Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

How do family ownership,control and management affect firm value?

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.     

Impact of off-farm income on food security and nutrition in Nigeria

While the poverty implications of off-farm income have been analyzed in different developing countries, much less is known about the impact of off-farm income on household food security and nutrition. Here, this research gap is addressed by using farm survey data from Nigeria. Econometric analyses are employed to examine the mechanisms through which off-farm income affects household calorie and micronutrient supply, dietary quality, and child anthropometry. We find that off-farm income has a positive net effect on food security and nutrition. The prevalence of child stunting, underweight, and wasting is lower in households with off-farm income than in households without. Using a structural model, we also show that off-farm income contributes to higher food production and farm income by easing capital constraints, thus improving household welfare in multiple ways.     

Information demand and stock market volatility

We study information demand and supply at the firm and market level using data for 30 of the largest stocks traded on NYSE and NASDAQ. Demand is approximated in a novel manner from weekly internet search volume time series drawn from the recently released Google Trends database. Our paper makes contributions in four main directions. First, although information demand and supply tend to be positively correlated, their dynamic interactions do not allow conclusive inferences about the information discovery process. Second, demand for information at the market level is significantly positively related to historical and implied measures of volatility and to trading volume, even after controlling for market return and information supply. Third, information demand increases significantly during periods of higher returns. Fourth, analysis of the expected variance risk premium confirms for the first time empirically the hypothesis that investors demand more information as their level of risk aversion increases.     

Commodity derivatives valuation with autoregressive and moving average components in the price dynamics

In this paper, we develop a continuous time factor model of commodity prices that allows for higher-order autoregressive and moving average components. We document the need for these components by analyzing the convenience yield’s time series dynamics. The model we propose is analytically tractable and allows us to derive closed-form pricing formulas for futures and options. Empirically, we estimate a parsimonious version of the general model for the crude oil futures market and demonstrate the model’s superior performance in pricing nearby futures contracts in- and out-of-sample. Most notably, the model substantially improves the pricing of long-horizon contracts with information from the short end of the futures curve.     

Increasing the credibility of the twin birth instrument

Twin births are an important instrument for the endogenous fertility decision. However, twin births are not exogenous either as dizygotic twinning is correlated with maternal characteristics. Following the medical literature, we assume that monozygotic twins are exogenous, and construct a new instrument, which corrects for the selection although monozygotic twinning is usually unobserved in survey and administrative datasets. Using administrative data from Sweden, we show that the usual twin instrument is related to observed and unobserved determinants of economic outcomes, while our new instrument is not. In our applications we find that the classical twin instrument underestimates the negative effect of fertility on labor income. This finding is in line with the observation that high earners are more likely to delay childbearing and hence have a higher risk to get dizygotic twins.     

State prices,liquidity, and default

We show, in a monetary exchange economy, that asset prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank, through its effect on default and interest rates. Two agents trade goods and nominal assets to smooth consumption across periods and future states, in the presence of cash-in-advance financing costs that have effects on real allocations. We show that higher spot interest rates reduce trade and as a result increase state prices. Hence, states of nature with higher interest rates are also states of nature with higher risk-neutral probabilities. This result, which cannot be found in a Lucas-type representative agent model, implies that the yield curve is upward sloping in equilibrium, even when short-term interest rates are fairly stable and the variance of the (macroeconomic) stochastic discount factor is 0. The risk-premium in the term structure is, therefore, a monetary-cost risk premium.     

Geography, institutions, and the making of comparative development

While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries, in former colonies, geography has also affected colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes. Using non-colonized countries as a control group, I re-examine the theories put forward by La Porta et al. (J Law Econ Org 15(1):222–279, 1999 and Acemoglu et al. (Am Econ Rev 91(5), 1369–1401, 2001. I find strong support for both theories, but also evidence that the authors’ estimates of the impact of colonization on institutions and growth are biased, since they confound the effect of the historical determinants of institutions with the direct impact of geographic endowments on development. In a baseline estimation, I find that the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2001) overestimates the importance of institutions for economic growth by 28 %, as a country’s natural disease environment affected settler mortality during colonization and also has a direct impact on prosperity. The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) underestimates the importance of colonization-imposed legal origin for institutional development by 63 %, as Britain tended to colonize countries that are remote from Europe and thus suffer from low access to international markets.