Financial globalization, financial crises and contagion

Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. non-financial sectors since the mid-1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets. Using an open-economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role, we show that financial integration leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and to large asset price spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. The impacts of these shocks on asset prices are amplified by bank capital requirements based on mark-to-market.     

Financial flows,financial crises,and global imbalances

In this lecture I document the proliferation of gross international asset and liability positions and discuss some consequences for individual countries’ external adjustment processes and for global financial stability. In light of the rapid growth of gross global financial flows and the serious risks associated with them, one might wonder about the continuing relevance of the net financial flow measured by the current account balance. I argue that global current account imbalances remain an essential target for policy scrutiny, for financial as well as macroeconomic reasons. Nonetheless, it is critically important for policymakers to monitor as well the rapidly evolving structure of global gross assets and liabilities.     

Bank liquidity creation,monetary policy,and financial crises

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

How the German government responded to the financial,economic and fiscal crises

This paper explains the German government's response to the financial, economic and fiscal crises. It covers the financial crisis in 2008 when banks were supported (SoFFin), the economic crisis in 2009, and the fiscal crisis of increasing state debts and budget deficits which caused the German government to cut spending (Sparpaket) in 2010. The author looks at the contents of the government's responses, but also at the political and administrative aspects of the government's decision-making processes.     

Bailouts,the incentive to manage risk,and financial crises

A firm's termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm's debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee, firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection. However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to “walk away.” I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices, while net worth is high. However, risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm's net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold. Hence, the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules, and can account for phenomena such as “flight to quality.”     

Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.     

Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises

This study examines the impact of financial flexibility on the investment and performance of East Asian firms over the period 1994–2009. We employ a sample of 1,068 firms and place particular emphasis on the periods of the Asian crisis (1997–1998) and the recent credit crisis (2007–2009). The results show that firms can attain financial flexibility, primarily through conservative leverage policies and less commonly by holding large cash balances. Financial flexibility appears to be an important determinant of investment and performance, mainly during the Asian 1997–1998 crisis. In particular, firms that are financially flexible prior to this crisis (1) have a greater ability to take investment opportunities, (2) rely much less on the availability of internal funds to invest, and (3) perform better than less flexible firms during the crisis. Our analysis covering the credit crisis period of 2007–2009 suggests that some of the advantages of flexible firms towards investing persist but are significantly less pronounced over that period. We also find that the value of financial flexibility is region/country specific, which may be explained by the fact that different regions/countries often adopt different macroeconomic policies and operate in diverse economic/legal environments.     

Financial inclusion,financial inclusion policy and Islamic finance

Using a qualitative analysis, the paper examines the links between financial inclusion and the Islamic financial services industry in Muslim countries. The findings show that, despite growth in the financial sector in many Muslim countries over the past few decades, many individuals and firms are still financially excluded. An analysis of the use of and access to financial services by adults and firms also shows that most Muslim countries lag behind other emerging economies in both respects, with a rate of financial inclusion of only 27%. Cost, distance, documentation, trust, and religious requirements are among the important obstacles. In addition, not surprisingly, the extent of Islamic microfinance is very limited, small by international standards; it accounts for a small proportion of microfinance, about 0.5% of global microfinance, and lacks a cost-efficient service model. This study suggests that Islamic instruments for redistributing income such as awqaf, qard-al-hassan, sadaqa, and zakah, can play a role in bringing more than 40 million people, who are financially excluded for religious reasons, into the formal financial system. The Islamic financial services industry has a long way to go in improving financial inclusion in many Muslim countries due to the scale needed and its relatively weak infrastructure.     

Financial advisors,financial crisis,and shareholder wealth in bank mergers

This study investigates the relationship between the quality of investment banks and shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Focusing on a US sample of 415 targets and 1066 bidders from 1995 to 2010, I find that the quality of financial advisors appears to have a significant impact on shareholder wealth for bidding firms, but not for target firms. The results suggest that bidders experience higher losses when hiring tier-1 advisors. Further analysis shows that this finding holds during ‘normal’ periods, but not during crisis periods, where I find a significant positive relationship between tier-1 advisors and bidder announcement returns, suggesting that more prestigious financial advisors can offer superior advising services.     

