Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting

The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb–Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor.     

The turnpike of dynamic general equilibrium paths and its insensitivity to initial conditions

Asymptotic turnpike theorems in the case where the future is discounted are traditionally derived under the assumptions that a utility function is twice differentiable and that is Hessian is negative definite. Replacing these assumptions by a weaker one. I give a proof of the theorem simpler than existing ones.     

Market Size and Firm Location in a Service Industry

This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Development of educational program for production manager leading new perspectives on manufacturing technology

In this paper, we consider the problems associated with the development and management of an educational program for manufacturing managers in leadership roles who are making contributions towards the creation of customer delight as well as customer satisfaction using manufacturing technology. The basic concept combines an intelligent knowledge-based approach with the kaizen activity program within the framework of value creation and comparative advantage models based on a network referred to as Academia, Business, Consultancy, and Government (ABC-G). This educational program, which reflects the characteristics of manufacturing technologies and practices in the Hokuriku District of Japan, was developed in 2005–2006 and the trial education was developed in 2005 and 2006, and a trial run of this program was conducted in 2006 and 2007 in close collaboration with local manufacturing companies and their employees. The results are informative of the effects of educating manufacturing managers in Japan and the problems that will have to be overcome for the continuous improvement of the program.     

Optimal chaos,nonlinearity and feasibility conditions

Summary This study constructs a class of dynamic models in which optimal paths are generated by nonlinear transition functions similar to a tent map. We provide a sufficient condition under which such a transition function is a chaotic map. This characterization provides a way to construct complex nonlinear dynamics in a broad range of dynamic economic models.We would like to thank Michele Boldrin, William Brock, Richard Day, Mukul Majumdar, Lionel McKenzie, Tapan Mitra, Luigi Montrucchio, Jose Scheinkman, Rangarajan Sundaram and the referees for comments and discussions.     

Managers’ exploration activities and individual unlearning: the mediating role of learning orientation and reflection

Abstract

The main goal of this study was to investigate the effects of managers’ exploration activities on learning orientation, reflection, and unlearning of team members. A questionnaire survey was conducted among 115 employees in 23 teams from a Japanese pharmaceutical company. The results of multi-level analyses suggest that managers’ exploration activities had a direct influence on team members’ learning orientations, which subsequently had a positive influence on their unlearning, with and without the mediation of reflection. These findings suggest that a subordinate’s unlearning is driven by managers’ activities through motivational and cognitive processes. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Setting an exam as an information design problem

We take a teacher's exam-setting task as an information design problem. Specifically, the teacher chooses a conditional distribution of grades given students' types. After observing their exam results, each student updates her belief regarding her type via Bayes' rule and chooses an action. Students' reactions to the same exam result could be different, depending on their heterogeneous prior beliefs. The teacher's objective is to persuade students to take a certain action (e.g., applying to universities), which some may not choose without an exam. The teacher adopts different grade distributions, depending on the teacher's and the students' heterogeneous prior beliefs.