Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment

To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist.     

Epistemological foundations for the assessment of risks in banking and finance

This article presents the epistemological and conceptual foundations on which current attempts to model crises and assess financial risks are based. It draws a distinction between two research programs, in Lakatos' sense: on the one hand, crises understood as structural events within a cycle; on the other hand, crises seen as statistical tail events. The methodological, theoretical and practical consequences of such a dichotomy are exposed. A crucial difference lies in the assumptions about change in the causal processes generating economic outcomes, especially asset returns. Furthermore, this article insists on providing conceptual definitions of key terms that have distinct meanings within the two research programs.     

Equilibrium in a reinsurance market with short sale constraints

Summary. This paper deals with the existence of equilibrium in a dynamic reinsurance market with short sale constraints, driven by a marked point process, as studied in Bernis and Jouini (2001). We use the set of reinsurance treaties as consumption set, which is the positive orthant of some Banach lattice that can be identified to a space of martingales, . The properness of preferences is a key assumption for us to prove the existence of an equilibrium. We provide a sufficient condition for the preferences to be proper in term of loading factor of the reinsurance premium. Received: June 15, 2000; revised version: May 17, 2001     

Explaining International Differences in Genetically Modified Food Labeling Policies*

Many countries have adopted labeling policies for genetically modified (GM) food, and the regulations vary considerably across countries. We evaluate the importance of political‐economic factors implicit in the choice of GM food labeling regulations. Using an analytical model, we show that production and trade‐related interests play a prominent role in labeling decision‐making. This conclusion is validated by an empirical analysis of GM food labeling policy choices. We find that countries producing GM crops are more likely to have less stringent labeling policies. Food and feed exporters to the European Union (EU) and Japan are more likely to have adopted stricter labeling policies. Labeling regulations in Asia and Europe are similar to those of Japan and the EU. Countries with no labeling policies are less developed, with important rural sectors and are more likely to have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.     

Let's Get Messi? Top‐Scorer Productivity in the European Champions League

Getting a player like Lionel Messi in the squad would seem like a dream come true for a professional football manager, but is it always best to have top‐quality players? We study the determinants of top goal‐scorers’ productivity in the UEFA Champions League. We find evidence of a concave relationship between age and productivity and uncover an inverted‐U relationship between performance and minutes played. Finally, we find a positive effect on height, being left footed and being a striker on the probability of scoring a goal. The results have important implications for managers both in looking to sign on new players and to maximise their potential during a competitive match.     

Hotel Attributes and Consumer Satisfaction: A Cross-Country and Cross-Hotel Study

The main purpose of this study was to identify the influence of the consumer’s country of residence on hotel service attributes’ contribution to consumer satisfaction. The hospitality services of Disneyland Paris in Paris, France, were analyzed in the context of the study. Data came from their seven hotels and comprised 47,885 valid questionnaires. The Tetraclasse model was applied to identify hotel attributes’ contribution to satisfaction and compare them for consumer segments from eight European countries and between hotels. Results showed that the four service attributes’ contributions are influenced by country of residence and vary between hotels.     

Evaluación de las prácticas de trabajo decente en las empresas. Análisis de las metodologías de calificación ambiental,social y de gobernanza

Las agencias de calificación ambiental, social y de gobernanza (ASG) han adquirido una función preeminente en el ámbito de la inversión responsable como proveedoras de datos no financieros. La bibliografía anterior sobre la construcción de métricas ASG no esclarece los procedimientos de las agencias para evaluar el trabajo decente. A partir del análisis de seis agencias de calificación, los autores investigan cómo se miden y evalúan los resultados empresariales en la dimensión de trabajo decente, señalando las dificultades conexas. El objetivo es determinar en qué medida la inversión responsable y las calificaciones ASG contribuyen a promover y a mejorar el trabajo decente en las empresas.     

The American frontier: Technology versus immigration

How important was international immigration for the US and its demography during the nineteenth century? This paper investigates, quantitatively, its effect on the westward movement of population and the regional and secular changes in fertility. Beside immigration, two alternative forces are considered: technological progress and the land policy (the Homestead Act). An optimal growth model with endogenous fertility and migration is calibrated, and counterfactual experiments reveal that the main driving forces were productivity growth and the declining cost of transportation. International immigration played a lesser role.     

Money and Information

This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fraction of high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange, but not because it saves information costs.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.