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1.
Diversification Categories in Investment Real Estate 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper continues previous work evaluating the benefits of diversification and analyzes the various dimensions within the commercial real estate opportunity set. The database is large and extends through the 1982 downturn in property values. Due to the low levels of systematic risk, current distinctions by region and property type make little sense in a world of costly diversification. More exacting categories combining property type, SMSA growth rate and lease maturity offer promise for more efficient diversification within the real estate portfolio. 相似文献
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Measurement of market integration and arbitrage 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We develop a measurement theory of market integration, basedon two notions of 'integrated markets'. First, two markets cannotbe perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct twoportfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffsbut different prices. In that case, the law of one price isviolated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integratedin a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities.Two measures of market integration are developed, respectivelyreflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the moreclosely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Amongother things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancybetween markets. 相似文献
4.
What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We study benefits received by target chief executive officers(CEOs) in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain targetCEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonusesor increased golden parachutes. These negotiated cash paymentsare positively associated with the CEO's prior excess compensationand negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomesan executive of the acquiring company. Regression estimatessuggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premiain transactions involving extraordinary personal treatment ofthe CEO. Target CEOs experience very high turnover rates bothat the time of acquisition and, for those who remain employed,for several years thereafter. 相似文献
5.
Crocker H. Liu David J. Hartzell Terry V. Grissom 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1992,5(3):299-319
The current study investigates whether systematic skewness offers an alternative perspective as to why the risk-adjusted returns
on real estate should be similar to that for stocks. This is not a trivial issue since an affirmative finding implies that
we might be incorrectly measuring real estate risk from both a pricing and a portfolio allocation perspective. A multivariate
test of the Kraus-Litzenberger model is used to investigate this skewness proposition with the K-L CAPM tested against several
alternative versions of the CAPM. The study finds that the Kraus-Litzenberger model offers additional insights into the measurement
of real estate risk. Evidence is also found that both the zero beta and the consumption-oriented CAPM hold, which is consistent
with the recent literature in real estate. 相似文献
6.
The Impact of Market Imperfections on Real Estate Returns and Optimal Investor Portfolios 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This study investigates the consequences of several imperfections associated with real estate markets on pricing and optimal investor portfolios from a CAPM context. CAPM assumptions are relaxed to recognize illiquidity, the consumption and investment attributes of owner-occupied housing, and a mildly segmented market structure. The study finds that relaxing the CAPM assumptions lead to a separate pricing paradigm for financial assets, income-producing real estate and owner-occupied housing respectively, that a "dividend effect" arises for real estate as the result of illiquidity, and that illiquidity reduces the extent to which investors hold real estate in their portfolios. 相似文献
7.
We analyze two managerial compensation incentive devices: the threat of termination and pay for performance. We first develop a simple model predicting that these devices are substitutes: when termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives. We then use data from real estate organizations to provide two independent tests of the model’s central prediction. First, we use the fact that chief executive officers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and general partners of Real Estate Limited Partnerships (RELPs) perform similar tasks, yet organizational features of RELPs ensure that the latter are much harder to terminate. Consistent with the model, we find that pay‐for‐performance sensitivity is much higher for general partners of RELPs, where the termination threat is less credible. Second, we use a recent cross‐section of REITs to show that in property types where it is expected to be more costly to replace managers, those managers have stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives. 相似文献
8.
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation 总被引:31,自引:2,他引:31
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences. 相似文献
9.
A process for evaluating physician practices by their strategic alignment with a health system's mission separates the practices into four categories: "Must-have"--Strategically and financially beneficial. "Cash is king"--Financially beneficial but not a strategic priority. "Dream big"--strategically important but currently not financially beneficial. "Avoid acquiring"--neither strategically nor financially beneficial. 相似文献
10.
Crocker H. Liu David J. Hartzell Terry V. Grissom Wylie Greig 《Real Estate Economics》1990,18(1):49-75
This study investigates whether the composition of the market portfolio leads to different inferences on real estate performance. As a point of departure, this paper first explores whether the omission of assets in a market proxy leads to a biased measurement of investment performance. The study finds that ranking investment performance is not meaningless even though investment performance is inaccurately measured. Furthermore, the composition of the market proxy does not necessarily lead to different inferences on real estate investment performance although superior real estate investment performance arises from the omitted asset phenomenon and also from smoothing bias in general. 相似文献