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Rainald Borck 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2011,113(1):30-54
This paper analyses the effect of federalism on fertility and growth. In a model with human capital accumulation and endogenous fertility, two regimes of education finance are compared: central and local. I find that local education finance yields higher growth at the price of increased inequality. The effect of federalism on total and differential fertility rates depends on the elasticity of substitution between children and consumption. The paper also empirically examines the relationship between fertility rates and fiscal decentralisation on a panel of OECD countries and finds a weak negative effect of decentralisation on total and differential (poor minus rich) fertility. 相似文献
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We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive goods. We consider two cases. In the first case (called a complex tax system) the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related expenditures should be fully deductible in the first case while deduction rates should be less than 100 percent in the second case. Under further simplifying assumptions, we also show that the simple system can be characterized by higher tax burdens on low income earners and less redistribution. 相似文献
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Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration. 相似文献
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VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Rainald Borck 《Journal of economic surveys》2007,21(1):90-109
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion. 相似文献
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We study a simple model of commuting subsidies with two transport modes. City residents choose where to live and which mode to use. When all land is owned by city residents, one group gains from subsidies what the other loses. With absentee landownership, city residents as a group gain at the expense of landowners. Subsidies toward different modes have different effects, however. For instance, in one case, rich automobile drivers suffer from transit subsidies, while poor transit users may benefit from subsidies to automobiles. 相似文献
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Rainald Borck Dirk Engelmann Wieland Müller Hans-Theo Normann 《Southern economic journal》2002,68(3):672-682
In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of the side of the market on which it is levied. This principle of liability-side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability-side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Thus, we cannot reject liability-side equivalence. 相似文献
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Rainald Borck 《International Tax and Public Finance》2008,15(3):338-352
This paper models voters’ preferences over central versus local education policies when there are private alternatives. Education
is financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are chosen by majority
vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised
education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school finance,
even in the community with good public schools.
相似文献
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We study the political economy of commuting subsidies in a model of a monocentric city with two income classes. Depending on housing demand and transport costs, either the rich or the poor live in the central city and the other group in the suburbs. Commuting subsidies increase the net income of those with long commutes or high transport costs. They also affect land rents and therefore the income of landowners. The paper studies how the locational pattern of the two income classes and the incidence of landownership affects the support for commuting subsidies. 相似文献
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This article studies a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model. Capital can freely move among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated to the region of residence. The activity of the modern sector is associated with positive spillovers. We study subsidy competition, starting from an equilibrium where the industry core is inefficiently locked in to the smaller region. When regions weigh workers’ and capitalists’ welfare equally, subsidy competition results in a relocation of industry to the larger region, restoring an efficient allocation. When workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the smaller (core) region may pay subsidies that are high enough to prevent a relocation of industry. 相似文献
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