flows’ predictability decreases the marginal gain from costly signaling through dividends and the assertion that corporate hedging decreases cash flow volatility. It is also in line with the purported positive relation between information asymmetry and dividend policy (e.g., Miller and Rock [1985. The Journal of Finance 40, 1031–1051]) and the assertion that risk management alleviates the information asymmetry problem (e.g., DaDalt et al. [2002. The Journal of Future Markets 22, 261–267]). Our theoretical model has testable implications.     

The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply,Reach‐for‐Yield,and Real Effects

We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).     

Monetary Policy Rules in an Open Economy with Heuristics: Which Model Is Best?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agents’ expectation have been critical issues for reconsidering monetary policy management since 2008. The purpose of this article is to evaluate macroeconomic stability in a New Keynesian open economy in which agents experience cognitive limitations. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy designs. Our simulations confirm that the business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a Taylor-type (CPI or domestic inflation) rule or a credible exchange rate pegging system can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy.     

The Cost Channel Reconsidered: A Comment Using an Identification‐Robust Approach

We reexamine the empirical relevance of the cost channel of monetary policy (e.g., Ravenna and Walsh 2006 ), employing recently developed moment‐conditions inference methods, including identification‐robust procedures. Using U.S. data, our results suggest that the cost channel effect is poorly identified and we are thus unable to corroborate the previous results in the literature.     

Is there a CSI-leverage nexus?

We examine how various measures of consumer sentiment index (CSI) affect firms' debt policy decisions. Using U.S. firm-level quarterly data from 1993 to 2017, we provide a strong positive relationship between CSI measures and corporate debt policy, implying that firms use external borrowing during a positive economic outlook and reap the tax-shield benefit. We also find that improved household optimism over financial and business sentiments leads to future household consumption. The CSI-leverage nexus is moderated by the state of firms' financial condition, reputation, and profitability. Importantly, our results are robust to sub-sample analysis, firm-level and macroeconomic controls, econometric specifications, alternative measures of sentiment including Shiller's cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (i.e., CAPE_SH), Baker and Wurgler (2006)’s stock market sentiment index (i.e., SENT_BW) and search-based uncertainty measure such as FEARS (i.e., Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search) index of Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015).     

Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises?

This paper evaluates the treatment effect of consistent pegs (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt announced pegged regimes) on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are indeed more prone to currency crises than other regimes. Using matching estimators as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with other exchange rate policies. More interestingly, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than those with a “fear of announcing a peg” policy (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt pegged regimes but do not claim to have pegged regimes). The results stand up to a wide variety of robustness checks.     

Money: Endogeneity and neutrality

This paper examines the implications of a contemporaneously observed endogenous money supply in rational expectations models of the Lucas-Barro variety. First, if there is contemporaneously perceived policy response (e.g., to interest rates), then a simultaneous equations bias produces inconsistency in the neutrality tests proposed by King and Boschen-Grossman. Second, if money acts as a ‘signal’ about economic conditions then autonomous money shocks can have real effects. In polar contrast to the Lucas-Barro analyses, this non-neutrality requires that monetary information be utilized by economic agents.     

An International Perspective for Mortgage Market Reform

The United States and certain European countries (e.g., Ireland and Spain) have recently experienced serious distress in their residential mortgage markets. Public policy has responded with interventions to limit the deadweight costs of mortgage foreclosures, but with limited success. There are also open questions with respect to long‐term reforms in mortgage market structures. In this paper, I make use of the important differences that exist between U.S. and European mortgage markets to help identify those aspects of residential mortgage markets that are most in need of reform.     

Economic policy uncertainty and bank earnings opacity

Using a sample of U.S. banks and an index for economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker et al. (2016), we investigate whether economic policy uncertainty is systematically related to bank earnings opacity. When economic policy is relatively uncertain, it is easier for bank managers to distort financial information, as unpredictable economic policy changes make assessing the existence and impact of hidden “adverse news” more difficult for investors and creditors. Economic policy uncertainty also increases the fluctuation in banks’ earnings and cash flows, thus providing additional incentives and opportunities for bank managers to engage in earnings management. Our results show that uncertainty in economic policy is positively related to earnings opacity, proxied by the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions and the likelihood of just meeting or beating the prior year’s earnings, and negatively related to the level of accounting conservatism (i.e., the timeliness of recognition of bad news relative to good news). Collectively, our results suggest that economic policy uncertainty leads to greater earnings opacity. We also find that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on financial reporting distortion is less pronounced for stronger banks (i.e., banks with high capital ratios).     

