代理问题、投资者保护与公司价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2002～2004年2238家上市公司为样本，按照最终控制人性质，将样本公司分为国有和民营金字塔控制两种主要类别，研究了代理问题在哪些公司较为严重，法律对于投资者保护是否能起到有效的治理作用。研究结果表明，国有和民营上市公司价值并无显著差异；随着政府层级的提升，国有控制公司价值提高；民营金字塔控制公司最终控制人所有权与控制权的分离对公司价值有负向作用；法治水平高的地区，其所属公司价值较高；海外上市提高了民营公司价值，但对国有公司的作用不显著；证券监管机构发挥的作用尚存不足。     

大股东控制、投资者保护与公司治理

本文旨在提供一个对大股东控制下的公司治理实践差异的理论解释。在缺乏有效保护中小股东利益的外部法律,并且存在政府对证券市场发展托市行为的基础上,较低的公司治理绩效和证券市场的表面繁荣可以共存。公司治理模式选择的方向不在于公司股权的分散化,而在于政府改变对证券市场发展的特殊偏好。     

Investor Protection and Governance in the Valuation of Emerging Markets Investments

The combination of ineffective corporate governance at the company level and an uncertain legal and regulatory environment can significantly reduce the prices investors are willing to pay when investing in companies in emerging markets. The authors report the findings of their recent survey that asks investment professionals to compare the value of a hypothetical Australian company with that of its identical counterparts located in five emerging markets: Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Iran. The responding investors said they would value the emerging markets investments at discounts from the value of the Australian company that ranged from a low of 13.5% for its Malaysian counterpart to 51.2% for the Iranian company. Moreover, they indicated they would require costs of equity for these investments that were consistent with even larger valuation discounts. The investors' responses to the survey also suggest that corporate governance is especially important in countries with weaker investor protection. Well‐governed companies located in these countries enjoy significant value premiums that can partly offset the negative effect of the poor institutional environments, which suggests there may be a significant payoff for investors that succeed in improving the governance of the companies they invest in.     

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover

Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that investor  protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, investor protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive investor protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.     

Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure

This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment‐induced biases in expectations. Proxying for sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, we show that during low‐sentiment periods, managers increase forecasts to “walk up” current estimates of future earnings over long horizons. In contrast, during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long‐horizon forecasting activity. Further, while there is an association between sentiment and the biases in analysts' estimates of future earnings, management disclosures vary with sentiment even after controlling for analyst pessimism, indicating that managers attempt to communicate with investors at large, and not just analysts. Our study provides evidence that firms' long‐horizon disclosure choices reflect managers' desire to maintain optimistic earnings valuations.     

Comply or Explain: Investor Protection Through the Italian Corporate Governance Code

Nearly 86% of listed Italian companies now claim to be in formal compliance with the provisions of the Italian Corporate Governance Code, which, like many codes in EU countries, give companies the option to either comply or explain their decision not to do so. But in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the effectiveness of such self‐regulatory corporate governance codes has been subjected to increasing skepticism. In particular, critics wonder whether such governance codes actually encourage the adoption of best practices and promote better governance. This article presents a governance indicator (CoRe) devised by the authors that attempts to assess the actual, or effective, levels of compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance Code in terms of listed companies' procedures for dealing with related party transactions (RPTs). The authors report that the companies' level of effective compliance with regard to RPTs is considerably lower than their publicly reported levels of formal compliance. The authors also report that higher levels of effective compliance tend to be found in companies where (1) minority shareholders have appointed one or more directors; (2) independent directors serve on important committees; and (3) there are significant holdings by institutional investors—particularly foreign investors—who participate in general shareholder meetings.     

标准的投资者保护制度和替代性投资者保护制度：一个概念性分析框架

基于在标准的投资者保护制度和替代性投资者保护制度之间做出的区分,本文提出了一个概念性分析框架,并对国有股权的制度安排在中国股票市场发展中的作用进行了初步的解释。标准的投资者保护制度——市场、法律和管制——固然重要,但是对于转轨国家而言,由于缺乏支撑标准的投资者保护制度运转的制度资源,利用替代性的投资者保护制度对于股票市场的早期发展就是至关重要的。     

Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency

We examine the association between institutional ownership and defined benefit (DB) pension decisions. We find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with pension underfunding, opportunistic increases in the expected rate of return assumption in the presence of underfunding, and significant ownership of the firm's own stock in the DB plan portfolio. Furthermore, these relations are stronger when institutional ownership is concentrated, when institutions are nontransient investors, or when institutions are relatively large. These results suggest that institutional investors are monitoring firm pension decisions, particularly those institutions with stronger monitoring incentives or resources.     

Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection and firm liquidity. We posit that less protective environments lead to wider bid-ask spreads and thinner depths because they fail to minimize information asymmetries. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare liquidity costs across distinct investor protection environments, but still within a common trading mechanism and currency. Our empirical findings verify that firm liquidity is significantly affected by investor protection. Regression and matched-sample results show that Hong Kong-based equities exhibit narrower spreads and thicker depths than their China-based counterparts.     

Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers

This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders' outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition, this does not improve efficiency, as the bid price, and thus bidders' need for funds, increases one‐for‐one with the pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity improves efficiency by making it less likely that more efficient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less efficient but wealthier rivals.     

控股溢价、分类要约与上市公司股东保护

本以《收购办法》颁布以来发生的十起要约收购为研究样本，从理论和实证两个角度进行分析。从理论角度探讨了要约收购出现的机理，即控股溢价在控股权转让中的合理性。依据理论分析，给出了股权分置情况下“控股溢价”的全新解释。对非流通股股东和流通股股东在要约收购中的行为和结果的分析表明，非流通股股东获得较好保护，拥有退出选择权，分享了“控股溢价”；而流通股股东未获任何保护，不能分享“控股溢价”。     

投资者权益保护的若干问题探讨

本文首先阐述了投资者权益保护的十大基本原则，在此基础上分析了投资者利益保护中应妥善处理的几个关系。文中就投资者权益保护的价值问题进行了探讨，结合1990年代以来国外学者对投资者保护进行的大量实证研究，逐一论述了投资者保护对上市公司价值、证券市场发展、金融稳定和经济增长等方面的正面作用。     

投资者情绪、经理激励契约与企业投资

本文基于中国上市公司经理激励契约安排的制度背景,把经理激励契约纳入投资者非理性分析框架,就投资者情绪与经理激励契约如何相互作用影响企业投资进行了理论分析,并进行了实证检验。结果发现,高管持股会诱发高管利用投机的股市进行过度投资,而与股价弱相关的货币薪酬没有这种作用,而且经理薪酬的这种作用因企业实际控制人性质不同而有所差异。本研究表明高管持股在企业投资决策中具有负面的公司治理效应。     

海外投资者保护基金制度及借鉴

保护投资者尤其是保护中小投资者,是证券市场监管的核心内容,也是证券市场健康运行的基础.国际上,证券投资者保护机制已经有30多年的运行经验,很多方面值得我们借鉴.本文从法律框架、组织模式、资金来源、赔偿机制、运作情况等方面,对国际上主要国家和地区的证券投资者保护基金制度进行了比较,并结合我国证券市场特征,对我国证券投资者保护制度的建立和完善提出若干建议.     

机构持股与中小投资者保护

信息不对称是导致中小投资者在资本市场遭受利益损失的重要原因,本文以会计盈余质量作为衡量中小投资者保护水平的指标,以2003-2005年沪、深两市A股为样本,实证检验了中国机构持股对中小投资者保护的影响.结果发现,机构持股降低了会计盈余质量,没有发挥保护中小投资者的利益的作用.上述研究发现,对理解机构持股的经济后果具有重要意义,有助于更加深入地理解机构持股影响中小投资者利益保护的制度条件,也为投资者保护研究提供了一个有益的视角.     

Commercial Real Estate Valuation: Fundamentals Versus Investor Sentiment

This paper investigates the role of fundamentals and investor sentiment in commercial real estate valuation. In real estate markets, heterogeneous properties trade in illiquid, highly segmented and informationally inefficient local markets. Moreover, the inability to short sell private real estate restricts the ability of sophisticated traders to enter the market and eliminate mispricing. These characteristics would seem to render private real estate markets highly susceptible to sentiment-induced mispricing. Using error correction models to carefully model potential lags in the adjustment process, this paper extends previous work on cap rate dynamics by examining the extent to which fundamentals and investor sentiment help to explain the time-series variation in national-level cap rates. We find evidence that investor sentiment impacts pricing, even after controlling for changes in expected rental growth, equity risk premiums, T-bond yields, and lagged adjustments from long run equilibrium.

企业人力资本价值及其评估方法初探(上)

随着知识经济时代的到来和全球一体化趋势的逐步演进,工业时代以来所确立的"资本雇用劳动"观念正在受到"人力资本论"的挑战.对人力资本价值的评估是企业各利益相关者的需求,也是对评估机构和评估师的一个挑战.本文拟通过对人力资本及其相关概念的介绍,从资产评估的角度提出人力资本价值评估的一些方法.     

技术时代的投资者保护

在技术带来的所有变化的包围中，证监会有一件事是根本不会改变的，这就是我们保护投资的献身精神。使市场不断响应投资的需要，是保持我们经济强大的最可靠办法。