AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: AN OUTLINE

This article deals in an axiomatic manner with problems of definition, classification, and measurement in the national accounts. It argues that the elementary units which must be classified in national accounting are economic objects (real and financial), rather than transactions. The article defines briefly a set of postulates, and shows that the structure of a simple system of national accounting can be derived from them. There are twenty postulates—certain of them establishing basic categories such as sector, time, economic object, value (price); others establishing relations between categories (for example the notion of ownership); and others describing operations in which economic objects can be involved, such as production, final consumption, change of ownership, and change of debtor and creditor (in the case of financial objects). It is shown that the system of postulates makes it possible to consider a large number of accounting concepts (flows or stocks) as classes (baskets) of real objects (e.g., exports, real capital) or financial objects (e.g., payments, total debt of a sector). These concepts can be defined without reference to prices, although prices are necessary to measure them. Other concepts cannot be defined in this way in this system of postulates, for example value added, foreign balance, saving, net worth. However, it is possible to define magnitudes of the latter type and measure them in terms of value: for example, value added can be defined as the difference between the value of receipts and the value of outlays of a sector. In this way it is possible to establish algebraic relations among the national accounting concepts. (This article is a summary of certain parts of the doctoral thesis of the author, published in Norwegian in 1955.)     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry

We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003     

Killing off cohorts: Forecasting mortality of non-extinct cohorts with the penalized composite link model

Mortality forecasting has crucial implications for insurance and pension policies. A large amount of literature has proposed models to forecast mortality using cross-sectional (period) data instead of longitudinal (cohort) data. As a consequence, decisions are generally based on period life tables and summary measures such as period life expectancy, which reflect hypothetical mortality rather than the mortality actually experienced by a cohort. This study introduces a novel method to forecast cohort mortality and the cohort life expectancy of non-extinct cohorts. The intent is to complete the mortality profile of cohorts born up to 1960. The proposed method is based on the penalized composite link model for ungrouping data. The performance of the method is investigated using cohort mortality data retrieved from the Human Mortality Database for England & Wales, Sweden, and Switzerland for male and female populations.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Hospital competition under pay‐for‐performance: Quality,mortality, and readmissions

Health outcomes, such as mortality and readmission rates, are commonly used as indicators of hospital quality and as a basis to design pay‐for‐performance (P4P) incentive schemes. We propose a model of hospital behavior under P4P where patients differ in severity and can choose hospital based on quality. We assume that risk‐adjustment is not fully accounted for and that unobserved dimensions of severity remain. We show that the introduction of P4P which rewards lower mortality and/or readmission rates can weaken or strengthen hospitals' incentive to provide quality. Since patients with higher severity have a different probability of exercising patient choice when quality varies, this introduces a selection bias (patient composition effect) which in turn alters quality incentives. We also show that this composition effect increases with the degree of competition. Critically, readmission rates suffer from one additional source of selection bias through mortality rates since quality affects the distribution of survived patients. This implies that the scope for counterproductive effects of P4P is larger when financial rewards are linked to readmission rates rather than mortality rates.     

Visitors’ acceptance of negative ecological impacts in national parks: comparing the explanatory power of psychographic scales in a Norwegian mountain setting

Even in protected areas, it is inevitable that any human use will produce some impact on natural resources. This study identifies visitors’ tolerance of potential negative ecological impacts from tourism activities and facilities in a Norwegian national park context, based on park visitors’ expressed degree of acceptance of negative effects on particular species of wildlife (wild reindeer and raptors) and on vegetation. Attitudes were analysed using psychographic scales, reflecting respondents’ nature orientations, their specific facility desires, their preferences in a wilderness setting and their concerns about human interaction with the natural environment. Fourteen research hypotheses were tested. Findings demonstrated that the psychographic scales explained more variation in attitudes than most social background and trip characteristics. Higher levels of education among visitors were strongly associated with increased ecological concern; age and gender were not. There was generally strong ecological awareness and eco-centrism among park visitors in general, with a small proportion of wilderness purists. Better trail conditions, signposting and interpretation were sought. But park visitors were also found to possess a complex mixture of needs and drivers. The study found significant potential for strategic alliances between tourism and conservation interests, and key value issues for park governance systems.     

Upper Secondary School Completion and the Business Cycle

Previous evidence suggests that enrollment in post‐compulsory education increases (decreases) in cyclical downturns (upturns). However, little evidence exists on whether enrollment is successfully transformed into completed education. This paper adds to the literature by analyzing the relationship between completion of upper secondary education and regional unemployment using Norwegian regional panel data on students graduating from compulsory school between 1981 and 2004. We find robust evidence that completion rates are countercyclical. Our results suggest that poor labor‐market conditions when starting upper secondary education have a lasting effect and motivate students to stay in school and graduate.     

Liquidity provision and optimal bank regulation

We extend the set of regulatory instruments for banks' liquidity provision by adding a policy instrument for controlling the fraction of perfectly-liquid accounts. We demonstrate how this instrument induces self-selection on behalf of depositors who are differentiated according to their probability of facing a liquidity shock. This self-selection leads to a market segmentation, which can break the bundling of deposits with liquidity risk and, thereby, enhance welfare. The optimal regulatory policy is explicitly characterized as a function of banks' investment return, and of depositors' gain from early withdrawals to fund a realized investment opportunity.