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1.
We investigate the sequential choice of location in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare–maximising public firm competes against a profit–maximising private firm. We examine the desirable role of the public firm in a mixed market. We also consider the effect of price regulation. We find that the public firm should become the follower (leader) if a price regulation is (is not) imposed. We also find that neither price regulation nor privatisation of the public firm improves welfare. 相似文献
2.
This paper applies a novel empirical approach to characterising the horizontal‐ness and vertical‐ness of affiliates based on Yeaple's complex FDI concept. In its simplest form, horizontal‐ness is measured as affiliates’ local sales share while their vertical‐ness is measures as their share of non‐local sourcing of intermediates. Japanese affiliates in most sectors and nations are partly vertical and partly horizontal, but those in North American are far more ‘horizontal’ than those in the EU and Asia. Affiliates became more vertical between 1996 and 2005. A four‐way sales and sourcing split (host, home, regional and RoW) suggests that affiliates act as nodes in regional production networks – especially in Asia. We posit several hypotheses that could be tested with our empirical approach. 相似文献
3.
This paper investigates the international spillover effects of a revenue-neutral increase in consumption taxes coupled with a reduction in wage taxes in a two-country open economy. Many economists feel that the consumption tax would be an improvement over the income tax. This paper provides counterexamples to the conventional wisdom. We show that conversion to a consumption tax may reduce capital accumulation and may transmit a negative externality to the rest of the countries in the world economy under certain conditions: endogenous labor supply and bequests. 相似文献
4.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《The Japanese Economic Review》1995,46(3):257-265
This paper presents an investigation of the endogenous timing in multi-stage duopoly games in which duopolists choose two variables over two periods. The paper elaborates the two-stage strategic commitment game discussed by Brander and Spencer (1983). Duopolists decide their outputs and cost-reducing investments and they are allowed to choose which action to take first. The paper discusses two types of games; one is a three-stage game in which each duopolist can commit to the order of choices before it chooses its output or cost-reducing investments, and the other is a two-stage game in which it cannot. The paper finds that at least one firm chooses its output first. Furthermore, the three-stage game has the unique equilibrium outcome in which both firms choose their outputs first. 相似文献
5.
We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome. 相似文献
6.
Masakatsu Okubo 《The Japanese Economic Review》2015,66(1):112-146
The recent empirical work on earnings processes using US panel data finds that ignoring heterogeneity in earnings profiles among individuals leads to an upward bias in the autoregressive parameter of earnings shocks. It then argues that the existing assumptions in incomplete markets and heterogeneous‐agent models, almost all of which require highly persistent earnings shocks and no individual‐specific and group‐specific differences in earnings growth rates, may be inappropriate. This paper investigates the applicability of this US data‐based debate to other developed countries by using a panel of Japanese male earnings. The results indicate that it is possible to corroborate the recent US arguments, despite some differences in the estimates. 相似文献
7.
8.
Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm‐level efficiency endogenously and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity because of entry and exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm‐size distribution via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their “birth nation.” We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade induces the most efficient small‐nation firms to move to the large nation. The large country gets an “extra helping” of the most efficient firms while the small nation's firm‐size distribution is truncated on both ends. This reinforces the large‐nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small‐nation productivity gain. The small nation is nevertheless better off allowing firm migration. 相似文献
9.
10.
This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends
to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central
and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the
local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating
because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment. 相似文献