Rushing to Overpay: Modeling and Measuring the REIT Premium

We explore the questions of why Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) pay more for real estate than non-REIT buyers and by how much. First, we develop a search model where REITs optimally pay more for property because (1) they are willing, due to cost of capital advantages and, (2) they are occasionally rushed, due to external regulatory time constraints and internal incentives to deploy capital quickly. Second, using commercial real estate transactions, we find that the extant hedonic pricing models contain an unobserved explanatory variables bias leading to inflated estimates of the REIT premium. Third, using a repeat-sales methodology that controls for unobserved property characteristics, we derive more plausible estimates of the REIT premium. Consistent with our model, we also find the REIT-buyer premium depends on the size of the REIT advantage, the rush to deploy, and the relative presence of REITs in the market.     

Is the Information Deficiency in Real Estate Evident in Public Market Trading?

This paper examines the summary informativeness of trading in real estate securities. Prior literature on publicly traded real estate securities suggests that the information deficiency associated with local economies and unique rent dynamics will manifest itself as severe information asymmetry. To date, most studies concerned with these issues have focused on the conventional measures of liquidity (serial correlations, bid—ask spreads, etc.). However, the conventional measures have several shortcomings as pure measures of trading information. To address this issue, we use a vector autoregressive methodology pioneered by Hasbrouck. We examine the empirical proposition that information-gathering activities are related to trade informativeness. The evidence is consistent with a theoretical model in which traders are risk-averse and the number of information gatherers is small.     

Capital Distribution Policy and Information Asymmetry: A Real Estate Market Perspective*

This article examines the relation between the distribution of capital to real estate investors and a market-based measure of information asymmetry. Previous research suggests that information asymmetries decrease as capital is distributed to outside investors. However, little attention has been given to those firms for which the marginal benefit of increased distributions may be small. Our analyses are based on a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs), which are popularly characterized as high yield investments due to the regulation of a minimum distribution policy. The extent to which information asymmetry is influenced by these regulations, as well as by the opaque nature of the underlying assets, is an interesting empirical question. The results based on several years of data indicate that the perception of asymmetric information is lower for REITs that distribute more capital to their shareholders. A decomposition of yield into income and return-of-capital components reveals no differential effect in information relevance. The insights drawn from the results may be useful in determining the efficacy of real estate capital distribution policies and regulations.     

A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall

We ask how the ability to recall past prices affects the dynamics of search and price formation. In the model, buyers have limited time to purchase a good and face uncertainty regarding the availability of past price quotes in the future. Sellers cannot observe a potential buyer’s remaining time until deadline nor her quote history, and hence post prices that weigh the probability of sale versus the profit once sold. We find that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, reducing the consumer’s recall ability may actually improve his expected utility because it lowers the average expected price in the market and reduces the duration of search.     

Why Do REIT Prices Change? The Information Content of Barron's “The Ground Floor”

This article examines the information content in a series of market commentaries covering the publicly traded real estate market. The data are constructed from REIT-specific announcements published in a widely disseminated source of market commentary. The empirical methodology is designed to test whether the unexpected price change and unexpected volume are significant on the announcement day. The results demonstrate that the market commentaries provide information that impacts prices and that investors use this information in their trading. Additional analysis suggests that prices change more in the period following the REIT boom than during an earlier period. This result seems somewhat puzzling given recent studies that report an increase in REIT market liquidity.     

Analyzing of the effects of league performance of Turkish sport clubs over the financial performances of the corresponding sport companies

In this study, it is searching for the answer of following question： ＂Does the success of sport clubs affect the financial success of the corresponding sport companies？＂ The accuracy of the ＂In Turkey, the league performances of sport clubs have a direct effect on the company＇s financial success＂ hypothesis is tested. TOPSIS method was used in order to prove the hypothesis. In the research, financial reports of sport companies traded in ISE between years 2005 and 2009 are used.     

Information Producers and Valuation: Evidence from Real Estate Markets

This paper examines valuation and its relation to information production by licensed appraisers across real estate markets. The testable implications are discussed for either a peer monitoring or a crowding out effect in the data. The empirical model is estimated with data for all 50 US states and DC covering the sample period from 1999 to 2008. While analysis is primarily cross-sectional and not causal, the evidence is consistent with theory stating that the minimum quality associated with residential licensure standards may be too low. In contrast, the evidence suggests certified residential standards afford information producers the opportunity to signal or information consumers the ability to screen based on quality.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.     

Commercial Real Estate, Information Production and Market Activity

This paper addresses several issues related to the production of information across commercial real estate markets. The purpose is to determine the extent to which factors of production might complement or substitute for one another. A simple model is presented to illustrate the potential trade-offs between appraisal- and transactions-based information production. A series of empirical tests are performed on a panel data set constructed for 51 markets covering 9 years, 2001 through 2009. The number of commercial appraisers (i.e., certified general appraisers) and the number of commercial property transactions are used as proxies for information production. Overall, the results support the substitution hypothesis. Additional analyses examine a broader definition of appraisal-based information production, as well as the influence of market transparency on the main findings of this paper. Findings based on these additional analyses indicate that the trade-off between appraisal- and transactions-based information production is more pronounced in transparent markets. We conclude that appraisal-based information as a factor of production is, potentially, most critical in markets or conditions where the information environment is incomplete (i.e., transactions are scarce or the information regarding transactions is not public).