Money as a Potential Anchor for the Price Level: a Critique of the P* Approach

A number of recent articles have attempted to restore the use of a simple measure of the money supply as an indicator of future price levels and to re-establish a causal link from money to prices. Most notably Hallman, Porter and Small (HPS) (1989a), (1989b) originated the approach using US data and Hannah and James(1989) have applied it to the UK The approach broadens the traditional idea of a constant velocity of money by introducing the notion of V* and Q*, the long-run value of velocity and income. These are then used to define P from the traditional quantity theory of money as the long-run equilibrium price level. The analysis then proceeds to estimate a standard Error Correction Model (ECM) for price determination with the levels effect given by (P-P*)t-1. The conclusion drawn is that 'a measure of money that determines the long-run future level of prices is useful in determining the proper monetary policy for attaining price stability. We have shown, through the construction of P*, that M2 can serve as this determinant for the price level' (Hallman, Porter and Small (1982a) p. 23).
We argue in this paper that the P* approach is flawed. It is certainly more complex than traditional monetarist approaches but the fundamental questions of causality are in no way either affected or resolved. The P* analysis is a variant on more conventional cointegration analysis (Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), Hall (1989)) and we argue that the Johansen framework allows us to address the question in a formal and more complete way. When this approach is applied to the US data used by HPS, we find that while the P* relationship does indeed represent a cointegrating one, it does not have a causal link with prices but rather the causality runs from prices to money - this result conforms well to the work of Hendry and Ericsson (1990) or Hall, Henry and Wilcox (1990), which use this form of relationship to model the demand for money.     

Distinctive characteristics of entities with an internal audit department and the association of the quality of such departments with errors*

Abstract. This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off-peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est-à-dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.     

Dualism in Part-Time Employment

This paper draws on open-ended interviews of managers to characterize two distinct types of part-time employment in service industries. "Secondary" part-time employment displays the typical characteristics of a secondary labor market; "retention" part-time jobs are primary labor market jobs. Some predictions of this model are tested on Current Population Survey data.     

Revisiting Real Wage Rigidity

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that real wage rigidity is not a major cause of unemployment volatility. We argue that there is a disconnect between the theoretical and empirical literatures on this topic. While theoretical studies define real wage rigidity as the response of wages to changes in unemployment following productivity shocks, the empirical literature measures real wage rigidity as the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment, averaged over all shocks. We show that averaging over shocks gives a biased measure of real wage rigidity, as the impact of other shocks confounds the response to productivity shocks. Our results indicate that the estimated semi-elasticity with respect to productivity shocks is twice as large as the estimated semi-elasticity averaged over all shocks. This implies that one cannot attribute unemployment volatility to real wage rigidity.     

Inflation Uncertainty and Strike Activity

In this paper, we hypothesize that the general level of uncertainty can influence the level of strike activity. We test this hypothesis by considering the impact of inflation uncertain & on strike activity. Two databases are used: a pooled time-series cross-section sample of individual negotiations over the period 1971–1980, and quarterly data on negotiations from 1954 to 1980. Results from both data sets support the proposition that inflation uncertainty influences strike activity.