The Impact of Liberalizing Trade in Services on Trade in Goods: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper we use a large dataset to explore whether the liberalization of trade in services is beneficial for the international trade in goods. We find empirical evidence supporting this notion. We investigate which types of trade in services are more important for the international trade in goods and find that trade in transportation and communication services generate the largest impacts on trade in goods. We also investigate which types of trade in goods are likely to benefit from the liberalization of trade in services and find that, under the 2‐digit ISTC classification, all the categories are likely to exhibit a positive impact.     

Stuck on gold: Real exchange rate volatility and the rise and fall of the gold standard, 1875-1939

Did the gold standard diminish macroeconomic volatility? Supporters thought so, critics thought not, and theory offers ambiguous messages. Hard regimes like the gold standard limit monetary shocks by tying policymakers' hands; but exchange-rate inflexibility compromises shock absorption in a world of real disturbances and nominal stickiness. A model shows how lack of flexibility affects the transmission of terms-of-trade shocks. Evidence from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century exposes a dramatic change. The classical gold standard did absorb shocks, but the interwar gold standard did not, supporting the view that the interwar gold standard was a poor regime choice.     

Transmission of information within transnational social networks: a field experiment

Several studies have shown a relationship between the stocks of migrants and country-level investment in the home country; however the mechanism through which this relationship operates is still unexplored. We use a field experiment in which participants who are recent immigrants send information about risky decisions to others in their social network in their home country. The results demonstrate how this information influences decisions in the home country. We find that the advice given by family members and decisions made by friends significantly affects an individual’s risky decision-making.     

Does Monetary Policy Respond to Uncertainty? Evidence from Australia

We construct a novel measure of uncertainty using expert monetary policy recommendation data for Australia. Our results suggest that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) tends to lower the cash rate when expert uncertainty is high. This result is robust to using other uncertainty measures.     

Endogenous capacities and price competition: The role of demand uncertainty

We analyze the role of demand uncertainty in markets of fixed size, in which firms take long-run capacity decisions prior to competing in prices. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria under various assumptions regarding the nature and timing of demand uncertainty. In order to prove equilibrium existence, we identify a sufficient condition for the capacity choice game to be submodular. This condition resembles the standard downward-sloping marginal revenue condition used in Cournot games. A robust conclusion of the analysis is that equilibrium capacity choices are asymmetric, even when firms are ex-ante identical. Concerning the equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, we find that with inelastic demands, the equilibria of the former belong to the equilibrium set of the latter. However, as compared to the Cournot game, the capacity-price game leads to lower prices and generates price dispersion.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Foreign Plants and Industry Productivity: Evidence from Chile

This paper presents new evidence on foreign plants and their effects on a host industry. I test the predictions of a Melitz‐type model using a panel of domestic and foreign plants in the Chilean manufacturing sector. Foreign ownership is a strong predictor of plant productivity and size advantages. Moreover, productivity gains for a domestic incumbent are positively associated with foreign plants' presence in the same industry and region. I also find a positive correlation between foreign entry and exit of less productive domestic plants, but inconclusive evidence on the effects on productivity of new domestic plants.     

Exponent of Cross‐Sectional Dependence: Estimation and Inference

This paper provides a characterisation of the degree of cross‐sectional dependence in a two dimensional array, {x_it,i = 1,2,...N;t = 1,2,...,T} in terms of the rate at which the variance of the cross‐sectional average of the observed data varies with N. Under certain conditions this is equivalent to the rate at which the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of x _t=(x_1t,x_2t,...,x_Nt)′ rises with N. We represent the degree of cross‐sectional dependence by α, which we refer to as the ‘exponent of cross‐sectional dependence’, and define it by the standard deviation, , where is a simple cross‐sectional average of x_it. We propose bias corrected estimators, derive their asymptotic properties for α > 1/2 and consider a number of extensions. We include a detailed Monte Carlo simulation study supporting the theoretical results. We also provide a number of empirical applications investigating the degree of inter‐linkages of real and financial variables in the global economy. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

HOW DO SPOUSES SHARE THEIR FULL INCOME? IDENTIFICATION OF THE SHARING RULE USING SELF‐REPORTED INCOME

The paper applies the collective model to the analysis of intra-household inequality using one of the subjective-qualitative questions available in the RLMS (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data, and provides a test for its assumptions. Interpreting the individual answers as reported budget scales we assume a correspondence between the budget level that household members report and their true income sharing. We first show that this assumption is supported by the data, and then use couples who report the same level of budget to identify the full sharing rule for the whole sample.