A STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

This research develops and analyzes a theoretical framework for supplier management and customer relationship strategies, supply chain management strategy, and firm performance using structural equation modeling. Data used in the paper were collected from a comprehensive survey circulated to a wide variety of U.S. and European business executives. Based on the findings, a clearer picture of the practice and benefits of SCM and its strategic implications emerges.     

Commentary on Schembri and Boyle (2013): From representation towards expression in videographic consumer research

In this commentary on Schembri and Boyle (2013) we offer an alternative perspective on the use of video in consumer research. The dominant modus operandi for visual research, as recently demonstrated by Schembri and Boyle in the pages of this journal, follows a paradigm typical of anthropological tradition. We propose an alternative approach: an expressive imperative in consumer videography emerging from theory on cinematography and experimental filmmaking, which emphasizes the evocative power of moving images.     

The limits to IPR standardization policies as evidenced by strategic patenting in UMTS

The impact of patents and patent royalties are a major concern of standards setting organizations. This study examines the patents filed in the standardization of UMTS, the third-generation mobile phone technology developed under sponsorship of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and others, using a patent policy developed in response to issues faced in the earlier GSM (née Group Special Mobile) standardization. After contrasting firm strategies and policy effectiveness between the GSM and UMTS efforts, the paper reviews the potential impact of potential changes to the ETSI IPR (intellectual property rights) policy.     

A Model of Declining Standards

This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards. There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to pass, a candidate's performance must be at least as good as the performance of a representative member of the elite. Without perturbations in the underlying data, the model predicts that standards will not change. Perturbations in the preferences used to judge candidates lead to a reduction in standards.     

Are property rights enough?Re‐evaluating a big‐bang claim1

We investigate the claim made by proponents of the big‐bang strategy that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition creates its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model contains a government engaging in activities to accomplish objectives that depend on public support for the enforcement of the rule of law and agents who interpret the level of activities of the government as indications of the government's intent to enforce the rule of law. Agents, using the level of government activities as an input to their decisions, choose whether to support the government's objectives. We establish conditions under which the level of activities chosen by the government maximizes its benefits, and simultaneously induces the constituency to support enforcement of the rule of law. These conditions provide a basis for the argument for the implementation of the big‐bang policy. When these conditions do not hold, however, we show that the level of activities that maximizes the government's benefits may have only a minor impact on support for the enforcement of the rule of law. Two characteristics play an important role in these conditions: the initial level of crime and the types of activities the government chooses to undertake. We present examples showing that the initial level of crime has the more dramatic effect on subsequent support for the rule of law.     

The Economic Value of Water Quality

Stated preference values for water quality ratings based on the US Environmental Protection Agency National Water Quality Inventory ratings provide an operational basis for benefit assessment. Iterative choice survey results for a very large, nationally representative, Web-based panel imply an average valuation of $32 for each percent increase in lakes and rivers in the region for which water quality is rated “Good.” Valuations are skewed, with the mean value more than double the median. Sources of heterogeneity in benefit values include differences in responses to average water quality information and the base level of water quality. Conjoint estimates are somewhat lower than the iterative choice values. The annual economic value of the decline in inland US water quality from 1994 to 2000 is over $20 billion.      

Equilibrium asset pricing and the cross section of expected returns

Annals of Finance - In a mean-variance framework with a representative agent, any linear model for the cross section of expected returns can be supported as an equilibrium as long as the market...