The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL NORMS: A MOTIVATION‐BASED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL NORMS

Abstract It is now commonplace to regard social norms as a subject of growing interest in the economic literature (e.g. game theoretical approaches based on ‘other‐regarding’ individual preferences, the analysis of the impact of rewards or punishment on individuals’ behaviour through experimental economics as well as field experiments, the revival of the institutionalist tradition spurred on by the influential work of Douglas North and followed by many others and the growing influence of neuroeconomics). In this paper, we focus on the relationship between incentives and social norms and survey the literature that could constitute the foundations of a motivation‐based economic analysis of social norms. Our main findings are that (1) the interaction between incentives and social norms is far from obvious since taking social norms into account involves the introduction of supplementary motives, in addition to self‐interest, into the economic analytical framework; (2) the analysis of the interaction between incentives and social norms resists an approach exclusively in terms of crowding‐in and ‐out effects because it is sensitive to whether it concerns behaviours driven by honour or by social stigma; (3) as a result, it is difficult to precisely evaluate the policy implication of the interactions between incentives and social norms.     

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen ( 2001 ), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.     

Portfolio optimization under model uncertainty and BSDE games

We consider robust optimal portfolio problems for markets modeled by (possibly non-Markovian) Itô–Lévy processes. Mathematically, the situation can be described as a stochastic differential game, where one of the players (the agent) is trying to find the portfolio that maximizes the utility of her terminal wealth, while the other player (“the market”) is controlling some of the unknown parameters of the market (e.g., the underlying probability measure, representing a model uncertainty problem) and is trying to minimize this maximal utility of the agent. This leads to a worst case scenario control problem for the agent. In the Markovian case, such problems can be studied using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equation, but these methods do not work in the non-Markovian case. We approach the problem by transforming it into a stochastic differential game for backward stochastic differential equations (a BSDE game). Using comparison theorems for BSDEs with jumps we arrive at criteria for the solution of such games in the form of a kind of non-Markovian analogue of the HJBI equation. The results are illustrated by examples.     

On the Complementarity of Equilibrium Exchange‐Rate Approaches

Based on a simple, stock–flow adjustment framework, we show that existing concepts of equilibrium exchange rates can be viewed as realizations of the same model at different time horizons. We then compare fundamental and behavioral estimations of equilibrium exchange rates based on the same, econometric modeling of the net foreign asset position in the long run, for a panel of 15 countries over the 1980–2005 period. These estimations suggest that, although more robust to alternative assumptions, the BEER approach may rely on excessive confidence on past behaviors in terms of portfolio choices. Symmetrically, FEERs may underestimate the plasticity of international capital markets because they focus on the adjustment of the trade balance.     

The Euro as a Monetary Anchor in the CEECs

We study whether Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have an incentive to use the euro as a monetary anchor. Adapting a cross-section estimation method initiated by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, we show that, compared to an optimum currency area standard, the CEECs have paid too much attention to the USD in the past and should prefer the euro to the dollar as a nominal anchor. Through a theoretical model that takes external constraints into account, we then show that the CEECs should also have an incentive to stabilize their currencies in real terms against a basket where the euro would be prominent.     

How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation?

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium.JEL Code: F21, H25, H87     

Fiscal sustainability in the presence of systemic banks: the case of EU countries

We provide a first attempt to include an off-balance sheet, implicit insurance to SIFIs into a consistent assessment of fiscal sustainability, for 27 countries of the European Union. We first calculate tax gaps à la Blanchard (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No 79, 1990) and Blanchard et al. (Revue économique de l’OCDE, 1990). We then introduce two alternative measures of implicit off-balance sheet liabilities related to the risk of a systemic bank crisis. The first one relies on microeconomic data at the bank level. The second one is based on econometric estimations of the probability and the cost of a systemic banking crisis. The former approach provides an upper evaluation of the fiscal cost of systemic banking crises, whereas the latter one provides a lower one. Hence, we believe that the combined use of these two methodologies helps to gauge the range of fiscal risk.     

The impact of market regulations on intra-European real exchange rates

We study the contribution of market regulations to the dynamics of the real exchange rate within the European Union. Based on a model proposed by De Gregorio et al. (Rev Int Econ 2(3):284–305, 1994a), we show that both product market regulations in nontradable sectors and employment protection tend to raise the real exchange rate. We then carry out an econometric estimation for European countries for 1985–2006 to quantify the contributions of the pure Balassa–Samuelson effect and those of market regulations on real exchange-rate variations. Based on this evidence and on a counter-factual experiment, we conclude that the relative evolutions of product market regulations and employment protection across countries play a very significant role for real exchange-rate variations within the European Union and especially within the euro area, through their impacts on the relative price of nontradable goods.