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We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of
customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence
of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities
will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it
turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore,
capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous
for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities. 相似文献
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We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage.
We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies
could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination.
Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles’ market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects
are strengthened. Therefore, ‘collusion’ may well be in line with social welfare.
相似文献
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Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information. 相似文献
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We examine the role of expectations for interest rates on mortgage loans. Our empirical results, based on cointegration tests, indicate a violation of the expectations hypothesis on the German loan market. In contrast to the capital market, a failure of the expectations hypothesis on the loan market cannot be attributed to the market segmentation hypothesis. Using a simple two-period model, we can show that the deviation from the expectations hypothesis is stronger than on the capital market and such that it confirms the common practice of choosing between loans with variable or fixed interest rates.An earlier version was presented at the annual meeting of theVerein für Socialpolitik 1994. We are grateful to Jürgen Wolters and an anonymous referee for their useful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
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Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
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