Bankenkrise: Steuerzahler tragen die Folgen

Ohne Zusammenfassung Rainer Kambeck ist Leiter des Kompetenzbereichs „?ffentliche Finanzen“ im Rheinisch-Westf?lischen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)     

Innovation,Market Structure and the Structure of the Economy: a micro-to-macro model

This paper presents a micro-to-macro model which connects an input–output model with price-dependent input coefficients and basic elements of industrial economics. This enables the determination of the most important variables on the micro, meso and macro levels, and, in particular, the determination of market structure and economic structure. On the basis of the model, we discuss the various intra-industry and interindustry impacts of process innovation. The results show the importance of considering heterogeneity of firms and sectors.     

Handelsmarken kontra Herstellermarken

Zusammenfassung  Der Marktanteil von Handelsmarken in der Konsumgüterbranche steigt seit geraumer Zeit kontinuierlich an. Stark begünstigt wird diese Entwicklung durch die rechtliche Regulierung des Marktes in Form des Verbots der vertikalen Preisbindung. Eine Langzeitstudie am Beispiel von Fertigprodukten aus dem deutschen Lebensmitteleinzelhandel pr?sentiert ausgew?lte Effekte der mit dem Preisbindungsverbot einhergehenden Zunahme von Handelsmarken. Deutlich werden dabei auch die Grenzen der industriellen Markenpolitik. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rainer Olbrich Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Marketing, der FernUniversit?t in Hagen Dipl.-Kff. Gundula Grewe Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Marketing, der Fern Universit?t in Hagen     

Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries

Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups.     

Decline of Controlled Foreign Company Rules and Rise of Intellectual Property Boxes: How the European Court of Justice Affects Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union (EU) in the past 20 years. However, it is unclear whether or not the ECJ's decisions and the corresponding reactions by the member states actually contribute to tax neutrality in economic terms and, therefore, to the achievement of the internal market. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in the EU that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low‐tax countries by multinationals. Our counterfactual analysis shows that the court's restriction of so‐called controlled foreign company rules and the related second‐round reactions by some member states – i.e. the introduction of low‐tax regimes for income from acquired intellectual properties (IP boxes for acquired IP) – cast doubt on the seemingly positive effects the ECJ has on reducing tax distortions. In addition, we demonstrate that the restricted applicability of IP boxes as endorsed by the OECD and the European Commission would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe.