Employee emotions during organizational change—Towards a new research agenda

In this research note, we address the role of employee emotions during organizational change processes. While prior studies have examined emotions during a single change, such research analyzes emotions and change as snapshot events. In addition, we lack sufficient knowledge of the role of employee emotions during repeated changes, despite the evidence that organizations increasingly need to adapt to dynamic environments. We address these shortcomings and offer a research agenda on emotions during change, which incorporates the so far neglected view of emotions as processes that unfold during and across organizational changes. Specifically, we illustrate the role of employee emotions during sequential and simultaneous changes and offer six suggestions for future research on emotions in such contexts.     

Killing off cohorts: Forecasting mortality of non-extinct cohorts with the penalized composite link model

Mortality forecasting has crucial implications for insurance and pension policies. A large amount of literature has proposed models to forecast mortality using cross-sectional (period) data instead of longitudinal (cohort) data. As a consequence, decisions are generally based on period life tables and summary measures such as period life expectancy, which reflect hypothetical mortality rather than the mortality actually experienced by a cohort. This study introduces a novel method to forecast cohort mortality and the cohort life expectancy of non-extinct cohorts. The intent is to complete the mortality profile of cohorts born up to 1960. The proposed method is based on the penalized composite link model for ungrouping data. The performance of the method is investigated using cohort mortality data retrieved from the Human Mortality Database for England & Wales, Sweden, and Switzerland for male and female populations.     

Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.