The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship‐Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services

The question of whether optimal provision of these services comes mainly from established relationships between banks and client firms or can result from arms'‐length market transactions has been the topic of considerable recent debate. This discussion has paralleled the debate in the commercial banking literature on the “specialness” of banks and whether lending can and should be relational or purely transactional. Whether the provision of investment bank services is relationship‐based or transactional is especially relevant now thanks to recent trends that have blurred the distinction between commercial and investment banks, and changed the competitive landscape for investment bank services. In their study summarized in this article, the authors examine whether investment bank‐client relationships create valuable relationship‐specific capital using stock market evidence from the period surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, they studied the effect of the Lehman collapse on companies that used Lehman for (1) underwriting equity offerings, (2) underwriting debt offerings, (3) advice on mergers and acquisitions, (4) analyst research services, and (5) market‐making services. The study addressed two specific questions. First, which investment bank services, if any, are associated with the creation of relationship‐specific capital; and second, what are the value drivers of this relationship capital? The authors report finding that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for public equity offerings experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy announcement. By contrast, they find no significant reaction to the announcement for Lehman's debt underwriting clients or any of the other client categories they examine. While most of these investment bank services have at least the potential to create relationship‐specific capital, the authors' findings suggest that except for equity underwriting, all the other investment bank services appear to be transactional rather than relationship‐based, at least in the average case. Moreover, the authors report significant differences even among different groups of Lehman's equity underwriting clients. An equity underwriting relationship with Lehman appears to have been especially valuable for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms—those firms which presumably had a high degree of dependence on Lehman to access the capital market.     

Measurement of Variables Involved in the Design of a Training Study: Practical Experience Undertaken in a Sports Organisation

This article describes the process for preparing a survey, which will be used to measure relevant variables, which are involved in a study of training needs in a Spanish sports organisation. The variables which have been considered are: problems and difficulties in carrying work of specific positions; “strong points” in carrying out this work; usefulness of the training received in facing and solving the above-mentioned problems and difficulties; usefulness of the training received in acquiring and strengthening these “strong points” in carrying out work; opinion and suggestions with respect to future training. Due to the applied nature of the study, a data collection methodology was designed which was based on interviews and group discussions with a representative sample of workers. Finally, the predictive capacity of perception, which workers have, of their motivation at work was clearly shown in order to then identify different attitude and conduct patterns.     

Short-run exchange rate uncertainty in Latin America

This paper to obtain an ex ante measure of exchange rate uncertainty in 11 Latin American countries. As a preliminary issue, the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition is tested using Engle and Granger two-step procedure and Johansen method. The argument is that exchange rate uncertainty could be lower if PPP holds in the long run. The expected exchange rate uncertainty is estimated according to an extended version of the autoregressive, conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) model. The results show that the ARCH adjusment produces more efficient estimates in seven countries and that the acceptance of PPP has little effect on exchange rate uncertainty.     

Are traditional timing models well specified?

Traditional timing models are affected by several biases, which generate spurious timing and stock-picking coefficients. Academics have appointed different causes as the possible sources of these biases. A negative correlation between timing and stock-picking abilities arises as a consequence of the biases in traditional timing models. This article provides evidence for one bias commonly found in traditional timing models, which is related with options. We focus on this bias in view of the scant attention it has so far received in the literature. We believe one possible cause for this bias is the failure to include the cost of the option implicit in timing activities in the timing models, and on this basis, we opt for a corrected version of the Merton and Henriksson model (1981 Merton, RC and Henriksson, RD. 1981. On market timing and investment performance II: statistical procedures for evaluating forecasting skills. Journal of Business, 54: 513–34. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). This study therefore is a pioneer in the assessment of the magnitude of this bias and in the measurement of the impact of its correction on fund managers’ results. Our results confirm both the existence of the bias and the correction of the problem when the cost of the option is included in timing models. The modified version of the Merton and Henriksson model, unlike the traditional model, reports positive timing and stock-picking coefficients, supporting the good performance by managers.     

The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage Under the Secret Ballot

Throughout much of mankind's experience with elections, vote brokers – local elites who direct the voting decisions of a subset of the electorate – have been able to make or break political careers. In various polities, brokers have thrived in spite of the secret ballot, a surprising outcome given that vote secrecy would ostensibly allow citizens to pocket the inducements offered by such individuals and vote their consciences anyway. To address this puzzle, we develop a framework for understanding the persistence and demise of vote brokerage under the secret ballot. In our model, a broker contracts with voters using an outcome contingent contract: some fixed benefit is promised to all voters sharing one of several observable profiles should the broker's candidate win the election. Using this framework, we demonstrate that the existence of brokerage depends on the size of the electorate contained within the jurisdiction controlled by the broker, with large jurisdiction sizes tending to drive brokerage out of existence. Moreover, we detail the manner in which the strategies employed by brokers depend on their economic power, the size of social groups, and ideological polarization. Empirical evidence from Minas Gerais, Brazil is used to evaluate the performance of the model.     

Technological change, human capital update and growth policies

This paper presents a model of growth driven simultaneously by innovation and human capital accumulation. Two different long-run equilibria are possible, according to whether or not workers skills are completely updated over time as knowledge expands. Skill gaps could arise as a consequence of poor education infrastructures, even in the efficient solution; in such circumstances, we find that whilst education policies are able to encourage growth, R&D policies are not. Otherwise, subsidizing education becomes ineffective for enhancing growth, although it could be necessary to avoid possible skill gaps originated by the R&D growth-enhancing policy.JEL Classification: O41, O33The authors wish to thank the financial support received for the project SEC 2001-2469 (Ministry of Science and Technology, Spain, and FEDER), as well as the comments of the co-editor and the referees.     

The anatomy of the aggregate labor supply elasticity

We show that the aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply can greatly exceed the corresponding individual-level parameter, and we illustrate the “anatomy” of the former in terms of intensive and extensive margins. The methodology consists of using micro data from the PSID to construct a panel of individuals and an aggregate time series obtained by aggregating these individuals each year. These two data sets represent exactly the same sample at different levels of aggregation, and we use them to identify the parameters of two distinct MaCurdy-type micro and macro equations. We find a micro elasticity of about 0.1 and a much larger macro elasticity that ranges from 1.1 to 1.7. There is no conflict between the two estimates: the micro one reflects only the intensive margin while the macro one reflects, in addition, the much more volatile extensive margin. Furthermore, aggregation of only continuously employed individuals allows us to provide a reliable estimate of the intensive margin elasticity in the range 0.3–0.4. This implies an extensive margin elasticity in the range 0.8–1.4. These findings suggest that micro evidence is not a benchmark for assessing how large the Frisch elasticity of labor supply should be in a model of the aggregate economy.