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This article analyses the functioning of Italian insolvency laws and practices, in particular their role in the selection and relaunch of viable firms. The article investigates the period between the 1920s and the 1970s, and focuses on joint‐stock companies. Using comparative data on the number of cases, we show that in Italy firms mainly used the procedure called fallimento (bankruptcy), consisting of the collection and subsequent liquidation of assets. Other procedures, such as deals with creditors or forms of receivership, able to give companies a further chance, were rarely used. On the basis of archival documents we maintain that this result was due to the strictness and complication of Italian procedures, as well as to their inability to select viable companies. The article also investigates the relation between the features of insolvency law and the nature of the Italian industrial system, specifically the peculiar small size and rapid turnover of joint‐stock companies. We suggest that the pro‐liquidation character of the insolvency law might have been one of the causes of the peculiarity of Italian industrial capitalism, even if the opposite direction of causality cannot be excluded. 相似文献
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PAOLO ANGELINI ANDREA NOBILI CRISTINA PICILLO 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2011,43(5):923-958
After the onset of the financial crisis, spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile. First, we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate—rather than bank‐specific—factors, notably risk aversion, and accounting practices; by contrast, funding liquidity, capital shortage, and central bank interventions were not important determinants. Second, prior to August 2007, the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics, whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness. Third, conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis, suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the “too‐big‐to‐fail” argument have increased. These results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis. 相似文献
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Correlation Risk and Optimal Portfolio Choice 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We develop a new framework for multivariate intertemporal portfolio choice that allows us to derive optimal portfolio implications for economies in which the degree of correlation across industries, countries, or asset classes is stochastic. Optimal portfolios include distinct hedging components against both stochastic volatility and correlation risk. We find that the hedging demand is typically larger than in univariate models, and it includes an economically significant covariance hedging component, which tends to increase with the persistence of variance–covariance shocks, the strength of leverage effects, the dimension of the investment opportunity set, and the presence of portfolio constraints. 相似文献
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In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are “ambiguity complements.” Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to “hedge” the candidates' ambiguity. 相似文献
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KRISTINA BLUWSTEIN MICHAł BRZOZA-BRZEZINA PAOLO GELAIN MARCIN KOLASA 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2020,52(7):1691-1718
We introduce multiperiod mortgage loans, fixed interest rate, a lower bound constraint on newly granted loans, and a possibly slack collateral constraint, in an otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing. Our nonlinear estimation shows that all those features are important to understand the evolution of mortgage debt during the recent U.S. housing market boom and bust. The transmission of monetary policy becomes dependent on the housing cycle, with weaker effects when house prices are high or start falling sharply. Higher average loan duration makes monetary policy less effective, eventually leading to asymmetric responses to positive and negative monetary shocks. 相似文献
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PAOLO ANGELINI STEFANO NERI FABIO PANETTA 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2014,46(6):1073-1112
The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies. 相似文献
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We examine the relationship between market conditions and the adoption of exclusive contracts. In particular, we develop a matching model in which agents may decide to adopt exclusive contracts to reduce bilateral bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information. We show that it is optimal for agents to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets and that for intermediate levels of market thickness strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria. We study the welfare properties of market equilibria and discuss under what circumstances courts should enforce exclusive contracts. 相似文献