How much does household collateral constrain regional risk sharing?

We construct a new data set of consumption and income data for the largest US metropolitan areas, and we show that the extent of risk-sharing between regions varies substantially over time. In times when US housing collateral is scarce nationally, regional consumption is about twice as sensitive to income shocks. We also document higher sensitivity in regions with lower housing collateral. Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this new stylized fact. When the value of housing relative to human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Our model aggregates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively match those in the data.     

From elite capture to marginalization of the poorest: a new social exclusion in anti-poverty programmes in China

Based on a case study of state-directed aid resources in anti-poverty programmes, we detected a new phenomenon of social exclusion in China. In a period of several years, a shift is observed from elite capture to marginalization of the poorest. This phenomenon occurs under the administrative pressure from the authoritarian state and the morbid democratic mechanism. Contemporary structural changes in economic and social culture also make it difficult for marginal people to escape from this predicament. From a social structural transformation point of view, we suggest that the marginalization of the poorest should be seriously taken into consideration in rural development programmes and policies.     

Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies

Competition in the financial sector, as in other sectors, mattersfor allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. Theory suggests,however, that unfettered competition is not necessarily bestgiven the special features of financial services. The authordiscusses these analytical complications before reviewing howto assess competition in the financial sector and its determinants.It is shown that competitiveness varies greatly across countries,in perhaps surprising ways, and that it is not driven by financialsystem concentration. Rather, systems with greater foreign entryand fewer entry and activity restrictions tend to be more competitive,confirming that contestability—the lack of barriers toentry and exit—determines effective competition. The authorthen analyzes how competition policy in the financial sectorhas generally been conducted and how changes in competitionin the financial services industries should affect competitionpolicy going forward. In part based on comparison with otherindustries, the author provides some suggestions on how competitionpolicy in the financial sector could be better approached aswell as what institutional arrangements best fit a modern viewof competition policy in the sector. The specific competitionchallenges for developing countries is also highlighted. Theauthor concludes that practices today fall far short of theneed for better competition policy in the financial sector. JEL codes: G10, G18, G28, L1, L5     

Student Access to Apprenticeships: Evidence from a Vignette Experiment

We identify the causal effects of student characteristics on the likelihood of being hired for an apprenticeship and explore the mechanisms underlying the employer’s decision. To this end, we perform a vignette experiment among human resources professionals in Belgium, focusing on less-qualified youth. Our results indicate that students with favorable educational records and students revealing being motivated are more likely to obtain an apprenticeship. Furthermore, we find that these characteristics are used by human resources professionals as signals of trainability, employability, and quit intentions.     

Standing by Your Organization: The Impact of Organizational Identification and Abusive Supervision on Followers’ Perceived Cohesion and Tendency to Gossip

Abusive supervision has been shown to have significant negative consequences for employees’ well-being, attitudes, and behavior. However, despite the devastating impact, it might well be that employees do not always react negatively toward a leader’s abusive behavior. In the present study, we show that employees’ organizational identification and abusive supervision interact for employees’ perceived cohesion with their work group and their tendency to gossip about their leader. Employees confronted with a highly abusive supervisor had a stronger perceived cohesion and engaged in less gossiping behavior when they identified more strongly with their organization. Our findings illustrate that organizational identification functions as a buffer for those confronted with an abusive supervisor.     

Why are REITS Currently So Expensive?

Over the last several years, the price of listed real estate stocks has been unusually high relative to dividends. I find that neither low interest rates nor low risk premia can account for the high valuation ratios. Lower interest rates have been offset by rising risk premia to keep expected returns close to average. Instead, the market has priced in future income growth on commercial properties far above the growth rates seen in the data. High implied growth rates are less extreme for nontraditional REIT sectors. Income growth expectations are also less extreme for international listed real estate.