Competition and diversification in public and private higher education

The development of mass higher education and growing competition between higher education institutions has given increasing visibility to the issue of diversification. This article analyses the issue of programme diversification, using a panel of 181 Portuguese higher education institutions over the period 1995 to 2007, by comparing the behaviour of public and private institutions. The results show that the legal status of institutions is the major determinant of programme diversification, as private institutions are far more specialized than their public counterparts. The study also evaluates the role of other institutional variables, such as the institution’s size, age, location, institutional mission and research intensity, to explain differences in the diversification behaviour of higher education institutions. The results provide important insights, as competition has been thought to improve the performance of higher education institutions.     

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.     

When do better schools raise housing prices? Evidence from Paris public and private schools

In this paper, we investigate how housing prices react to the quality of education offered by neighboring public and private schools. The organization of secondary schooling in the city of Paris, which combines residence-based assignment to public schools with a well-developed and almost entirely publicly funded private school system, offers a valuable empirical context for analyzing how private schools affect the capitalization of public school performance in housing prices. Using comprehensive data on both schools and real estate transactions over the period 1997–2004, we develop a matching framework to carefully compare sales across school attendance boundaries. We find that a standard deviation increase in public school performance raises housing prices by 1.4 to 2.4%. Moreover, we show that the capitalization of public school performance in the price of real estate shrinks as the availability of private schools increases in the neighborhood. Our results confirm the predictions of general equilibrium models of school choice that private schools, by providing an advantageous outside option to parents, tend to mitigate the impact of public school performance on housing prices.     

R&D competition between public and private sectors

We investigate a mixed market where a welfare-maximizing public research institute competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We investigate R&D competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure. We find that the innovation size (R&D expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from the viewpoint of social welfare, respectively, and so the government should control the public institute appropriately. We also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes.     

Long-run relations between private and public sector wages in Sweden

Using a maximum likelihood cointegration approach we find two long-run relationships between central government, local government, and private sector wages in Sweden. This means that there is one common trend for the three sectoral wages. Private sector wages are weakly exogenous for the estimation of the long-run relationships. This suggests that the private sector is the wage leader. Testing linear restrictions on the estimated cointegrating space, we reject stationarity for the three relative wages using likelihood ratio-tests. The hypotheses of homogeneity for the two cointegrating vectors, i.e., that wages do not diverge in the long run, is also rejected.     

On the interaction between public and private capital in economic growth

This paper introduces two forms of interaction between private and public capital in an endogenous growth model in which productive government expenditure takes the form of a stock-variable and public capital is used in part as an input in the production of final output and in part to increase its own supply. While the first form of interaction involves the stocks of the two capital-goods and takes place within the final output sector through the specification of the aggregate production function (Cobb?CDouglas vs. CES), the second one concerns the rates of investment in the two kinds of capital. The share of productive public expenditure devoted to output production can be either exogenous or endogenous. Our results suggest that when this share is exogenous, along the balanced growth path the optimal growth rate of the economy is a positive function of the degree of complementarity between the two forms of investment. When the share of productive public expenditure devoted to output production is endogenous, the public capital share in GDP becomes, along with the model??s preference parameters, an important determinant of the economy??s long run growth. We also find that the optimal growth rate is an increasing function of the elasticity of substitution between public and private capital inputs in goods production, and is independent of the complementarity/substitutability between the two forms of investment.     

The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey–Boiteux pricing versus bundling

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey–Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.     

Empirical studies on the relationship between public and private investment and GDP growth

This study performs empirical studies on the interaction between public and private investment and GDP growth for Japan and the USA. Since the data for each country used show features that are quite different from each other, empirical methods of GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) and OLS (Ordinary Least squares) are accordingly applied to Japan and the USA, respectively. The empirical results suggest that both public and private investment make great contributions to Japanese economic growth, while the US private investment seems to play a much more significant role than public investment.     

The nexus between public sector corruption and private sector efficiency: Evidence from worldwide firm-level data

Anti-corruption is highlighted as one of the key institutional principles by the United Nations, as corruption hinders the progress in achieving sustainable development goals. However, the extant literature on how private firms' efficiency is influenced by corruption prevailing in regulatory agencies across economies has been inconclusive. Analyzing the World Bank Enterprise Survey data across 45,121 firms from 80 countries, this study finds that bribe payments to corrupt public officials by firms causes bureaucratic delays. Employing an instrumental variable Tobit framework to address the issue of endogeneity inherited with observational data, this study demonstrates that an increase in the magnitude of bribes and depth of corruption by one percentage point separately expands the firm managers' time being spent on regulatory requirements by 2.78 percentage points and 2.47 percentage points, respectively. The findings are robust to different specifications. The results imply the importance of promoting anti-corruption measures across countries to create a conducive environment for firms to enhance efficiency, and thereby to achieve sustainable development goals successfully.     

