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1.
Raffi Duymedjian Olivier Germain Guillaume Ferrante Mary Catherine Lavissière 《Entrepreneurship & Regional Development》2019,31(7-8):605-622
ABSTRACTThis paper aims to explore the conceptual potential of the Deleuzian notion of the encounter in order to better understand the genealogy of opportunities. We adopt a processual perspective of opportunities. In order to translate this notion to the domain of entrepreneurship, we analysed and interpreted Jean-Marc Vallée’s Dallas Buyers Club. This film follows the creation of the first club in the United States that illegally allowed HIV-positive people to supply themselves with foreign antiretroviral drugs from Mexico or Japan. The article highlights encounters in this process that disturb the entrepreneur’s belief systems and allow him or her to be open to potential opportunity. It finally explores how the encounter may improve our understanding of the political becoming of opportunities within the entrepreneurial process. 相似文献
2.
The nature and magnitude of the economic shocks that have affected the per capita GDP of 16 OECD countries are analyzed over a long period using the outlier method. Strong proof of infrequent large permanent and transitory shocks were found, essentially resulting from the two major wars in the twentieth century, the recession in the 1920s, the Great Depression, among others. We also examine the nature of the output trend by combining different tests of non-stationarity on different GDP series corrected by the outliers detected. It is shown that the per capita GDP series cannot reject the unit root hypothesis in 13 of the 16 countries examined. No conclusion could be drawn for the other countries because the test results were contradictory. 相似文献
3.
Drs. W. Th. Vogelaar 《De Economist》1948,96(1):681-692
Eindhoven, September 1948. 相似文献
4.
This article addresses the issue of optimal patent protection in an economy with a downstream and an upstream sector. The key insight is that higher patent protection in the downstream sector raises the incentives of agents to do R&D in that sector but discourages innovation in the upstream sector because of a market size effect. Hence, higher patent protection in the upstream sector accelerates growth whereas higher patent protection in the downstream sector slows it down. If some innovation is socially desirable, optimal patent protection is necessarily higher in the upstream than in the downstream sector. 相似文献
5.
When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts. 相似文献
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Summary This paper formulates an optimizing model of a small open economy with a representative (immortal) household, a firm and a government. The asset menu consists of domestic currency, non-traded bonds and traded bonds. There is a risk premium on traded bonds, which leads to deviations from perfect capital mobility and uncovered interest parity. Taxes are lump-sum, so that finance by bonds and by taxation are equivalent. The model allows for current-account and wealth dynamics. The model assumes either purchasing power parity or imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and either labour market equilibrium, nominal wage rigidity or real wage rigidity. The steady-state effects of a fiscal contraction, a monetary disinflation and an increase in the world interest rate are discussed. The transient effects of these policies are analysed with the aid of a multiple shooting algorithm.We thank Gerard Staarink for implementing the multiple shooting algorithm used in section 4 and we thank Professors M. Fase and J. Pen for their constructive comments on a previous version of this paper. The paper is a shortened version of discussion paper No. 168 of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 相似文献
9.
We study the connections between the labour market and the education sector in a matching framework with ex-post wage bargaining. Workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education is a time-consuming activity and determines jointly the scope - or adaptability - and intensity - or productivity - of individual skills. We establish three main results. First, unemployment provides incentives to schooling by raising the need for adaptability. Second, private returns to productivity are below social returns, but no hold-up phenomenon is involved. Third, due to wage and congestion externalities, private returns to adaptability exceed social returns. As a consequence, both over- and under-education may take place in equilibrium. 相似文献
10.
Olivier Compte 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(1):151-188
I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72. 相似文献