Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

Absolute and Relative Deprivation and the Measurement of Poverty

This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices (some of them well–known) which aggregate normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are distinguished by a parameter value that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to "exclusion" or "relative–deprivation" aversion. The indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that the United States show more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countries considered will generally depend on the intensity of the ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty also depends on the presence of and on the attention granted to concerns over relative deprivation.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.     

Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation

Summary This paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.We are very grateful to Patrick Bolton for his helpful advice. We also wish to thank Richard Caves, Anthony Creane, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, Jean-Charles Rochet, Margaret Slade, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, Mike Whinston and an anonymous referee.     

Competition and productivity growth in South Africa

This article shows that mark‐ups are significantly higher in South African manufacturing industries than they are in corresponding industries worldwide. We test for the consequences of this low‐level of product market competition on productivity growth. The results of the paper are that high mark‐ups have a large negative impact on productivity growth in South African manufacturing industry. Our results are robust to three different data sources, two alternative measures of productivity growth, and three distinct measures of the mark‐up. Controlling for potential endogeneity of regressors does not eliminate the findings.     

On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games

It is shown that a differentiable market game remains generically inefficient when its strategic outcome function is perturbed smoothly. The proof is based on Thom's transversality theorem and removes any restriction regarding the dimension of the strategy spaces. A converse result is that almost all efficient market games that are competitive are characterized by Bertrand-like non-differentiabilities. Finally a synthesis between the Cournot-and-Bertrand-type approaches to Walrasian equilibrium, as recently developed in the literature, is suggested.     

Wage Inequality and the New Economy

Many economists have argued that the observed increase in wageinequality in developed economies over the past 30 years isdue to skill-biased technical progress. In this paper we putforward a somewhat different technology-based argument, namelythat the increased inequality was caused by technical changelinked to the pervasive innovation wave associated with theNew Economy. This technical change was not skill-biased in theusual sense, but rather raised the reward to adaptability. Thisalternative approach based on the notion of ‘general-purposetechnology’ can shed light on a number of outstandingpuzzles on the evolution of wage inequality both between andwithin educational groups.     

Academic freedom,private‐sector focus,and the process of innovation

We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private‐sector research. Rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research, we emphasize control‐rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early‐stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists toward higher‐payoff activities makes it more attractive for later‐stage research.     

Exchange rate volatility and productivity growth: The role of financial development

The vast empirical exchange rate literature finds the effect of exchange rate volatility on real activity to be small or insignificant. In contrast, this paper offers empirical evidence that real exchange rate volatility can have a significant impact on productivity growth. However, the effect depends critically on a country's level of financial development. The results appear robust to time window, alternative measures of financial development and exchange rate volatility, and outliers. We also offer a simple monetary growth model in which real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative investment effects of domestic credit market constraints.