Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.     

What Makes a Stock Risky? Evidence from Sell‐Side Analysts' Risk Ratings

We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross‐sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book‐to‐market, and leverage. In addition, earnings‐based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross‐sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

A SPECIALIST'S QUOTED DEPTH AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE VARIABLE: AN APPLICATION TO SPREAD DECOMPOSITION MODELS

Although there is a sizable literature demonstrating that liquidity and transaction costs are multidimensional, researchers continue to estimate adverse‐selection costs using only prices. We present a model of a profit‐maximizing specialist who posts prices and depths. The model is simulated to measure changes in the adverse‐selection component of the spread that result under different levels of informed trading. We find that spread decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse‐selection risk when specialists choose depth. We recommend that researchers use adverse‐selection measures that account for depth as well as spread to mitigate this problem.     

Redacted Disclosure

In this paper we investigate a firm's decision to redact proprietary information from its material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants a firm's request to withhold information from investors in its material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread, reductions in market depth, and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the competitiveness of the firm's industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long‐term debt and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or experience losses.     

Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and subjectivity

This paper examines the impact of performance measure diversity and the use of subjective performance measures on performance evaluation bias. The empirical results indicate that both performance measure diversity and subjectivity are positively related to performance evaluation bias. More specifically, I find that the use of multiple objective performance measures and the use of subjective performance measures are related to more compressed performance ratings and more lenient performance ratings, which could result in problems in personnel decisions and future incentives.     

Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics

This article investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.     

Genetics,Alzheimer’s Disease,and Long-Term Care Insurance

Abstract

This paper applies a model of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) developed by Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) to the question of the potential for adverse selection in long-term care (LTC) insurance introduced by the existence of DNA tests for variants of the ApoE gene, the ε4 allele of which is known to predispose one to earlier onset of AD. It computes the expected present values (EPVs) of model LTC benefits with respect to AD for each of five ApoE genotypes, weighted average EPVs with and without adverse selection, and sample underwriting ratings. The paper concludes that adverse selection could increase costs significantly in a small LTC insurance market only if current population genetic risk is not much smaller than that observed in case-based studies, and if carriers of the ε4 allele are very much more likely to buy LTC insurance. Finally, the paper considers the cost of a combined retirement package, providing both pension and LTC insurance, and shows that it can reduce adverse selection.     

Morningstar ratings and future performance

Morningstar is one of the major ratings suppliers of Australian managed funds. Ratings are a convenient information source for investors. Over time the ratings methodology used by Morningstar in Australia has become more like its North American counterpart. However, Morningstar Australia uniquely retains a commitment to a qualitative dimension to their research. This paper explores the relationship between Morningstar, qualitative and quantitative ratings and future fund product performance. Results do not support predictive power in the ratings, in the relatively short periods available for analysis, using a range of commonly used performance measures.     

Take it with a pinch of salt—ESG rating of stocks and stock indices

This paper investigates the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings of 20 leading stock exchange indices by analyzing and aggregating ratings of underlying stocks. ESG ratings are increasingly important inputs to sustainable investments in the European Union and United States with the phasing-in disclosure regulations. We find that ratings from two different rating providers (Sustainalytics and Refinitiv) for the same listed stocks are only weakly correlated, even if the scaling differences of the ratings are adjusted. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to estimate how the choice of major ESG rating inputs (i) aggregation formula, (ii) weighting scheme and (iii) data provider influence the uncertainty of ratings and thus indirectly the sustainable investment process. The simulations reveal that the uncertainty is primarily related to choice of the ESG rating provider. We found that the popular best-in-class portfolio selection could be built on ESG scores. In lower segments of the ESG asset universe, investment selection becomes more challenging due to the increasing uncertainty of ratings. Finally, the paper shows that exchanges in the European Union provide relatively good ESG investment opportunities in international comparison.     

Differences of opinion and selection bias in the credit rating industry

Many regulations use private sector credit ratings to determine investment prohibitions and capital requirements for institutional portfolio investments. These regulations implicitly assume that different agencies have equivalent rating scales, despite the fact that some agencies assign systematically higher ratings than others. We assess the appropriateness of these regulatory practices by testing whether observed rating differences reflect different rating scales or simply result from sample selection bias. Our analysis reveals only limited evidence of selection bias. We also ask what types of firms of firms are most likely to seek ratings from the agencies with higher rating scales. Our analysis uncovers no evidence that firms seek ratings from these agencies to clear specific regulatory hurdles or to reduce ex ante uncertainty about default risk.     

