Competition and UK Defence Policy

Defence is a 'public good' that economists (until recently) have regarded as necessarily supplied by government. But it can use the market to maximise efficiency and minimise costs. Dr Hartley shows how, and with what results.     

产业政策、产品市场竞争与企业债务融资

关注产业发展和资源配置效率,现实考察特定行业的企业融资效率,不仅需要分析产业政策的冲击,还需重点检验产品市场竞争的影响。选取A股非金融类上市公司2006-2015年数据为研究样本,统计分析我国产业政策对企业债务融资的影响,并结合产品市场竞争分析产业政策影响下银行的信贷资金配置效率。结果表明,相比未受产业政策支持的行业企业,受产业政策支持的行业企业债务水平较高,且产品市场竞争越激烈,这种正向效应越强。研究结论对于产业政策的有效实施和信贷资源的优化配置具有重要启示。     

New Directions in Competition Policy

‘When a man has learnt his lesson very well, it surely can be of little importance where or from whom he learnt it.’ The paper discusses whether universities can continue to be the‘template for the extension and transmission of knowledge.’Technical and social changes are already undermining the universities’previous near-monopoly of delivery of higher education. Alternative delivery methods ought to be considered on their own merits and barriers to entry should be removed. The ideal form of higher education is not necessarily residence combined with traditional teaching and associated research.     

Can We Privatise Competition Policy?

How large a role is there for government in competition policy? Graham Mather, general director of the Institute of Economic Affairs and a part-time member of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, argues the case for loosening the Stock Exchange listing requirements.     

The Case for International Competition Among Economic Policy Makers

How can governments and civil servants be controlled? Professor Roland Vaubel, of the University of Mannheim, explains how competition between nations improves economic policy.     

Competition,regulation and bribery

Bribery of government officials is commonly used to obtain contracts in many foreign countries. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) made it illegal for US firms to pay bribes, even in the absence of regulation on the bribe-taking side of the transaction. Opponents of the law claimed it would put US firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign suppliers who were not subject to the same regulation. This paper models the effects of two types of anti-bribery regulation. In general, regulation of bribe takers reduces the disciplinary effect of competition and is ineffective in deterring bribery unless the penalties exceed the gains. The impact of regulation of bribe payers (i.e. suppliers) depends on whether the law is applicable to all bribe payers, firms' costs and the existence of contract price constraints on the purchasing side of the transaction. The results lead to empirically testable hypotheses about US exports to bribery-prone countries.     

垄断、竞争与经济增长

一个国家经济增长的实质就是垄断的不断形成与竞争逐渐产生的过程。没有垄断,经济增长就缺乏后劲;没有竞争,经济增长就失去了动力。垄断并非十恶不赦,它有其存在的基础,也有它消失的理由;新的垄断需不断问世,旧的垄断要及时退出历史舞台,只有这样,经济的持续增长才能实现。     

基于国防工业市场形成有效竞争的政策思考

竞争是市场经济得以维持和运转不可或缺的重要因素,是改进商品生产最有效的激励机制,没有竞争就没有市场经济。国防工业作为国家的战略产业,引入竞争已成为大势所趋。正是基于国防工业引入竞争的需要及我国国防工业市场的现状,本文研究了政府促成国防工业推行有效竞争应采取的政策     

财务杠杆、投资行为与企业竞争优势——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以我国2001～2005年度工业类307家上市公司的面板数据为基础,运用因子分析和数据包络分析方法构建企业竞争优势变量,对财务杠杆、固定资产投资、无形资产投资与企业竞争优势之间的关系进行实证分析.结果表明,上市公司的财务杠杆与企业竞争优势显著负相关,固定资产投资与企业竞争优势显著正相关;但与低杠杆企业相比,扩大固定资产投资对于增强高负债企业竞争优势的作用更不明显.     

Multimarket Competition,Mobility Barriers,and Firm Performance

This study develops and tests a theoretical framework which suggests interactive dynamics, with strong performance implications, between the height of mobility barriers surrounding strategic groups and the extent of within‐group multimarket competition. Empirical analysis drawn from a longitudinal sample of pharmaceutical firms indicates that within‐group multimarket competition has strong positive effect on firm performance for strategic groups surrounded by high mobility barriers. As we move lower on the mobility barriers hierarchy, this effect decreases, becoming non‐significant for groups surrounded by moderate mobility barriers and negative for groups surrounded by low mobility barriers. These findings highlight the conditions under which mobility barriers and multimarket competition have significant performance implications. In addition, our results suggest that mobility barriers and multimarket competition are not substitutive but complementary devices promoting mutual coordination within strategic groups. Finally, our findings point to the need to consider multimarket contacts as an aggregate property of strategic groups.     

Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence

We survey recent empirical evidence on monetary policy rules, and find that the emphasis in the political economy literature on institutional design (e.g. central bank independence and inflation targeting) is exaggerated. Formal institutional reform seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the observation of shifts in monetary policy rules. However, there is no doubt that in some cases (e.g. the UK following the start of inflation targeting in 1992, and Bank of England Independence in 1997), a major shift in monetary policy conduct is detectable. We also highlight the problems in explicitly testing the predictions of the political economy literature. Semi-structural modelling approaches, such as time-varying VAR models may be more useful in understanding policy rules, and the interaction between policy shifts and changes in the transmission mechanism.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

连接外部性、横向联盟和市场竞争

分析了横向关系的双寡头企业具有连接外部性条件下的联盟决策,得出结论,横向企业的联盟降低了企业自身的成本,同时也降低了竞争对手的成本,具有正的连接外部性。企业先决定是否联盟,然后在市场上进行竞争;证实了市场竞争比较缓和时,横向企业联盟;市场竞争比较激烈时,横向企业不联盟。当存在产品差异化时,结论仍然不变;比较了企业联盟决策和社会计划者决策,论证得出市场竞争比较缓和时,企业和社会计划者联盟决策一致;市场竞争比较激烈时,企业联盟决策背离社会计划者的决策。     

研发投入、市场竞争与品牌价值

本文以2013—2017年世界品牌实验室发布的《中国500最具价值品牌》排行榜中我国沪深两市A股上市企业为样本,对研发投入与品牌价值的关系及市场竞争对两者的调节效应进行实证研究。结果表明:研发投入能够正向促进品牌价值的提升,且企业所处行业的市场竞争越激烈,这种正向促进作用越明显。     

住房保障制度国际比较、借鉴及中国政策优化

各个国家都依现实情况建立了住房保障制度,并呈现出不同的特征.论文对典型国家住房保障制度进行比较研究,通过对这些国家住房保障经验进行总结,结合我国的发展实际,以进一步完善我国住房保障制度.通过研究得出,中国应选择能在自由市场与国家干预之间达成平衡,介于自由市场和政府干预的“中间道路”住房保障模式,进而提出有助于完善中国住房保障制度的政策优化.     

转移成本、网络兼容与商业银行竞争

本文借助理论模型和经验研究,探讨了客户转移成本和自动柜员机网络兼容性两个问题。研究表明：存款客户转移成本随银行规模增大而提高,贷款客户转移成本随银行规模增大而降低;单向兼容情况下,某家自动柜员机网络单向开放导致自身利润下降。     

财政政策、货币政策和产业政策对宏观经济作用的实证分析

财政政策、货币政策与产业政策三大政策并用,是我国推动经济发展的重要特征之一。2008年以来,中国政府为应对金融危机,实施了一系列宏观调控措施以稳定经济增长与治理通货膨胀。对财政政策、货币政策和产业政策这三大宏观调控政策对经济增长与通货膨胀的作用进行实证分析,得出结论并在此基础上提出政策建议。