The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.     

Are Venture Capitalists a Catalyst for Innovation?

In this paper we test two hypotheses concerning the presence of innovation in venture capital investments and the growth of innovative venture backed firms. To examine these hypotheses we considered sample of 37 Italian venture backed firms that went public on the Italian Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2004 and by a statistical matching procedure we picked 37 twin firms among the non‐venture backed IPOs for the same period. Our evidence shows that innovation is an important factor during the selection phase but once the investment is made, the company does not promote continued innovation and concentrates all efforts to improve other economic and managerial aspects.     

Delayed IT Usage: Is It Really the Drag on Europe's Productivity?

This paper explores the quantitative plausibility of three candidateexplanations for the European productivity slowdown with respectto the US. The empirical plausibility of the common wisdom onthe topic (the "IT usage" hypothesis) is found to cruciallydepend on how IT-using industries are defined. If a narrow definitionis chosen, the IT usage hypothesis no longer explains the wholeof the EU productivity slowdown but just about 55 percent ofit, with the remaining part to be attributed to other factorsthan IT, as argued in the "IT irrelevance" view. No room isleft for IT-producing industries as another potential vehiclefor the US-EU productivity growth gap, instead. (JEL O4, O47,O52)     

CSR in SMEs: do SMEs matter for the CSR agenda?

In this paper we argue that the collective grandness of small business is often underestimated in CSR research and policy-making. We emphasize the importance of understanding the contexts and the ways in which small- and medium-sized companies engage in CSR and how they differ from multinational companies. We suggest that it might be that researchers and practitioners are asking the wrong questions in their ambitions to prove 'the business case for CSR'. Perhaps we should rather focus on the 'how' and the 'with what impact' questions to understand better the SME engagement in CSR.     

Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?

This paper employs a novel data set on lobbying expenditures to measure the degree of within-sector political organization and to explore the determinants of the mode of lobbying and political organization across U.S. industries. The data show that sectors characterized by a higher degree of competition tend to lobby more together (through a sector-wide trade association), while sectors with higher concentration and more differentiated products lobby more individually. The paper proposes a theoretical model to interpret the empirical evidence. In an oligopolistic market, firms can benefit from an increase in their product-specific protection measure, if they can raise prices and profits. They find it less profitable to do so in a competitive market where attempts to raise prices are more likely to reduce profits. In competitive markets firms are therefore more likely to lobby together, thereby simultaneously raising tariffs on all products in the sector.     

Inside innovation persistence: New evidence from Italian micro-data

This paper contributes the analysis of the persistence of innovation activities, as measured by different innovation indicators and explores its past and path dependent characteristics. The study provides new insights on the role of R&D investments in innovation persistence and analyses differentiated patterns of persistence across product and process innovation, by accounting for complementarity effects between the two types of innovative behaviour. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 451 Italian manufacturing companies observed during the years 1998–2006. Results highlight the relevance of innovation persistence. The highest level of persistence is found for R&D-based innovation activities, witnessing the actual presence of significant entry and exit barriers. Moreover, we obtain more robust evidence of persistence for product innovation than for process innovation when complementarity effects between the two types of innovation are accounted for.     

Uniqueness of ASM solutions in rational expectations models: An example

Using a technique recently proposed by Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1979) we prove that for a process m_t asymptotically stationary in mean (ASM) the solution for the price level equation proposed in Fischer (1979) and in Blinder and Fischer (1979) is the unique ASM solution.     

Non‐Reciprocal Trade Preferences and the Role of Compliance Costs in the Agricultural Sector: Exports to the EU

We investigate whether non‐reciprocal preferential regimes granted by the European Union have an impact on agricultural export flows from beneficiary countries while accounting for the costs of compliance that may prevent exporters from taking full advantage of potential benefits. Compliance costs are heterogeneous and difficult to measure. We proxy their influence and specify a model that allows for a different preferential margin impact according to the proxy costs. Adopting the gravity framework and using a sample of 554 lines of agricultural products for 131 developing countries in 2002, we find that the costs of compliance play a role in making the schemes work: the lower the costs, the greater the impact of the preferential margins. Moreover, the estimated margin effect differs between different regimes.     

Critical mass of users versus critical mass of services in a multiproduct information service system

In this paper we study the economic behaviour of the suppliers of a set of advanced telecommunications services with a joint adoption cost (common access facilities, learning process, etc.). In fixing the two-part tariffs for their services the suppliers have to share the burden of leaving to the users a surplus sufficient to cover the adoption cost. The lack of coordination in supplying a critical mass of services or in the pricing decisions has high changes to result in suboptimal or unviable diffusion of the new technology as a whole. We present a static optimization model of user behaviour, and derive access and usage demand with a two-part tariff and a joint adoption cost. We compare noncooperative and cooperative market equilibria in a duopoly with perfect information; finally we discuss the extension of our analysis to the case of imperfect information in a dynamic setting.     

Stochastic stability in networks with decay

This paper considers a stylized model of network formation in which relations among agents are subject to frictions, as described in Bala and Goyal [A non cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1231]. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self-interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, make mistakes. Then, using stochastic stability, we identify the network structures to which the formation process will converge.