深市买卖价差逆向选择成分的估算与分析

本文以深市150家上市公司为样本，估算买卖价差逆向选择成分，研究逆向选择成分与公司特征之间的关系，并探讨其日内变化模式。研究发现信息不对称对深市买卖价差的贡献度为39％。公司规模越大，其股票的逆向选择成分越小；逆向选择成分随着交易量水平的上升而降低；高价股的逆向选择成分比低价股低。总体而言，逆向选择成分在早市呈现“倒U”型，在午市呈现“L”型。逆向选择成分与公司特征之问的关系及逆向选择成分的日内变动模式的实证分析结果，符合信息不对称与公司特征之问的逻辑关系及信息不对称的日内变动模式。     

Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings

This paper examines whether credit ratings convey information about the firm’s future earnings to the capital markets. Using the future earnings response coefficient methodology, we find that the current stock returns of rated firms reflect more future earnings than do the stock returns of non-rated firms. We also find that the market reflect more future earnings in current returns for higher-rated firms. In addition, we present evidence that returns impound future earnings to a greater extent after a ratings initiation or upgrade. We empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by earnings smoothing, market liquidity or omitted default risk factors associated with ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for potential omitted variables, endogeneity bias, loss versus profit firms, and serial correlation of error terms. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit ratings help disseminate private information to reduce information uncertainty about the firm’s future profitability among market participants.     

Credit Rationing,Income Exaggeration,and Adverse Selection in the Mortgage Market

We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low‐doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self‐employed borrowers.     

Modeling and Management of Nonlinear Dependencies–Copulas in Dynamic Financial Analysis

We study the influence of nonlinear dependencies on a non-life insurer's risk and return profile. To achieve this, we integrate several copula models in a dynamic financial analysis framework and conduct numerical tests. We also test risk management strategies in response to adverse outcomes. Nonlinear dependencies have a crucial influence on the insurer's risk profile that can hardly be affected by the analyzed management strategies. We find large differences in risk assessment for the ruin probability and for the expected policyholder deficit. This has important implications for insurers, regulators, and rating agencies that use these measures as a foundation for internal risk models, capital standards, and ratings.     

Corporate Governance Ratings and Firm Performance

We examine the corporate governance ratings provided by three premier US rating agencies and find that summary scores are generally poor predictors of primary and secondary measures of future firm performance. However, some component sub-ratings that focus on the eight key dimensions of dynamic governance structures provide more positive and reliable evidence of their information content in predicting the multiple dimensions of firm performance. These results reflect the recent observations by academic researchers and money managers that it is extremely difficult to distill all of the complex governance mechanisms into a single integrated, yet informative overall score.     

Adverse Selection and the Required Return

An important feature of financial markets is that securitiesare traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors.We study how current and future adverse selection affect therequired return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated byadverse selection is not a cost, on average, for agents whotrade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly influencethe required return. Adverse selection contributes to trading-decisiondistortions, however, implying allocation costs, which affectthe required return. We explicitly derive the effect of adverseselection on required returns, and show how our result differsfrom models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an exogenouscost.     

Contracting costs and the window of opportunity for straight debt issues

We analyze whether fluctuation in economy-wide factors cause time-series variation in the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress for a sample of straight debt issues. We find that the announcement period abnormal returns to debt issues are more negative in periods of higher interest rates and in industry downturns. When we partition the impact of each issue- and firm-specific measure of contracting costs across high and low levels of each economy-wide variable, we find that only the measures of agency cost are significant in general, and measures of financial distress become relevant for those debt issues that constitute a leverage increase for the firms.     

Adverse selection and the presence of informed trading

We combine two concepts of informed trading – contrarian trades and stealth trading – to develop proxies for the probability of informed trading. These proxies are used to test the link between informed trading and adverse selection as measured by bid–ask spreads and stock illiquidity. The estimation results show that these proxies, which are based on the probability of contrarian trading (PC) and progressively refined thereon, are all highly significantly positive in various empirical specifications of the cross-sectional determinants of spreads and illiquidity across stocks, and after controlling for important firm characteristics and trading factors. The robustness of our PC-based proxies for informed trading in these analyses, especially for the further refined measures, suggests that they successfully capture the adverse selection component of bid–ask spreads and illiquidity due to information asymmetry.     

Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs): modeling and risk analysis

Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs) are structured credit derivatives that generate high coupon payments by dynamically leveraging a position in an underlying portfolio of investment-grade index default swaps. CPDO coupons and principal notes received high initial credit ratings from the major rating agencies, based on complex models for the joint transition of ratings and spreads for all names in the underlying portfolio. We propose a parsimonious model for analysing the performance of CPDO strategies using a top-down approach that captures the essential risk factors of the CPDO. Our approach allows us to compute default probabilities, loss distributions and other tail risk measures for the CPDO strategy and analyse the dependence of these risk measures on various parameters describing the risk factors. We find that the probability of the CPDO defaulting on its coupon payments can be made arbitrarily small—and thus the credit rating arbitrarily high—by increasing leverage, but the ratings obtained strongly depend on assumptions on the credit environment (high spread or low spread). More importantly, CPDO loss distributions are found to exhibit a wide range of tail risk measures inside a given rating category, suggesting that credit ratings are insufficient performance indicators for such complex leveraged strategies. A worst-case scenario analysis indicates that CPDO strategies have a high exposure to persistent spread-widening scenarios and that CPDO ratings are shown to be quite unstable during the lifetime of the strategy.