The Moderating Effects of Political Skill and Leader–Member Exchange on the Relationship Between Organizational Politics and Affective Commitment

Previous empirical studies have shown that perceptions of organizational politics are negatively related to individuals’ affective commitment. The key contribution of this study was that it found the interactive moderating effects of political skill and quality of leader–member exchange (LMX) on the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and affective commitment. Our results indicated that politics perception affective commitment relationship was weaker when both political skill and quality of LMX are high. When only political skill is high and the quality of LMX is low, or LMX quality is high but political skill is low, the negative relationship between politics perception and affective commitment was not mitigated. Limitations and implications for future research are discussed.     

Examining the success of women of color-owned small and medium-sized enterprises in the United States: A system dynamics perspective

The objective of this study was to unravel the challenges confronting women of color (WoC)-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the United States. This is based on findings that most WoC-owned SMEs fail within the first few years of establishment. The impact of the global financial crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic on WoC-owned SMEs was also explored. System Dynamics (SD) is a computational modeling approach useful for understanding changes in a system over time and is applied in this study to illustrate WoC entrepreneurs' navigation through the startup and maturation of SMEs. The authors calibrated and validated the model with publicly available data. Findings revealed that more emphasis should be placed on failure reduction in the early years of establishment of these businesses. Also, there is the need for early intervention rather than focusing on the improvement of the successful business exit from the system. Results indicated that the creation of new businesses by WoC after the failure of existing businesses produced an increase in the number of failed enterprises. The authors assert that attention must be paid at the individual level through support to the entrepreneur. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing the first known SD model useful in depicting the SME system for WoC entrepreneurs in the US. The model serves as a potentially useful tool for informing effective policy making, education, and programmatic approaches to support the success of WoC entrepreneurs in the US.

     

Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.     

Debt covenants in Japanese loan markets: in comparison with the traditional relationship banking

This study investigates determinants of debt covenants in Japanese loan markets. We focus on a unique monitoring mechanism by Japanese banks and hypothesise that debt covenants substitute for the traditional main bank governance. Consistently, we find that debt covenants are less likely to be used for firms with stronger ties with their main banks. We also document that such use of debt covenants results in borrower’s upward earnings management. Overall, our evidence suggests that, in the Japanese context, debt covenants are used as a substitute for the main bank system yet they alone are an incomplete monitoring mechanism.     

The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction

Experimental Economics - We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects...     

Unnatural selection of outside directors: Consequences of Japanese corporate governance reforms

We examine how Japanese listed companies increase the number of outside directors to comply with corporate governance reforms. We find that, after the reforms, there has been an increase in the number of cases in which former company auditors (kansayaku) become outside directors in the same company. This trend is more pronounced for hitherto noncompliant firms with insufficient outside directors before the reforms. Moreover, the firms appointing company auditors as outside directors tend to change their corporate structures to maintain existing practices and minimize compliance costs. Our findings imply that Japanese reforms have increased the unnatural selection of outside directors.     

Asset bubbles and borrowing constraints

In this paper, we study the existence of asset bubbles in an overlapping generations economy à la Tirole [Tirole, J., 1985. Asset bubbles and overlapping generations. Econometrica 53, 1499–1528] with borrowing constraints. Deriving a condition for the existence of equilibrium paths with bubbles, we demonstrate that (i) a monetary steady state (a steady state with bubbles) is constrained dynamically inefficient, whereas capital in the monetary steady state is underaccumulating relative to the quasi-golden rule, (ii) there exists a government intervention which corrects the constrained dynamic inefficiency, and (iii) for some parameter values, such a government intervention reduces the utilities of agents with high productivity, while it increases per capita consumption.     

Endogenous business cycles in a perpetual youth model with financial market imperfections**

An economy in which entrepreneurs and financiers interact with each other through an imperfect financial market is investigated by applying a dynamic general equilibrium theory. In each period, there is a certain probability of each entrepreneur's life ending, and a certain number of entrepreneurs are newly born. Although entrepreneurs are potential capital producers, they receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock in each period. Therefore, entrepreneurs who draw higher productivity become capital producers and those who draw lower productivity become lenders. Financiers do not have an entrepreneurial talent for capital production, and thus they lend their assets in the financial market to acquire an interest income. In equilibrium, deterministic endogenous business cycles can occur at the intermediate level of financial constraints.     

Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [Jackson, M.O., Palfrey, T.R., Srivastava, S., 1994. Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 6, 474–501]. Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.     

Institutional shareholder services' proxy voting guidelines and ROE management

We examine the impact of the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) proxy voting guidelines on managers' opportunistic reporting behaviours. In February 2015, the ISS introduced a new advisory policy based on firms' return on equity (ROE) and started to issue negative recommendations for top executive election in firms whose past average and most recent ROE are lower than 5%. We find that managers are more likely to achieve the 5% ROE after implementing the policy, and they do so by discretionary activities. Our findings imply that accounting-based guidelines issued by a proxy voting advisor can generate managers' incentives for opportunistic reporting.