Payment Limitations and Acreage Decisions under Risk Aversion: A Simulation Approach

Payment limits have played an important role in U.S. farm policy deliberations for the last thirty years. Current limits are largely nonbinding. Proposals to strengthen and enforce limits are currently in discussion. We evaluate the likely effects of such proposals on acreage for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice in several important producing states. Our results generally indicate that payment limits are unlikely to significantly affect acreage in most cases; exceptions occur for cotton and rice, where the probability that limits would be binding is much greater and thus more likely to affect production.     

Spatiotemporal Modeling of Asian Citrus Canker Risks: Implications for Insurance and Indemnification Fund Models

Asiatic citrus canker is a disease that poses a significant hazard to commercial citrus production. This article examines spatiotemporal models of the risks of citrus canker transmission. Models evaluate risks and are used to price annual contracts, which would pay producers a prespecified indemnity in the event that their grove is found to be infected with canker. Implications for risk management policy are discussed.     

Public Responses to Agricultural Disasters: Rethinking the Role of Government

We provide a broad overview of the role and history of federal disaster relief in U.S. agriculture. We discuss various economic arguments that may be used as justification for such disaster relief and subsidized insurance programs. In general, we find no persuasive argument that market failure justifies subsidized risk management activities by the government. Important exceptions exist in the case of catastrophic damages to public infrastructure, invasive and communicable disease threats, and the hazards posed by accidental or deliberate contamination of food supplies in that the presence of significant transactions costs may inhibit private market solutions. We also consider a panel VAR analysis of the dynamic interrelationships among market returns and farm program payments conveyed under three different types of programs—disaster assistance, crop insurance, and all other direct payments. An important finding is that disaster and insurance payments appear to imply higher subsequent levels of market income risk in agriculture. This finding is consistent with arguments that subsidized disaster assistance and insurance may lead to greater risk in agriculture. Nous présentons un large aperçu du rôle et de l'historique du programme fédéral d'assistance en cas de catastrophe agricole aux États‐Unis. Nous analysons différents arguments économiques qui peuvent justifier ces programmes d'aide et d'assurance subventionnés. En général, nous ne trouvons aucun argument convaincant comme quoi une défaillance de marché justifie des activités de gestion du risque subventionnées par le gouvernement. Cependant, des exceptions importantes existent pour les cas de dommages catastrophiques à des infrastructures publiques; de menaces de maladies contagieuses et invasives; et de dangers associés à la contamination accidentelle ou délibérée de la chaîne alimentaire, auquel cas les coûts de transaction importants pourraient inhiber les solutions du marché privé. Nous considérons également une analyse panel VAR des relations entre les rendements de marché et les paiements versés en vertu de trois types de programme: assistance en cas de catastrophe, assurance récolte et tout autre type de paiement direct. Nous en arrivons à la conclusion importante que les paiements d'assurance et d'aide aux sinistrés semblent mener à des niveaux de risque relatif au revenu marchand plus élevés dans le secteur de l'agriculture. Ceci concorde avec les arguments voulant que les programmes subventionnés d'assurance et d'assistance en cas de catastrophe mènent à une augmentation des risques dans le secteur de l'agriculture.     

Agricultural Policy Reform and Off‐farm Labour Decisions

Off‐farm labour decisions of a sample of Kansas farmers are evaluated. The central question of our analysis pertains to whether 1996 US farm policy reforms may have altered the decisions to work off the farm. The effects of policy decoupling on off‐farm labour are complex: different aspects of policy changes can have opposing effects on off‐farm work decisions. Essentially, this makes this issue an empirical question. Results show that the introduction of fixed, decoupled payments in 1996 might have reduced the likelihood of off‐farm labour participation. However, the new policy environment may have increased farm households’ revealed aversion to risk, motivating a higher participation in non‐farm labour markets. The effects of 1996 policy reforms on farm income variability could have been attenuated by changes in US crop insurance programmes and by an increase in emergency assistance payments towards the end of the 1990s. The reduction in price supports may have increased the motivation for working off the farm. The net effect of the overall reforms on off‐farm work participation is not likely to have been large.     

Empirically Testing the Law of One Price in an International Commodity Market: A Rational Expectations Application to the Natural Rubber Market

The Law of One Price (LOP) is an important ingredient in theories of international trade and exchange rate determination. An important shortcoming of the existing empirical literature is that parity is typically assumed to hold contemporaneously. This overlooks the fact that international commodity arbitrage takes place over time as well as across spatially separated markets. Recognizing this fact, we expect to see parity holding for expected prices. A model which incorporates the expectations of commodity arbitragers is constructed and used to test the LOP in the natural rubber market. Results indicate that the inclusion of expectations may be of value when considering the LOP.     

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.     

Dynamic Relationships in the Market for Ocean Grain Freighting Services

A vector autoregressive model containing ocean grain freight rates, grain shipments, idled tonnage, new carrier deliveries and fuel prices is used to evaluate dynamic linkages in the ocean grain transport market. Dynamic relationships are of particular importance in ocean freighting months because freighting services are often contracted several months before shipment. In addition, such markets may be slow to adjust to shocks because of significant short-run fixities in shipping services. Ocean grain freight rates are found to be responsive to fuel prices and new ship deliveries, but are not affected by demand shocks. Ship idling rates are found to be sensitive to fuel prices, grain shipments and freight rates. Significant adjustment lags are revealed.