Competition and petrol pricing in the smartphone era: Evidence from Singapore

This paper examines how pre-tax petrol and diesel prices in Singapore respond to changes in crude oil prices using an asymmetric error correction model. We pay particular attention to the effect increased use of smartphones may have had in altering the pattern of price adjustment as consumers become more informed about fuel prices and as search costs decline. The results suggest that increases in the use of smartphones and tablets have increased the estimated short-term response rate but only for the adjustment of retail prices to decreases in crude oil prices. We find no evidence of a smartphone effect for wholesale prices indicative of the different roles played by consumers in competition.     

Competition and market power in physician private practices

This article presents a theoretical and empirical model to examine competition in physician private practices implementing a conjectural variation framework. Our study uses the 1998 American Medical Association Physician Socioeconomic Monitoring Survey and tests for collusion and market power in physician private practices. The year 1998 is of particular interest due to charges filed in Federal court by The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) against a number of large physician practices, ruling that physicians could no longer engage in joint negotiations. The indictments by the DOJ were based on anecdotal economic and legal observations rather than the result of empirical evidence from accepted econometric modeling. Our model indicates that the behavior of physicians in medical subspecialties and surgical subspecialties is consistent with a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.     

Understanding the gender wage-gap differential between the public and private sectors in Italy: A quantile approach

This paper analyzes the gender-based wage gaps across the wage distribution in the private and public sectors in Italy for the years 2005–2010. We use quantile regression methods to estimate and decompose the wage gap at all wage levels and propose a two-step procedure that relies on a novel approach to estimating fixed effects quantile regressions. The method's main advantage is that it allows the employment sector's marginal effect on wages at various points of the distribution to be estimated, while accounting for both observable and time-invariant unobservable factors. The new method stresses important differences with respect to standard decomposition analyses and amplifies the differences in the two sectors' wage-setting mechanisms. When the estimation is net of individual heterogeneity, the gender-based wage gap decreases in both sectors and there is evidence of a glass ceiling effect, but only in the public sector. Economic grounds are provided.     

Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

Abstract.  This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without 'unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with 'after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.     

Social network and private provision of public goods

Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agent’s utility has two terms: (a) ‘ego’-utility derived from the agent’s consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of the public good. We also find that, in networks with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social network play an important role inducing an agent’s contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.     

Government reactions to private substitutes for public goods: Remittances and the crowding-out of public finance

Migrant remittances have been praised as an important source of capital for development. However, one aspect that has been relatively neglected so far is: How do governments respond to the inflow of remittances? This research claims that remittances crowd out public finance, because governments enjoy higher approval rates in the presence of remittances without the need to buy electoral support and face lower pressure for increasing public spending when private substitutes exist. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis is provided from subnational public finances in Mexico, using exogenous variation in migrants’ exposure to U.S. labor market conditions as an instrument for remittances. The panel analysis of trends in municipal budgets reveals that state governments responded to the inflow of resources by allocating funds away from municipalities with a stronger presence of remittances. This is true for private remittances as well as for collective remittances, i.e. cases in which migrants and public actors jointly finance public spending via matching grant schemes. The effect is driven by poorer municipalities and is stronger in states governed by the traditional party PRI that has been associated with a long history of clientelistic rule.     

Toward ‘privatization’ of public sector output: decentralized contracting for public and private goods

Public sector goods and services can be produced in the private sector. The challenge is to provide incentives for allocative and technological efficiency. Either of two mechanisms is proposed to accomplish this. To ensure allocative efficiency, the proposed mechanisms require knowledge of the complete schedule of benefits. Alternatively, they can use information available on benefits in an efficient manner. Costs need not be known to authorities. Profit maximization leads to efficient private sector responses to cost changes over time. Either mechanism can be combined with the demand revealing process to circumvent the need for ex ante information on benefits.     

Factor-biased public capital and private capital crowding out

This paper studies the dynamic effects of public investment on private capital accumulation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model of a small open economy with factor-biased public capital. I show that public investment induces rather complex private capital dynamics—falling in the short and in the long run, but potentially increasing along transition—if public capital augments private capital and private inputs are gross complements in production. Whether private investment is crowded in or out during transition critically depends on parameters that are empirically hard to measure, such as the labor supply elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between private inputs—a small increase in the latter from 0.5 to 0.6, for instance, turns a totally negative transitional effect into a predominantly positive one. These results help rationalize the lack of empirical consensus on the relationship between public and private investment.     

The impact of information technology on the relationship between the public and the private realms

This paper is based on the hypothesis that public and private 'space' is becoming blurred and ambiguous and that a series of factors linked to the spread of information technology (IT) could be influencing this phenomenon. Moreover, this paper argues that the demise of the 'public realm' represents a serous threat to democracy flourishing in a pluralistic society. For polic-makers the potential adverse impact of IT on the relationship between public and private space should be of concern. The author believes there needs to be serious evaluation leading to a new set of govermance decisions on the wider social repercussion of IT.