Managing Employee Compensation Risk

Review of Accounting Studies - We analyze a principal-agent model in which the principal (e.g., shareholders) and the agent (e.g., an employee) can personally trade securities tied to the outcome...     

Economic policy uncertainty,institutional environments,and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on corporate cash holdings using a large sample of international firms. EPU intensifies concerns of investors on managerial self-dealing and political extraction. Consequently, the potential cost of cash holdings (i.e., expropriation) outweighs its benefit (i.e., precautionary motives), and the optimal amount of cash holdings decreases. We find supportive evidence that firms hold less cash when EPU is high. We further show that the market discounts excess cash holdings under high policy uncertainty, but this negative effect is mitigated by stronger investor protection, better freedom of press, and better government quality.     

交易限制与股票市场定价效率——基于创业板涨跌幅限制放宽的准自然实验研究

本文基于2020年8月24日创业板涨跌幅限制由10%扩大到20%这一政策变化建立准自然实验,从市场层面与公司事件层面探讨交易限制放宽的外生冲击下市场定价效率的变化。研究发现,涨跌幅限制放宽政策实施后,股票价格能更灵敏地反映公开市场信息,更多地包含公司层面特质信息,整体市场定价效率显著提升。进一步研究表明,涨跌幅限制放宽有效缓解了交易干扰问题,避免了过度交易行为延后,缓解了波动性外溢与价格发现延迟。异质性分析表明,无论是市场层面定价效率改善,还是事件层面波动性外溢、价格发现推迟与交易干扰问题的缓解,均在低信息透明度公司中更为显著。本文研究发现为验证涨跌幅限制会抑制股票市场定价效率的理论提供了直接经验证据,同时为推广完善市场化交易制度提供了有益启示。     

Lumpy investment and the monetary transmission mechanism

The lumpy nature of plant-level investment is generally not taken into account in the context of New Keynesian monetary theory (see, e.g., 8 and 32). Our main result shows that if this theory is augmented by a standard model of lumpy investment, monetary policy shocks lead to large but very short-lived impacts on output and inflation, in a way that goes against empirical evidence and the consensus view in the literature.     

Model Secrecy and Stress Tests

Should regulators reveal the models they use to stress-test banks? In our setting, revealing leads to gaming, but secrecy can induce banks to underinvest in socially desirable assets for fear of failing the test. We show that although the regulator can solve this underinvestment problem by making the test easier, some disclosure may still be optimal (e.g., if banks have high appetite for risk or if capital shortfalls are not very costly). Cutoff rules are optimal within monotone disclosure rules, but more generally optimal disclosure is single-peaked. We discuss policy implications and offer applications beyond stress tests.     

Challenging the NPM Ideas About Performance Management: Selectivity and Differentiation in Outcome‐Oriented Performance Budgeting

This paper shows how the performance budget of a local government organization, in this case a province in the Netherlands, can be attuned to the specific task characteristics of the programmes in these budgets. Three ways of alignment are suggested: differentiating between standardized and complex programmes; focussing on the politically most relevant programmes in order to avoid information overload; and distinguishing between the types of performance information in terms of the role of the province in the programme (facilitator versus executor) and the stage in the policy making cycle (policy development, policy elaboration or policy execution). These suggestions challenge the generally straightforward NPM rationale of performance budgeting, in which standardized outputs are directly related to resources. Our empirical research shows on the one hand that the redesigned programme budget based on the above principles received substantial approval of its users, i.e., the provincial councillors. On the other hand, as regards the use of this programme budget the picture is rather diffuse, i.e., the majority of the councillors indicate that they use the information rather intensively, but its formal use in official Council and Council committee meetings remains limited.     

Determinants of the informativeness of analyst research

We examine cross-sectional determinants of the informativeness of analyst research, i.e., their effect on security prices, controlling for endogeneity among the factors affecting informativeness. Analyst reports are more informative when the potential brokerage profits are higher (e.g., high trading volume, high volatility, and high institutional ownership) and lower when information processing costs (e.g., more business segments) are high. We also find that the informativeness of analyst research and informativeness of financial statements are complements.