Gender‐Compensation Differences Among High‐Level Executives in the United States

Bertrand and Hallock (2001: 3) present compelling evidence that female executives in the United States earned 45 percent less total compensation than their male counterparts for 1992–1997. We complement their results by analyzing data over a longer time period and, more importantly, contend that most of the unexplained gender difference in total pay among executives was due to gender differences in the portion of variable pay, in particular a different cash payout from stock option exercises.     

CAPITAL CONTROLS AND THE LENDING BEHAVIOUR OF SOUTH AFRICAN BANKS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF BASEL II

Banking regulation has developed rapidly over the past few years. There is a growing realization that the regulatory environment must keep pace with globalization and with advances in the financial sector. The 1988 Basel Capital Accord was an attempt to align regulatory capital with the actual underlying risks that banks face, thereby improving the soundness of the banking sector. The New Basel Capital Accord, due for implementation in South Africa in 2007, refines this principle and remedies some of the flaws of the 1988 Accord. This paper considers whether such implementation would have an effect on lending patterns and credit expansion in South Africa. It falls into five parts. Section 1 examines the rationale for the 1988 Basel Accord and outlines the relevant features of the New Accord. Section 2 reviews some of the criticisms directed towards the New Accord, concentrating on the speculation that its implementation will adversely affect bank credit expansion. Section 3 proposes a method of research for assessing the effect of the New Accord in South Africa. Section 4 analyses the trends in South African banking and considers how the New Accord may affect bank behaviour. Section 5 concludes.     

Firm Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity

Models of firm microstructure are becoming now a standard building block in macroeconomics, trade, and development. This literature builds on the recognition that firm heterogeneity and the allocation of resources across firms plays a key role in determining aggregate productivity and the gains from trade. Barriers to the efficient allocation of resources across firms have been recently recognized to play a key role in economic development. This paper focuses on this methodological contribution, the link between firm microstructure and economic aggregates.     

Flexible distribution functions,higher-order preferences and optimal portfolio allocation

In this paper we show that flexible probability distribution functions, in addition to being able to capture stylized facts of financial returns, can be used to identify pure higher-order effects of investors' optimizing behavior. We employ the five-parameter weighted generalized beta of the second kind distribution—and other density functions nested within it—to determine the conditions under which risk averse, prudent and temperate agents are diversifiers in the standard portfolio choice theory. Within this framework, we illustrate through comparative statics the economic significance of higher-order moments in return distributions.     

Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions

We study the effects of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability, the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of a trade-off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less protected firms is driven by better bidder-target matching and merger synergies.     

USING PSEUDO‐PANELS TO MEASURE INCOME MOBILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

This paper presents a comparative overview of mobility patterns in 14 Latin American countries between 1992 and 2003. Using three alternative econometric techniques on constructed pseudo‐panels, the paper provides a set of estimators for the traditional notion of income mobility as well as for mobility around extreme and moderate poverty lines. The estimates suggest very high levels of time‐dependent unconditional immobility for the Region. However, the introduction of socioeconomic and personal factors reduces the estimate of income immobility by around 30 percent. There are also large variations in country‐specific income mobility (estimated to explain some additional 10 percent of inter‐temporal income variation). Analyzing the determinants of changes in poverty incidence within cohorts revealed statistically significant roles for age, gender, and education of the household head, the latter subject to distinctive effects across levels of attainment and transition in and out of poverty.     

Forecasting Heavy‐Tailed Densities with Positive Edgeworth and Gram‐Charlier Expansions*

This article presents a new semi‐nonparametric (SNP) density function, named Positive Edgeworth‐Sargan (PES). We show that this distribution belongs to the family of (positive) Gram‐Charlier (GC) densities and thus it preserves all the good properties of this type of SNP distributions but with a much simpler structure. The in‐ and out‐of‐sample performance of the PES is compared with symmetric and skewed GC distributions and other widely used densities in economics and finance. The results confirm the PES as a good alternative to approximate financial returns distribution, specially when skewness is not severe.     

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.