Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

Diverse approaches to managing diversity

Against a backdrop of philosophical and political debate, this article reviews the emerging pitfalls of new corporate diversity programs. Three pioneering corporate programs are examined closely, and a discussion of the purpose, the process, and the impact of these programs is offered. Original survey data reported here suggest that exposure to diversity issues affects workplace attitudes. Lessons are drawn that address the role of top leadership, participant mix, instructor quality, and corporate culture.     

The Only Fund in Town? Geographic Segmentation in the US Mutual Fund Industry

We find that mutual funds located in regions with more competing funds charge lower management fees, but higher fees related to sales and distribution (12b‐1 fees), sales loads, and other nonmanagement fee expenses. There is some evidence that funds in more competitive regions have higher total expense ratios than similar funds in less competitive regions. Our results indicate that while increased competition drives down fund profits, it creates a negative externality by way of increased sales expenses. Overall, our results suggest the mutual fund industry is characterized by monopolistic competition determined at the local level.     

Critical competencies and developmental experiences for top HR executives

This article describes the context and methodology used in formulating and validating a senior-level human resource competency model for professional development. The development and implementation of the architecture for the model, including the provision of various developmental tools and experiences, was undertaken by the Society of Human Resource Management, a professional association dedicated to the advancement of the human resource profession. The purpose of this effort is to specify benchmarks for professional competence building and to reposition the emerging role and processes associated with the human resource function in responding to the changing organizational and competitive challenges facing United States-based, multinational organizations. © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Do bookmakers possess superior skills to bettors in predicting outcomes?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that bookmakers display superior skills to bettors in predicting the outcome of sporting events by using matched data from traditional bookmaking and person-to-person exchanges. Employing a conditional logistic regression model on horse racing data from the UK we find that, in high liquidity betting markets, betting exchange odds have more predictive value than the corresponding bookmaker odds. To control for potential spillovers between the two markets, we repeat the analysis for cases where prices diverge significantly. Once again, exchange odds yield more valuable information concerning race outcomes than the bookmaker equivalents.     

University of Texas Roundtable on Financing and Managing Energy Investments in a Low‐Price Environment

During the past 18 months, the U.S. oil industry has seen oil prices plunge from well over $100 a barrel to under $30. In a session that was part of a recent Private Equity Conference at the University of Texas in Austin, the CEO of a small independent producer and a representative of a large global oil and gas company discussed the challenges of financing and operating energy companies in today's low‐price environment with the director of energy research at a brokerage firm, the senior partner responsible for the natural resource investments of a well‐known private equity firm, and the head of the oil and gas restructuring practice of a national law firm. The panelists appeared to reach a consensus on at least the following three arguments:

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Dynamic dissolutions and unifications

I reexamine the key results from the literature on the size and number of countries under different political institutions in a simple dynamic model. I find that the canonical static results that democracies lead to too many too‐small countries and that Leviathans lead to too few too‐large countries no longer necessarily hold. The key dynamic element that drives the new results is that public goods are modeled as public capital; this changes the incentives to unify or divide countries. I also show that there are hysteresis effects on the size and number of countries; that is, arbitrary initial configurations of national boundaries may tend to persist because of the initial public capital location decisions they promote.     

INFORMATION AGGREGATION,GROWTH, AND FRANCHISE EXTENSION WITH APPLICATIONS TO FEMALE ENFRANCHISEMENT AND INEQUALITY

We develop a model of voluntary gradual franchise extension and growth based on the idea that voting is an information aggregation mechanism. A larger number of voters means that more correct decisions are made, hence increasing output, but also implies that any incremental output must be shared among more individuals. These conflicting incentives lead to a dynamic model of franchise extensions that is consistent with several real world episodes, including female enfranchisement. The model also predicts that in certain circumstances growth and enfranchisement will be accompanied by Kuznets curve type behaviour in inequality. Contrary to the preceding literature these conclusions do not rest on incentives for strategic delegation.