North–South Outsourcing,Immigration, and Skilled Wages: Through the Lens of Incomplete Contracts

The forces of immigration and offshore outsourcing are subject to factors that leave sufficient room for incompleteness in a contract. The authors present a model that allows one to compare the effects of immigration and offshore outsourcing, on skilled wage, when both are subject to contractual incompleteness. They capture the sensitivity of the effect on the skilled wage, of immigration and offshore outsourcing to complementarities between firm‐specific human capital and human capital that is transferable across firms manufacturing intermediate goods. In particular, the authors show that the North–South gap in skilled wages is likely to (i) increase through the forces of immigration when the intermediate goods' technology is super‐modular in the North but sub‐modular in the South and (ii) decrease through the forces of outsourcing when the intermediate goods' technology is sub‐modular in the North but super‐modular in the South.     

基于多目标规划的寿险公司资产负债管理

资产负债管理是保险公司管理的核心内容之一,其所要实现的目标很多,其中某些目标之间是具有矛盾性的。本文针对寿险公司资产负债管理存在的众多冲突目标问题,建立了一个多目标资产负债管理模型,以帮助寿险公司实现资产配置和负债配置的风险最小化目标、利润最大化目标和公司价值最大化目标。算例分析发现,基于多目标规划的资产负债管理模型能够同时实现不同的目标,改善寿险公司的管理效果,而且该模型具有稳定性。     

Selective immigration policy and its impacts on Canada's native‐born population: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper analyzes the effects of skilled immigration on the wage inequality between different education groups and the welfare of the incumbent population. I use a heterogenous agent overlapping generations model with endogenous discrete college education choice and calibrate it to match the features of 1981 Canadian economy. My quantitative analysis suggests that reducing the skilled immigration rate generates a rise in the growth rate of the wage inequality between college‐educated and non‐college workers. As skilled immigrants are admitted at a lower rate, more natives opt for college education in the economy. My welfare analysis shows that the incumbent young and college‐educated population benefits more from a reduction in the skilled immigration rate. On the other hand, young generations with below college education face welfare losses. My results suggest that skilled immigration contributes positively to the overall welfare in the economy.     

Intermediate good sourcing,wages and inequality: From theory to evidence

This paper examines the consequences of offshoring and outsourcing on domestic wages and wage inequality. I highlight the role of labor market frictions in impacting firms’ outsourcing and offshoring decisions; specifically, how differential costs of matching with workers affect the location of production (onshore or offshore) and how differential costs of assessing worker quality affect the ownership of intermediate production (intra‐firm or inter‐firm). I demonstrate how firm sourcing decisions can depend crucially on the industry skill intensity, which reflects the importance of worker–firm match quality, and as a result, the effect of offshoring on domestic labor depends on occupation and industry characteristics, as well as the ownership regime of trade. Bringing the theory to the data I rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of inter‐ and intra‐firm offshoring to identify the effects of a change in each type of offshoring on domestic wages. I find strong evidence that the effect of offshoring on domestic wages—both on the average and on the wage distribution—is governed by the type of offshoring (inter‐ vs. intra‐firm), the skill intensity of the industry, and the offshorability of the occupation.     

Profit Sharing and Outsourcing under Labor Market Imperfection

When the wage rate is set by the labor union, profit sharing and outsourcing is combined in this paper to analyze how the implementation of profit sharing affects individual effort and wage and thus outsourcing. The findings show that profit sharing and wage have an individual effort‐augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. It is also found that the wage effect of profit sharing in general is ambiguous. There is a wage decreasing substitution effect, but in contrast, there is a wage increasing effect via labor demand elasticity and effort so that outsourcing and employment effects are also ambiguous. Furthermore, it is shown under which condition a firm will implement a profit sharing scheme.     

Migration and imperfect labor markets: Theory and cross-country evidence from Denmark,Germany and the UK

We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark.     

International outsourcing when labour markets are unionized

Abstract. We consider the implications of international outsourcing in a simple general equilibrium model where the wage rate is the outcome of negotiations between a firm and a trade union. The effects of potential, but non‐realized, international outsourcing, is a reduction in the wage rate and an increase in employment. Aggregate welfare increases, but the trade union becomes worse off while owners of capital become better off. Realized international outsourcing gives rise to an increase in the wage rate and a reduction in employment. Aggregate welfare decreases, but the trade union becomes better off, while owners of capital become worse off.     

International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage Inequality

This paper analyzes the impact of international outsourcing on UK wage inequality during the 1990s by applying the mandated wage approach proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999 ). The methodology is extended in order to obtain additional insight into the relative importance of the factor and sector bias of international outsourcing and technological change. The results indicate that technological change is the predominant force behind the increase in wage inequality, but international outsourcing also contributed significantly. In explaining the increase in wage inequality the factor bias of technological change was slightly larger than its sector bias, while for international outsourcing the sector bias was much more important. The relative importance of the two effects hinges crucially on the estimated rate of productivity passthrough.     

