Inequality and entrepreneurial thresholds

We explore the relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on cross-sectional data from a largescale survey of the economic conditions of individuals across India, we develop a number of dimensions of inequality to explore empirically how inequality interacts with entrepreneurship, operationalized as self-employment or as employing other people. We find compelling evidence that there are thresholds to becoming self-employed, and even more so to assembling the combinations of resources and personal attributes required to become an employer. Greater inequality leaves more people unable to make the transition to self-employment, leaving casual laboring as the occupation of necessity. At the same time, inequality increases the number of employers in a society, by concentrating resources - particularly land and finance - enough for significant numbers of people to be able to cross this higher threshold. Lastly, greater differentiation into social or religious groups curtails the ability to cross either entrepreneurial threshold, presumably by limiting the extent and benefits of social networks of value for entrepreneurship.     

Should I Stay or Should I Go? On Relative Deprivation and Migration Dynamics

An overlapping-generations model for rural to urban labor migration is developed. In the migration decision the potential migrants consider both the absolute income gain and the relative deprivation associated with moving to town. It is shown that the relative deprivation mechanism introduces a positive externality between generations of migrants that can generate dual equilibria.     

Predator or prey?: Parasitic enterprises in economic development

In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get stuck in a Predators’ Club characterized by a vicious cycle of poverty and predation. Societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club. Poor societies with a high flow of new entrepreneurs, however, may grow out of the trap and join the rich Producers’ Club.     

Fighting against the odds

The fight for power is not only over immediate rents, but also over advantageous positions in future power struggles. When incumbency yields an extra fighting edge, current struggles involve high stakes as a victory today may guarantee the victory also tomorrow. Such an incumbency edge may stem from the control of the army, the police and other instruments reserved for the government. The conclusions drawn from static conflict models are turned on their head when the fight is also over the incumbency edge. A sharper incumbency edge increases the implicit prizes of winning. The fighting intensity may therefore rise when the strength of each side becomes more unequal. Unbalanced fights can last long and become particularly severe. This is in contrast to the standard result that equal strengths give the most intense fighting. Received: June 2004, Accepted: December 2004, We want to thank the editor and a referee.     

Employee Relations and the Likelihood of Occurrence of Corporate Financial Distress

Abstract:   In this paper, we investigate the association of employee relations with the occurrence of onset of financial distress. We argue that if adverse economic conditions arise, firms that have maintained good employee relations will be more effective in obtaining temporary labor concessions. As a result, firms with good employee relations, to the extent they are dependent on labor in the conduct of business operations, should be more likely to avoid the onset of future financial distress. The empirical findings we document support this prior.     

The taxation of passive foreign investment: lessons from German experience

Abstract The paper evaluates the working of German CFC rules that restrict the use of foreign subsidiaries located in low‐tax countries to shelter passive investment income from home taxation. While passive investments make up a significant fraction of German outbound FDI, we find that German CFC rules are quite effective in restricting investments in low‐tax jurisdictions. We find evidence that the German 2001 tax reform, which unilaterally introduced exemption of passive income in medium‐ and high‐tax countries, has led to some shifting of passive assets into countries for which the exemption was previously limited.     

Supply‐ versus Demand‐Side Policies in the Presence of Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox

We consider a climate coalition that seeks to reduce global emissions in the presence of carbon leakage and resource exhaustibility. We show that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply‐side policies delays foreign emissions, and we derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes when we consider leakages from free riders, both within periods and across periods. The tax shares generally differ over time. A decline in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model.     

Belastung der Kapitalgesellschaften nach der Unternehmensteuerreform 2008

Mit der Unternehmensteuerreform 2008 wird die tarifliche Belastung von Kapitalgesellschaften deutlich gesenkt. Dem stehen jedoch Mehrbelastungen durch die Ma?nahmen zur Gegenfinanzierung und insbesondere die Abschaffung der degressiven Abschreibung gegenüber. Wie wirkt sich dies insgesamt auf die Investitionsbedingungen für Kapitalgesellschaften aus? Welche Rolle spielt dabei die Einführung einer Abgeltungsteuer auf private Kapitaleinkünfte? Dr. Jana Kremer, 35, ist Mitarbeiterin in der Volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung der Deutschen Bundesbank in Frankfurt. Sie gibt in diesem Beitrag ihre pers?nliche Meinung wieder. Dr. Martin Ruf, 35, Dipl.-Kaufmann, ist Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre an der Universit?t Mannheim.     

Monopsony in the Labor Market,Minimum Wages and the Time Horizon: Some Unresolved Issues

This article discusses development of optimal solutions for monopsony in the labour market for the long run (when labour and capital are both flexible). It is shown that binding minimum wages up to a certain degree pushes the monopsonists to choose a high capital intensity of production, just as high as or even higher than that chosen when there is no regulation for minimum wages. Thereby, we demonstrate the existence of re-switching effects in the tradition of Piero Sraffa. The second part of the paper recalculates and analyzes earlier results by making use of the rather general constant elasticity of substitution production function. Based on a numerical solution for optimal monopsony under different regimes (no minimum wage, minimum wages of different values, etc.), we formulate a two-period game between the government and the monopsonistic firm (‘minimum wage game’). Finally, we analyze the relationship between the elasticity of substitution on the one hand and likely levels of employment on the other hand, after introduction of minimum wages.     

Cursed by Resources or Institutions?

Natural resource‐abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lies in the quality of institutions. With grabber‐friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer‐friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse – as the deterioration of institutions strengthens the negative effect of more natural resources.