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1.
Marco Runkel 《Bulletin of economic research》2004,56(2):115-132
This paper investigates optimal emissions taxation under imperfect competition in a durable good industry where products are sold (instead of rented). As a benchmark, attention is paid to the special case of monopoly with exogenously given product durability. In line with previous literature, the optimal emission tax in this benchmark model falls short of marginal damage (underinternalization). Extending the benchmark model either to the case of an oligopolistic market structure and/or to the case of endogenous product durability then provides two cases in which the optimal emission tax overinternalizes marginal damage. 相似文献
2.
Castaneda Marco A.; Garen John; Thornton Jeremy 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2008,24(1):215-246
This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model. 相似文献
3.
Marco Dardi 《International Review of Economics》2006,53(4):476-490
Pareto initiated the shift of economic theory from utility/preference to choice in order to fill a gap between theoretical
and empirical economics. His suggestions for an empirically-oriented theory of choice were to be developed decades later in
the literature on revealed preference and on the conditions of equivalence between preference-based and choice-based axiomatic
structures. In the process, however, substantial departures from Pareto’s implicit design of the situation of choice were
introduced. In this paper, the conditions for the rationalizability of choice are re-defined so that they fit the type of
situation that Pareto had in mind. The result is that the main consistency axioms of standard choice theory have to give way
to a different combination of axioms that concern decisiveness as well as consistency. (JEL:B13, D01, D11). 相似文献
4.
Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries
to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding
regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage
tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix.
We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result
in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the
seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation.
An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent
that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government
finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase
in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification
of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate.
Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001 相似文献
5.
A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. 相似文献
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8.
Anna Corinna Cagliano Alberto De Marco Sabrina Grimaldi Carlo Rafele 《Journal of Risk Research》2013,16(7):817-840
Despite the increasing attention that supply chain risk management is receiving by both researchers and practitioners, companies still lack a risk culture. Moreover, risk management approaches are either too general or require pieces of information not regularly recorded by organisations. This work develops a risk identification and analysis methodology that integrates widely adopted supply chain and risk management tools. In particular, process analysis is performed by means of the standard framework provided by the Supply Chain Operations Reference Model, the risk identification and analysis tasks are accomplished by applying the Risk Breakdown Structure and the Risk Breakdown Matrix, and the effects of risk occurrence on activities are assessed by indicators that are already measured by companies in order to monitor their performances. In such a way, the framework contributes to increase companies’ awareness and communication about risk, which are essential components of the management of modern supply chains. A base case has been developed by applying the proposed approach to a hypothetical manufacturing supply chain. An in-depth validation will be carried out to improve the methodology and further demonstrate its benefits and limitations. Future research will extend the framework to include the understanding of the multiple effects of risky events on different processes. 相似文献
9.
We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated. 相似文献
10.
This paper provides an explanation for the increasing reliance on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We
develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country imposes a source-based tax on capital and supplies
an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Without tax competition, the price on the public good is zero. Tax
competition induces each country to choose a positive price. The reliance on user charges turns out to be increasing in the
intensity of tax competition measured by the number of countries. A coordinated decrease in user charges is shown to raise
welfare in all countries.
相似文献