Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

What drives the cross‐country growth and inequality correlation?

Abstract.  We present a neo‐classical model that explores the determinants of growth‐inequality correlation and attempts to reconcile the seemingly conflicting evidence on the nature of the growth‐inequality relationship. The initial distribution of human capital determines the long‐run income distribution and the growth rate by influencing the occupational choice of the agents. The steady‐state proportion of adults that innovates and updates human capital is path dependent. The output elasticity of skilled‐labour, barriers to knowledge spillovers, and the degree of redistribution determine the range of steady‐state equilibria. From a calibration experiment we report that a skill‐intensive technology, low barriers to knowledge spillovers, and high degrees of redistribution characterize the industrial countries with a positive growth‐inequality correlation. A negative correlation between growth and inequality arises for the group of non‐industrial countries with the opposite characteristics. JEL classification: E1, O4     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Determinacy with nominal assets and outside money

Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.Received: 2 July 2003, Revised: 1 December 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D50, E40, E50, E58.Correspondence to: J. Geanakoplos     

Thinking critically about critical thinking: Assessing critical thinking of business students using multiple measures

Critical thinking is a skill that potential employers expect all graduates to possess. Hence, most business management programs consider critical thinking as an important student learning goal. Unfortunately, there is ambiguity about how to best assess critical thinking, both as a skill and a learning outcome. The authors empirically demonstrate how they measure the critical thinking ability of their students in different settings, and how their critical thinking ability improves as they progress through the business program.     

Understanding the economic dynamics behind growth-inequality relationships

In this paper, a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model of growth-inequality relationships, with missing credit markets, knowledge spillover and self-employed agents, is calibrated to New Zealand data. The model explains how two distinct policy shocks involving redistribution and immigration imply, subsequently, two completely opposite outcomes. Agents’ inability to borrow aggravates a negative macroeconomic effect of heterogeneity on growth. Redistribution mitigates that effect but creates microeconomic disincentives on saving and work-effort. Consequently, immigration shocks that perturb variance of efficiency induce a negative growth-inequality relationship, while redistribution shocks, in New Zealand’s case, produce larger fluctuations in incentives than in macro benefits, implying a positive growth-inequality relationship.     

Occupational diversification as an adaptation to rainfall variability in rural India

Occupational diversification among household members in rural India is investigated as an adaptation strategy against the risks arising from the variability of local rainfall. Nationally representative household‐level survey data are combined with the coefficient of variation of rainfall constructed based on historical rainfall data at the district level. The analysis finds that high rainfall variability has significant negative effects on the agricultural specialization of within‐household occupational choices. This result is reinforced by the finding that improved access to irrigation, education, credit, roads, and postal services, is associated with a lower occupational diversification within families and a greater specialization of household members in agricultural‐related employment.     

Product innovation for the people's car in an emerging economy

As product offerings of multinational enterprises (MNEs) continue to primarily serve the relatively well-to-do consumers in emerging economies, innovations to meet the unique affordability and acceptability criteria of masses at the base of the pyramid (BoP) continues to remain a daunting challenge. The academic literature is sparse on comprehensive in-depth studies about the intricate processes involved in shaping and managing technology development for the masses. Focusing on product innovation by Tata Motors of India with the Nano—the world's cheapest car, our case study aims to understand how the innovator's choices regarding the use of technology, product design and organizational practices for new product development enabled it to meet the challenge of innovation for India's masses. Drawing on Christensen's work on disruptive innovations, our analysis shows how frugal use of resources through a new combination of existing component technologies created a new modular product to achieve the unique price–performance requirements demanded by the BoP. Our findings show that collaboration with suppliers for component design and their early integration in the design phase substantially lowered costs and helped eliminate unnecessary frills whilst incorporating features valued by mass markets. Our study has important managerial implications for MNEs and provides critical insights into the processes for a new blueprint for an untapped market segment in the automobile industry.