Estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games

We use instrumental variables for estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games. The effect is about half as large as suggested by ordinary least squares. Thus, we present evidence that beliefs have a causal effect on contributions, but also that beliefs are endogenous. We compare the causal, belief-based model of contributions to alternative models based on matching the previous contributions of others and responding to one’s deviation from the average in the previous round. The causal, belief-based model performs well, indicating that beliefs have a central role in determining contributions.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public good that avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the aggregate level of public good is determined as a more general social composition function of individual gifts — specifically, as a CES form — rather than as an unweighted sum. We also analyze Hirshleifer's weakest-link and best-shot models. In each case, we characterize the set of equilibria, in some cases establishing existence of a unique equilibrium as well as briefly pointing out some interesting comparative static properties. We also study the weakest-link and best-shot limits of the CES composition function and show how the former can be used for equilibrium selection and the latter to establish that equilibria of some better-shot games are identical to those of the much simpler best-shot game.     

External heterogeneity and its impact on open innovation performance

While current research commonly finds there may be an optimum overall level of search depth commitment at the apex of an inverted U relationship, it says comparatively little about the optimal allocation of search depth between competing search channels. Neither does it explore in depth the qualitative differences in the breadth of different external search channels. Here we conceptually and empirically explore the idea of the intra-search channel allocation problem using the concept of heterogeneity in search depth and breadth. We explore how variations in the distribution of open innovation search depth and breadth influnence innovation performance and in doing so contribute to a more fine grained conceptual understanding of external innovation. We do so an emerging market context, namely China. Our contributions are therefore twofold, involving both conceptual and empirical elements.     

The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply

It is well known that private provision of a public good may lead to a higher supply than that in some Pareto optimal allocation. The traditional view attributes this overprovision anomaly to a specific kind of preferences. The present paper, however, shows that preferences do not play a decisive role. Assuming normality, overprovision will occur only if the distribution of income is extremely skewed and Pareto optimal allocations are not within the set of cost-share equilibria.     

The impact of public and semi-public information on cotton futures market

This study estimated the impact of all major public and semi-public reports on the cotton futures market from 1995 through 2012. The estimation was based on the event study approach with the events measured by the release of five major reports: Export Sales, Crop Progress, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) and Prospective Plantings (public reports from US Department of Agriculture) and Cotton This Month (semi-public report from International Cotton Advisory Committee). The best-fitting IGARCH(1,1)-t model that accounted for the day-of-week, seasonality and stock levels was used to measure the report effects on daily nearby cotton close-to-close futures returns. Prospective Plantings and WASDE reports appeared to be the most important sources of information in the cotton markets moving the conditional standard deviation of returns by an average of 14.4 and 9.6 percentage points, respectively. However, significant market reaction was not found for the other three reports. Our analysis revealed that, in the presence of clustering, ignoring the impact of other reports would have resulted in about 18% overestimation of WASDE impact.     

The impact of public capital on the US private economy: new evidence and analysis

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of public capital on the productivity of the US private sector. Using a production function approach, we estimate the impact of public investment on private capital productivity, specifically addressing the empirical critiques of earlier studies. We find evidence of a cointegrating relationship in a dynamic specification of an empirical model that includes public infrastructure as a factor of production, indicating the existence of a long‐run relationship between the US public capital stock and the productivity of the private capital stock. The results are used to explore how the decline in the growth rate of the public capital stock would have affected the performance of the private sector.     

Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis

One important determinant of voluntary contributions to public goods is the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) formalized this relation in the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) and demonstrated its influence on the provision of linear public goods. This paper develops a parallel concept, in the context of a threshold public good, the Step Return (SR). After providing a meta-analysis of the effect of SR in previous experiments, we compare contributions in threshold public goods games with low, medium and high SRs. Results show that subjects respond to the SR in this setting just as they respond to the MPCR in the linear public goods setting: higher SRs lead to more contributions.     

Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment. The third party’s exaggerated emotion towards free riders is proposed to explain their superior punishment effectiveness.     

The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games

We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously.     

