Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups

Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by “leveling the political playing field”. With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise, resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions. In particular, a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo; and even if better policies are chosen, the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs. Regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups, creating costly rent-seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying.     

What Do Corruption Indices Measure?

Evidence from the International Crime Victimization Survey and the World Business Environment Survey suggests that actual corruption experience is a weak predictor of reported corruption perception, and that some of the factors commonly found to “reduce” corruption, such as economic development, democratic institutions or Protestant traditions, systematically bias corruption perception indices downward from corruption experience. In addition, perception indices are influenced by absolute (as opposed to relative) levels of corruption, which tends to penalize large countries, and they exhibit diminishing sensitivity to both absolute and relative corruption, indicating that they may better capture differences among countries with low levels of corruption than among highly corrupt ones. Individual characteristics such as education, age, or employment status, and firm‐level characteristics such as the number of competitors are also found to influence corruption perceptions holding experience constant.     

A class of multiattribute utility functions

A function u(z) is a utility function if u′(z) > 0. It is called risk averse if we also have u′′(z) < 0. Some authors, however, require that u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) > 0 if i is odd and u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) < 0 if i is even. The notion of a multiattribute utility function can be defined by requiring that it is increasing in each variable and concave as an s-variate function. A stronger condition, similar to the one in case of a univariate utility function, requires that, in addition, all partial derivatives of total order m should be positive if m is odd and negative if m is even. In this paper, we present a class of functions in analytic form such that each of them satisfies this stronger condition. We also give sharp lower and upper bounds for E[u(X ₁,... , X _s )] under moment information with respect to the joint probability distribution of the random variables X ₁,... , X _s assumed to be discrete and representing wealths. Partially supported by OTKA grants F-046309 and T-047340 in Hungary.     

The academician–practitioner gap in advertising

The existence of the academician–practitioner gap is readily acknowledged and widely discussed in the marketing/advertising literature. This paper analyses key writings on the nature of the academician–practitioner rift and proposes a new approach complementing the literature. The review identifies five prevailing explanations why miscommunication between academicians and practitioners exists: (1) the failure of academic knowledge dissemination systems; (2) problems with the knowledge content and knowledge form academicians produce; (3) counterproductive academic organisational systems; (4) questions of philosophy of science; and (5) practitioners’ inability and unwillingness to process academic information. The study concludes that one potential explanation is entirely missed in these accounts: the possibility that practitioners’ knowledge about how advertising works is an autonomous construct, which has its own rules and deep structure, and resists simple assimilation attempted by academicians. The study also complements the existing literature by basing the review on firm theoretical grounds: the authors apply the influential sociological theory of professionalisation. Finally, future directions for research investigation are suggested, which moves the predominantly normative discourse into the empirical world.     

Implementation of IFRS for SMEs in Emerging Economies: Stakeholder Perceptions in the Czech Republic,Hungary, Romania and Turkey

This research investigates the perceptions of stakeholders involved in financial reporting in four emerging economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey) regarding the possible implementation of IFRS for SMEs, in terms of costs, benefits, and strategy of adoption. In‐depth, semi‐structured interviews were conducted with representatives of main stakeholders (preparers, auditors, regulators, professional bodies, and users). We find more support for IFRS for SMEs implementation in these four countries than suggested by the results of the European Commission's 2010 consultation for the European Union. Interviews reveal differences between stakeholder groups and between countries regarding the preferred implementation approach (mandatory adoption, voluntary adoption or convergence of national regulations with IFRS for SMEs). Interviews indicate the most support for the convergence approach. However, users oppose convergence and prefer the adoption of IFRS for SMEs. The convergence approach moves regulators' attention from users' needs to preparers' preferences and preparedness. This finding is relevant in the decision‐making process of national regulators, who should balance the needs of various stakeholders, but also the country's political and economic objectives.     

Budget allocation for permanent and contingent capacity under stochastic demand

We develop a model of budget allocation for permanent and contingent workforce under stochastic demand. The level of permanent capacity is determined at the beginning of the horizon and is kept constant throughout, whereas the number of temporary workers to be hired must be decided in each period. Compared to existing budgeting models, this paper explicitly considers a budget constraint. Under the assumption of a restricted budget, the objective is to minimize capacity shortages. When over-expenditures are allowed, both budget deviations and shortage costs are to be minimized. The capacity shortage cost function is assumed to be either linear or quadratic with the amount of shortage, which corresponds to different market structures or different types of services. We thus examine four variants of the problem that we model and solve either approximately or to optimality when possible. A comprehensive experimental design is designed to analyze the behavior of our models when several levels of demand variability and parameter values are considered. The parameters consist of the initial budget level, the unit cost of temporary workers and the budget deviation penalty/reward rates. Varying these parameters produce several trade-offs between permanent and temporary workforce levels, and between capacity shortages and budget deviations. Numerical results also show that the quadratic cost function leads to smooth and moderate capacity shortages over the time periods, whereas all shortages are either avoided or accepted when the cost function is linear.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

Optimal capital structure: A multi-period programming model for use in financial planning

This paper describes a multi-period, chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period, the firm's optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt. The model assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize total value of the firm, and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty, with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Finally, the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model.