Focus, Transparency and Value: The REIT Evidence

We trace the effects of corporate focus by examining the relationships among focus, cash flows and firm value. In contrast to past studies that examine the effects of diversifying across SIC-code-defined industries, we show that diversification, even within a single industry, reduces value. Our evidence, drawn from a panel of real estate investment trusts, indicates that this reduction is not due to poor managerial performance. Project-level cash flows are actually higher for less focused firms. However, these gains are offset by higher management, administrative and interest expenses. Thus, the corporate cash flows available to shareholders are not related to focus. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that links the effect of focus on value to informational asymmetries which cause the equity of diversified firms to be less liquid. We attribute some of the effect of focus on the cost of both debt and equity to informational asymmetries or transparency costs.     

Managerial Style and Firm Value

This study analyzes the effect of managerial style on firm value by partitioning general and administrative (G&A) expenses in the real estate investment trust industry into a nondiscretionary "structural" component associated with the costs of asset and liability management and a discretionary or "style" component. The discretionary component is significantly related to at least one measure of style—specifically, the portfolio focus/diversification of the firm. Gross (project-level) cash flows are invariant to the nondiscretionary or structural component of G&A but are positively related to the style component of G&A. The structural component has a negative impact on share price while the style component has a neutral impact. Therefore, for this industry, creating larger, less-levered firms would result in enhanced value.     

On the anticipation of IPO underpricing: Evidence from equity carve-outs

We investigate IPO market efficiency using a sample of equity carve-outs offered during the period of 1985–2005. Unlike IPOs examined in previous studies where trading during the pre-IPO book-building period does not exist and trading on the IPO date is rationed, in equity carve-outs, investors can trade in the non-rationed market for shares of the parent, which holds a significant fraction of the subsidiary. We find that the subsidiary's initial day return is significantly related to its parent's return over the book-building period, but unrelated to its parent's contemporaneous return. Neither the pre-IPO price revision of the subsidiary nor the return to the parent on the initial trading day can be predicted. While the portion of the subsidiary's initial return unpredictable from information available during the book-building period is significantly related to its parent's contemporaneous return, the predictable component of the initial return is not. We interpret these results as evidence consistent with market efficiency.     

The Value of Liquidity

In this study, we examine the relationship between the liquidity of equity and its market value. We find that creating liquid equity claims on relatively illiquid property assets increases value by 12–22%. However, the fixed costs associated with creating these claims offset these liquidity gains for pools of assets below $100 million. We also estimate that the liquidity of individual properties adds 16% to their value relative to a notional nontradable property asset. Managers can enhance the liquidity of equity and, therefore, the benefits of securitization by increasing size, focus, and institutional ownership.     

Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q ). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general.     

Debt,Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle

This study investigates why externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) underperform their internally managed counterparts. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REITs managed by external advisors underperform internally managed ones by over 7 percent per year. Property-level cash-flow yields are similar between the two managerial forms, but corporate-level expenses and especially interest expenses are responsible for lower levels of cash available to shareholders in externally advised REITs. We document that the higher-interest expenses are due to both higher levels of debt and to higher debt yields for externally advised REITs. We posit that compensating managers based on either assets under management or on property-level cash flows creates incentives for managers to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs are unfavorable.     

Dividend Policy and Cash-Flow Uncertainty

We explore the role of expected cash-flow volatility as a determinant of dividend policy both theoretically and empirically. Our simple one-period model demonstrates that, given the existence of a stock-price penalty associated with dividend cuts, managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when future cash flows are less certain. The empirical results use a sample of REITs from 1985 to 1992 and confirm that payout ratios are lower for firms with higher expected cash-flow volatility as measured by leverage, size and property-level diversification. These results are consistent with information-based explanations of dividend policy but not with agency-cost theories.