The effect of leadership on performance management, good governance, internal and external satisfaction in study programs

Rapid changes in business environment have increased the needs of graduates who have capabilities of anticipating to the changes. The faculty, especially at the level of study program, has an important role in affecting the quality of graduates, because the study program is the core element in the higher education institution which involves directly in planning, organizing, executing and controlling the teaching and learning activities. This dissertation is to examine the effect of leadership on performance management and good governance, and also to examine the effect of performance management and good governance on internal and external satisfaction. The data for this causal research is collected by questionnaire. Unit of analysis in this research is all study programs in all accredited faculty of economics in East Java. The respondents are academic staffs, students and administrative staffs in the study program. There were 83 of 125 accredited study program which has been successfully contacted and agreed to participate in the research. There were 900 students and 285 academic staffs filling up the questionnaires. The data analysis is conducted by Path Analysis with the SPSS 11.5 version software to measure construct validity and reliability and to test causal relationships between variables in the model. The findings of the research showed that： （1） Leadership affects performance management significantly; （2） Leadership affects good governance significantly; （3） Leadership affects internal satisfaction significantly; （4） Performance management affects internal satisfaction; （5） Good governance significantly affects external satisfaction; （6） Internal satisfaction does not affect external satisfaction. Based on the findings in this research, it is suggested that the study programs take into account the implementation of performance management in order to undertake improvement continuously considering that performance management supports the quality assurance activity. It is also suggested that the faculty implements good governance formally. However, the implementation should empower the study program to undertake the improvement.     

财政学教学改革探讨

财政学作为一门专业基础课,其基本理论和分析方法对我国建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制具有重要的意义,一直以来都是教育部确定的高等学校经济类专业的核心课程。因此,精通教学内容、完善教学方法、运用教学技巧,教授学生掌握财政学的理论体系和精髓是财政学教师义不容辞的责任。文章分析了该课程的特色及在目前教学中普遍存在的一些问题,并提出了财政学教学改革的若干建议。     

住房公积金属性研究

住房公积金发展十年来,对我国城镇居民住房保障起了很大的作用,但也存在一些问题。这些问题出现的根本原因在于对住房公积金的基本属性没有进行深入全面的认识。从住房公积金基本属性的研究出发,分析未来住房公积金发展与改革的方向。     

大型公益建设项目全寿命集成管理模式研究

本文将项目管理的三维结构体系和项目环境进行综合研究,结合大型公益建设项目管理系统的内涵和特点,构建大型公益建设项目集成管理的系统模型。在以实现大型公益建设项目整体目标和整个系统最优化的前提下。根据系统工程理论和战略管理理论,形成时间维——项目全寿命周期过程集成、逻辑维——项目管理要素集成、知识维——项目管理知识和技术的三维系统和项目内外环境要素共同形成的大型公益建设项目管理空间结构。并对管理体系的运行机理及支撑条件进行阐述。     

公共项目交易中的治理模式研究

本文在对公共品供给模式分析的基础上探讨了公共项目契约的形成和交易治理模式.非经营性项目由传统的公共部门垄断经营供给模式转化为对其实行代建制,准经营性项目实行公私合作的供给模式,并针对不同的供给模式给出了两种不同的治理模式以解决公共项目契约组织中的代理人问题.     

金融舆情理论国内外研究综述

通过"中国知网"数据库检索发现,截至2014年4月25日,篇名中包含"舆情"的各类文献有5 352篇,其中期刊文献有3 728篇;但是,包含"金融舆情"的各类文献仅有5篇。金融舆情研究的相关理论基础不仅限于舆情或金融舆情领域,与金融舆情研究主题相关的现有研究可以分为三类:第一类是舆情与舆情演化理论研究;第二类是金融舆情相关理论研究;第三类是社会舆论及其对投资市场的影响。     

黑龙江省公共管理学科人才公共服务能力缺失问题与对策

公共服务能力的缺失是当前公共管理学科人才培养中亟待解决的问题。大力加强实践教学和其他实践环节,培养复合型人才,提高学生解决复杂、综合性公共问题的能力和水平,是提升公共管理学科人才公共服务能力的现实选择和必由之路。     

关于公共支出与经济增长的国内外研究综述

公共支出与经济增长的关系一直以来为经济学家们所争论。持公共支出促进经济增长观点认为,政府公共支出在经济增长中发挥着重要作用,因为它为经济发展提供了大量的公共品和其他具有外部效应的公共福利或服务,从而鼓励和便利了私人投资,形成了一个较好的投资环境,促进了经济增长。而持反对意见的认为,公共支出往往是生产率较低的,为融通政府支出而形成的高税收又会对私人部门的消费和投资造成很大的负面影响,因此,必须缩减政府支出,才能保证经济增长。当然也有人持两者根本就没有关系的观点。