International outsourcing,wage gap,and welfare

Comparing to other OECD countries, “the Japanese economy appears to not yet be fully taking advantage of international outsourcing” (Tomiura, 2008). Would the different attitudes toward international outsourcing strategy make a difference in the welfare of the economy as a whole? To address this issue, I present a three-country model to argue that a country that is engaged in international outsourcing, ceteris paribus, will have a higher wage rate than the country otherwise. Welfare improves in all countries since the benefits of international outsourcing diffuse abroad. However, the diffusion effect increases with the relative scale of the outsourcer to non-outsourcer.     

Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact of Labor Market Policy Reforms

This paper shows that outsourcing of parts of the workforce in unionized firms leads to wage moderation both in the case of strategic and flexible outsourcing. As long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, this wage‐moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect so that domestic employment increases in unionized firms as outsourcing costs fall. With respect to the impact of labor tax reform changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments affect domestic wage setting in the same way as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant continues to be good for employment. However, except for low outsourcing activities, the impact of these policy measures will become smaller as outsourcing costs fall.     

POLICY EVALUATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OUTSOURCING: GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY

We analyze the effects of outsourcing in the presence of a minimum wage by presenting a general-equilibrium model with an oligopolistic export sector and a competitive import-competing sector. An outsourcing tax is politically popular because it switches jobs to unemployed natives. It is also economically sound because it raises national income. An export subsidy may or may not be justified on welfare grounds. Increased international competition has no effect on the level of outsourcing, but the direction of its effect on unemployment and national income depends on the relative factor intensities of the two sectors.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

International Outsourcing and the Sector Bias: New Empirical Evidence

Considering labor market effects of international outsourcing on more disaggregated industry levels, a sector bias appears showing that low skilled labor receives a wage premium when international outsourcing takes place in low skill‐intensive industries. However, there is no empirical evidence supporting this pattern. Applying a panel data analysis for Germany, this paper provides new empirical evidence for the existence of the sector bias of international outsourcing: significant results confirm the decreasing wage gap if international outsourcing takes place in low skill‐intensive industries. If international outsourcing takes place in high skill‐intensive industries, the wage gap increases.     

International knowledge spillovers and wage inequality in developing countries

In this paper, international knowledge spillovers are incorporated in a horizontal innovation model, designed to explain the observed uncertain effects that openness of trade can have on wage inequality in small developing countries. Openness of trade can produce two different effects: an increase in the relative price of less-skilled labor-intensive products and a wider skill discrepancy due to knowledge spillovers from the more to less developed country. The former triggers a fall in the wage premium, while the latter widens the wage premium gap in a developing country. These two opposing forces explain the observed uncertain effects of openness to trade on wage inequality in developing countries.     

Migration and Wage‐setting: Reassessing the Labor Market Effects of Migration*

In this paper we employ a wage‐setting approach to analyze the labor market effects of immigration into Germany from 1980 to 2004. This enables us to consider labor market rigidities, which are prevalent in Europe. We find that the elasticity of the wage‐setting curve is particularly high for young workers. Moreover, natives and foreigners are imperfect substitutes. The wage and employment effects of immigration depend on the skill structure of the immigrant workforce. Because the foreign labor supply shift has mainly affected the high‐skilled labor market segment, the 4 percent increase of the workforce through immigration has not increased either aggregate or foreign unemployment.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality and offshore outsourcing with asymmetric adjustment costs

We present a model that can capture the effects of offshore outsourcing on the wedge between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers when costs of adjustment are asymmetric. We identify conditions under which offshore outsourcing activities widen the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs. We show how a higher cost of adjustment in the import-competing sector can magnify the offshore outsourcing induced gap between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of the effects of offshore outsourcing, on the skilled–unskilled wage gap, to asymmetries in the costs of adjustment.     

Does Outsourcing Provision Lead to Wage Inequality? New Evidence from Thailand's Establishment‐level Data

The impacts of outsourcing provision—the arrangements whereby a firm carries out production stages for other firms—are examined on wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers using Thailand's establishment‐level data. The estimates based on a translog production function indicate that outsourcing provision augments productivity of both skilled and unskilled labor and contributes positively to wage inequality. The model predicts that a 1% increase in outsourcing provision leads to a rise in wage differentials by nearly 2.5%. The robustness check further reveals that the impacts of services provision on wage inequality are more pronounced than those of materials provision. These results highlight the importance of outsourcing provision as a new explanation of the widening skilled–unskilled wage gap in developing countries which typically emerge as a hub of outsourcing provision.     

Temporary and Permanent Immigration under Unionization

This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

外包与工资差距:基于工业行业数据的实证研究

笔者以Feenstra等人的三要素模型为基础,分析了国际外包影响发达国家及发展中国家熟练劳动力与非熟练劳动力之间工资差距的理论机制,运用我国工业行业面板数据,实证检验了外包对我国工业行业总体及分部门工资差距的影响。结果表明:外包和技术进步对我国工业行业熟练劳动力与非熟练劳动力之间工资差距的扩大均存在明显的正效应,但外包对劳动力资源密集型部门和中等技术部门的影响效应相对更强。