Is Devaluation Working? Evidence from India in Phase of Economic Liberalization

Using the data from a developing country like India, we offer an empirical analysis to examine the relationship between devaluation of the Rupee and the real trade balance with her major trading partners since the liberalization process that began in July 1991. Exploiting the recent advances in panel-data time-series econometrics, we document that devaluation may not be effective in improving trade balance in the long run. Success may follow only if the policymakers view devaluation as a short run tool to improve the trade balance. Nominal devaluation is unable to alter real exchange rates substantially and hence, the inflationary impact of devaluation is large in India.

     

A three layer multi-item production–inventory model for multiple suppliers and retailers

The paper deals with a production inventory model for various types of items where multiple suppliers, a manufacturer and the multiple non-competing retailers are the members of the supply chain. In this model, each supplier supplies only one type of raw material to the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces a finished item by the combination of certain percentage of the various types of raw materials. The manufacturer produces also multi-items and delivers them according to the demand of the different retailers. Finally, an integrated profit of the supply chain is optimized by optimal ordering lot sizes of the raw materials. A numerical example is provided to justify the proposed model.     

Welfare Effect of Mergers and Multilateral Trade Liberalization

In a two‐country model where firms behave à la Cournot, we show that trade liberalization increases (decreases) the social desirability of those mergers that generate sufficiently large (small) reductions in marginal cost. There exists a range of intermediate levels of marginal cost savings such that marginal tariff reductions increase (decrease) the desirability of merger at sufficiently low (high) tariff levels. Moreover, in the neighborhood of free trade, we show that if trade liberalization increases the profitability of a merger, it necessarily also increases its desirability.     

中国和印度不平衡发展的比较研究

本文考察了中国和印度近年来经济增长不平衡的情况,并分析了不平衡增长对不均等和贫困的影响。通过对家庭调查数据和官方加总数据的分析,本文发现增长存在不平衡——区域间、产业间和家庭层面上,这表明减贫工作进展不平衡,若增长更平衡,减贫效果可能更好;另外,收入不均等程度也在提高。本文探讨了增长不平衡及其应引起重视的原因。具体讨论围绕"有利的"和"不利的"不均等两个概念展开——不均等与不平衡增长对公平性以及长期增长与发展的有利或不利影响。我们认为,需要制定相关政策,保持有利的不均等——继续鼓励创新和投资,同时降低不利的不均等的程度,尤其是通过人力资本和农村基础设施投资,帮助贫困人口参与市场。     

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.     

Anti‐immigration policy in the destination country and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source economy with or without unemployment

This paper is aimed at theoretically examining the consequence of the anti‐immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source nation using a couple of two‐sector, specific‐factor general equilibrium models in both the presence and absence of unemployment. Emigration requires incurring some capital cost for professional skill formation on the part of every prospective emigrant that adds to the opportunity cost of emigration. The authority of the destination country determines the number of visas to be granted and hence directly controls the magnitude of skilled emigration from the source country. In the migration equilibrium, the expected skilled wage income abroad is equal to the opportunity cost of emigration. In both the presence and absence of unemployment of unskilled labor, the outcome of the policy on the wage inequality crucially hinges on both the magnitude of the fixed cost of emigration and the technological factors. In the specific‐factor Harris–Todaro model, the degree of imperfection in the unskilled labor market is an additional factor. Finally, some policy recommendations have been made for protecting the interest of the poor unskilled workforce.     

Recommended play and performance bonuses in the minimum effort coordination game

We use experiments to investigate the efficacy of recommended play and performance bonuses in resolving coordination failures in a stag-hunt type coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, often referred to as a “weak link” game. Participants routinely find it difficult to coordinate to the payoff-dominant outcome in such games. We look at performance in both fixed and randomly re-matched groups. A recommendation to the payoff-dominant outcome is successful in resolving coordination failures with fixed groups but only when this recommendation is “common knowledge” in the sense that all members of the group receive the same message and it is read out loud for everyone to hear. Resolving coordination failures is harder with randomly re-matched groups and the greatest success is achieved only upon payment of a performance bonus.     

Economic liberalization and welfare in a model with an informal sector

The paper reexamines the conventional results relating to inflow of foreign capital, removal of protectionism and structural reform programmes, in a small open economy in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market distortion and a protectionist policy, inflow of foreign capital may be desirable irrespective of the pattern of trade of the economy due to its favourable impact on welfare. But the welfare implications of tariff reductions and/or structural adjustment programmes, such as deregulating the formal sector labour market, depend crucially on the economy's trade pattern. The paper provides an answer to the question as to whether in a developing economy labour market reform and tariff reform should go hand-in-hand or whether one should precede the other for welfare improvement.
JEL classification: F10, F13, F21, O17.     

A multi-echelon supply chain model for reworkable items in multiple-markets with supply disruption

The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-echelon supply chain model for multiple-markets with different selling seasons. Here, two suppliers are involved to supply the raw materials to the manufacturer where the main supplier may face supply disruption after a random time and the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive than the main supplier. In this article, the manufacturer produces a random proportion of defective items which are reworked after regular production and are sold in a lot to another market just after completion of rework. The retailer sells the finished products in different markets according to seasons. Finally, an integrated expected cost per unit product of the chain is minimized analytically by considering the lot-size ordered as a decision variable. An appropriate numerical example is also provided to justify the proposed model.     

The size and development of the shadow economy: An empirical investigation from states of India

Using the state level data from India, this paper investigates the size of the hidden economy in Indian states over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96. Our analysis has shown that after liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991/92, the growth in the size of the hidden economy has decreased on an average. Our results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy is approximately 4% less in scheduled election years than in all other years. We also demonstrate that the growth is significantly lower in those states where the coalition government is in power. An increased growth of newspapers and the literacy rates translate to cleaner governance, e.g. to fewer amounts of shadow economy activities in the economy.