Land,Gender, and Food Security

Since 2008, a surge in large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, has been taking place in low- and middle-income countries around the globe. This contribution examines the gendered effects of and responses to these deals, drawing on nine studies, which include conceptual framing essays that bring in debates about human rights, studies that draw on previous waves of land acquisitions globally, and case studies that examine the gendered dimensions of land dispossession and loss of common property. Three key insights emerge: the evolving gender and land tenure literature provides valuable information for understanding the likely effects of land deals; some of the land deal issues transcend gender-equity concerns and relate to broader problems of dispossession and loss of livelihoods; and huge gaps remain in our knowledge of gender and land rights that require urgent attention and systematic integration of gender analysis into mainstream research.     

Piecewise linear exchange equilibrium

It is known that if a pure exchange model in which all consumers have linear utility functions has an equilibrium it has one which is rational in the initial data. Examples show on the other hand that this is no longer true in general if utility functions are merely piecewise linear. In this note we observe that for the case of two traders the rationality result carries over and we sketch a finite procedure for calculating the equilibrium.     

The Asian Crisis,Gender, and the International Financial Architecture

This paper begins with an account of the Asian crisis, its creation and management by international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and the gender impact of their stabilization and structural adjustment programs. Next we consider the new debate on reforming the IMF and the World Bank and restructuring the international financial architecture to prevent crises and manage them more effectively. Finally, we consider the gender ramifications of these changes. Since feminists have been absent from this debate, we examine issues essential to the formation of a gender-conscious international financial structure.     

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 11–130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322–336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent's payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides.     

Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games

Rubinstein and Wolinsky [Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63] show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has a continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria; however, the unique Markov-perfect equilibrium of this model is competitive. By contrast, in the more general case of heterogeneous markets, even the Markov property is not enough to guarantee the perfectly competitive outcome. We define a market game that allows for heterogeneous values on both sides of the market and exhibit a number of examples of (non-competitive) Markov-perfect equilibria, with and without discounting. Unlike the homogeneous case, these equilibria allow for inefficient trades and for trade at non-uniform prices. The non-competitive equilibrium may be unique.     

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.