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A theory of bank regulation and management compensation 总被引:14,自引:0,他引:14
We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratiosmay be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead,a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives,in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentivefeatures of top-management compensation. With this scheme, weshow that bank owners choose an optimal management compensationstructure that induces first-best value-maximizing investmentchoices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize theparameters of the optimal management compensation structureand the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presenceof a single or multiple sources of agency problems. 相似文献
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