Financial crises,unconventional monetary policy exit strategies,and agents׳ expectations

A central bank may purchase assets during a financial crisis and then exit from those purchases. Agents have rational expectations about financial crises as rare events, the probability the central bank purchases assets, and the exit strategy. Selling off assets quickly produces a double-dip recession while slowly unwinding generates a smooth recovery. Expectations about the exit strategy influence the initial effectiveness of purchases. Increasing the probability of purchases during crises distorts the pre-crisis economy and depends upon the exit strategy. The welfare benefits of unconventional policy may differ ex-ante versus ex-post, as can the preferred exit strategy.     

Openness,financial structure,and bank risk: International evidence

Using panel data from a large cross-country sample covering 97 countries over the period 1996–2017, we combine 2SLS procedure with system GMM estimation to study the relationship between openness, financial structure and bank risk. The main contribution of the paper is that we identified a new channel, i.e. the financial structure channel, through which financial openness reduces bank risk. In particular, we find that as financial openness increases, a country's financial system tends to be more market-based, and a more market-based financial system is associated with higher bank market power, better information sharing and more revenue diversification, all of which contribute to the reduction in bank risk. We also find that the effect of inflow restrictions on bank risk is more pronounced than that of outflow restrictions. These results highlight the importance of an appropriate design of a country's opening-up strategy to match the evolution of its financial structure to increase bank stability.     

Financial crises and monetary policy: Evidence from the UK

We analyse UK monetary policy using monthly data for 1992–2010. We have two main findings. First, the Taylor rule breaks down after 2007 as the estimated response to inflation falls markedly and becomes insignificant. Second, policy is best described as a weighted average of a “financial crisis” regime in which policy rates respond strongly to financial stress and a “no-crisis” Taylor rule regime. Our analysis provides a clear explanation for the deep cuts in policy rates beginning in late 2008 and highlights the dilemma faced by policymakers in 2010–11.     

Financial crises and political crises

The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country's stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbating distortions and possibly leading to political crisis; but if lenders are optimistic, the cost of the debt falls and political crises disappear. In such a case, international liquidity packages can select the best equilibrium and rule out political crises at negligible cost.     

Regulation,financial crises,and liberalization traps

This paper examines how financial regulation and institutional quality affect the probability of a banking crisis using a panel of 138 countries over the period 1996–2017. Our key inference is that the probability of a financial crisis fits an inverted U-shaped curve: it rises as regulation stringency moves from low to medium levels and falls from medium to high levels. Countries located in the intermediate level of regulatory stringency face more financial instability than either loosely or severely regulated countries, which are caught in a “liberalization trap” and a “regulation trap,” respectively. Institutional quality interacts significantly with the regulatory environment, implying a trade-off with regulatory stringency.     

Banking crises,financial dependence,and growth

This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. In particular, we investigate the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finance. If banks are the key institutions allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system in which such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Our results do not suggest, however, that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.     

Financial statements based bank risk aggregation

One of the major challenges involved in risk aggregation is the lack of risk data. Recently, researchers have found that mapping financial statements into risk types is a satisfactory way to resolve the problem of data shortage and inconsistency. Nevertheless, ignoring off-balance sheet (OBS) items has so far been regarded as the usual practice in risk aggregation, which may lead to deviations in conclusions. Hence, we improve the financial statements based risk aggregation framework by mapping OBS items into risk types. Based on 487 quarterly financial statements from all 16 listed Chinese commercial banks over the period 2007–2014, we empirically study whether the overall impact of OBS activities and the individual impact of each of the OBS risk types on total risk depend on bank size. Moreover, this research divides the sample into two subsets, during and after the subprime crisis, to find out how the subprime crisis affects risks of Chinese banks. Our empirical results show that although OBS credit risk is positively linked to total risk while OBS operational risk is negatively linked to total risk for both large and small banks, the overall impact of OBS activities on total risk depends on bank size. The overall OBS activities are positively related to the large bank’s total risk while they are negatively related to the small bank’s total risk. Besides, we also found that it is the increase of liquidity risk and market risk that leads to the larger total risk of Chinese banks during the subprime crisis.     

The impact of government ownership on bank risk

We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ownership on bank risk. We distinguish between default risk (likelihood of creditors’ losses) and operating risk (likelihood of negative equity). Our analysis is based on the joint use of issuer ratings, a synthetic measure of a bank’s probability of default, and individual ratings, which omit the influence of any external support and focus on a bank’s operating risk. We report two main results. First, government-owned banks (GOBs) have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking. Second, GOBs’ operating risk and governmental protection tend to increase in election years. These results are consistent with the idea that GOBs pursue political goals and have important policy implications for recently nationalized European banks.     

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used.