全文获取类型
收费全文 | 60篇 |
免费 | 0篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 5篇 |
工业经济 | 3篇 |
计划管理 | 10篇 |
经济学 | 23篇 |
贸易经济 | 19篇 |
出版年
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 1篇 |
2019年 | 1篇 |
2018年 | 2篇 |
2012年 | 2篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 1篇 |
2008年 | 2篇 |
2006年 | 3篇 |
2005年 | 1篇 |
2004年 | 1篇 |
2003年 | 1篇 |
2001年 | 1篇 |
1999年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 2篇 |
1984年 | 2篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 3篇 |
1981年 | 4篇 |
1980年 | 2篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 2篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
1973年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有60条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Demarketing as a differentiation strategy 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Demarketing discourages consumers from buying. This paper shows that demarketing can be a profitable alternative when differentiation through product improvements is not cost effective. The impact of differentiating demarketing on profit, market share, consumers, and total welfare is investigated.This research began while Hess was visiting MIT's Sloan School of Management and was finished while visiting University of Haifa; he thanks both for their support. 相似文献
2.
Harold M. Hochman 《Constitutional Political Economy》1996,7(1):3-20
This essay examines, from the perspective of both economics and ethics, the logical foundations of income transfers in a democratic society that allocates resources, in the large, through free markets. Such transfers, enacted through the public choice process, modify the market-determined distribution of income, as a reflection of the distributional preferences of the members of a society. Both constitutional and post-constitutional explanations of redistributions are considered. A discussion of recent experimental evidence of distributional preferences leads into a critique of simple equality, built on Michael Walzer's distinction between monopoly and dominance, as a criterion of distributive justice. 相似文献
3.
This paper remedies ambiguity in the discussion of interdependent preferences by developing a consistent set of distinctions, which span the full range of sympathetic and antipathetic interaction, for the two-person case without reactive behavior. It defines concepts such as benevolence, generosity, altruism, destructiveness, and willingness to begrrudge transfers to others and indicates how their use can clarify the discussion of economic behavior. The definitions take account of preferences (indicated by rates of substitution) and prices (indicated by rates of exchange) at critical income allocations. 相似文献
4.
Gal Hochman 《The Canadian journal of economics》2008,41(3):781-795
Abstract. This paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non-discrimination links trade agreements to non-trade agreements and, under certain conditions, helps governments further lower tariffs and/or domestic standards (policies). These conditions are: (i) governments' objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards (policies); (ii) domestic standards are sufficiently valued; and (iii) policies are strategic complements. These can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non-discrimination. 相似文献
5.
The idea of a dual-market structure in the early stages of a product's life cycle has become one of the most widely accepted ideas among new product marketing practitioners in the past decade. Concepts such as “Early Market/Main Market” and “Visionaries/Pragmatists” have entered the lexicon of high-tech executives to express the notion that the market for new products is composed of early and main markets with a discontinuity in the diffusion process in between them. Moreover, these concepts have been at least partially tested and verified in the marketing academic literature in the past few years.We extend this branch of research by investigating the timing issues in dual-market cases. We define Change-of-Dominance Time (CD-Time) as the number of years it takes main market adopters to outnumber early market adopters. We empirically investigate this timing issue on a comprehensive data set of new product sales in the consumer electronics industry. We find that regarding explanatory determinants of CD-Time, external influence, such as advertising, to the early market is the most important explanatory variable.We examine the relationship between CD-Time and other early product life cycle phenomena: Takeoff, Saddle, and Rogers' size of adopter categories. We found relatively high correlations between these phenomena and CD-Time.The answer to the question “When does the majority become a majority?” is indeed “at 16%”! In a dual-market setting, the average time at which the main market outnumbers the early market is when 16% of the market has already adopted the product. In terms of time, in 75% of the cases the majority becomes a majority in 5 to 10 years. 相似文献
6.
The paper provides a new proof for the optimality of market provision for Buchanan's club goods where club goods are treated as goods of variable quality. This approach extends the theory of clubs, and introduces congestion to the analysis of competitive equilibrium with goods of variable quality. 相似文献
7.
Eitan Berglas 《Journal of public economics》1976,6(4):409-423
This paper introduces into the Tiebout model individuals with different skills. It is shown that the production techniques, the distribution of tastes and skills and intercommunity trade will affect the pattern of communities. In the suggested model competition with local public goods is Pareto optimal: communities will not be composed of identical people. The optimal solution requires that every community will tax everybody according to his marginal social cost. A Pareto efficient redistribution policy can be carried out only by a central government using lump-sum taxes. A federal income tax will affect community patterns and therefore is inefficient. 相似文献
8.
9.
Oded Hochman 《Journal of urban economics》1982,12(1):85-101
In this paper the properties of a congestable concentrated local public good (CCoLPG) are described, taking into account both locational aspects and congestion. This discussion, therefore, completes the analysis of congestable local public goods (LPG) which was started in our earlier paper (Congestable local public goods in an urban setting, J. Urban Econ., 290–310 (1982). It is here shown that the optimal provision of CCoLPG leads to the creation of clubs, where the government has to determine the location and provide the optimal quantity of LPG in each club and also levy congestion tolls on users according to their level of utilization of the club. Congestion tolls cover the αest part of the costs, where α is the level of congestability of the CCoLPG. The rest of the costs are covered by taxing land rents. Clubs will form, possibly more than one per city, even if the LPG is pure (i.e., α = 0) and they will contain a single household if the LPG is private (i.e., α = 1). The difference between these results and those of classical club theorists stem from the fact that here we also take into account the limited supply of land of given accessibility (i.e., locational aspects), which like congestion lead to the creation of clubs. When these two factors are considered together, it explains why congestion tolls alone are not sufficient to finance clubs' operations, or why pure LPGs also have to be provided locally, etc. 相似文献
10.