Der Beitrag kontrolltheoretischer Methoden zur Analyse der Stabilisationspolitik

Ohne ZusammenfassungFür Anregungen und Unterstützung danke ich besonders den Herren Professoren Abele (Universität Freiburg/Schweiz), Tintner (TU Wien), Aoki (Universität Urbana/Illinois, USA) und Ferschl (Universität Wien); für allenfalls verbleibende Irrtümer bleibe ich selbst verantwortlich.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Optimal macroeconomic policies in a financial and economic crisis: a case study for Slovenia

In this paper, we study different and, in particular, “optimal” reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies to the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 in Slovenia, a small open economy that is part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Using an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects of the crisis. Next, we study the possibilities of fiscal policy reducing or even annihilating the effects of the crisis. We also investigate the optimal reaction of fiscal policies based on the assumption that Slovenian policy-makers behave as though they were optimizing an objective function. We show that optimal policies call for only a very modestly active countercyclical role of fiscal policies. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal solvency.     

Macroeconomic Policy Design in the European Monetary Union: A Numerical Game Approach

Optimal economic reactions of European policy-makers on exogenous shocks are determined by simulating a global macroeconomic model under different institutional arrangements. In particular, it is investigated whether discretionary or rule-based policies and whether non-cooperative or cooperative policies for Europe result in a better performance as measured by intertemporal objective functions. The results show that the answers to these questions depend strongly on the nature of the shock to which European economies are exposed. For a negative supply shock, rule-based policies dominate, whereas for a negative demand shock, cooperative fiscal policy-making within the European Monetary Union gives the best results.     

Estimating the costs and benefits of soil conservation in Europe

Economics is about problems of choice. In erosion control, both public authorities and private land users are faced with such problems. What is the impact of erosion, both on-site and off-site, and to what extent can this impact be quantified? If we conceptualize this impact in terms of sustainability, how can we compare one type of effect against another? The former question can be answered only by natural scientists, the latter by economists and other social scientists. Weighing different aspects of sustainability requires value judgments, and economists are sometimes accused of having a jaundiced view of reality, wrongly supposing that decisions are based on rationality and denying the importance of emotion.However, let us assume that there is some mileage to be gained out of attempting to estimate the cost of erosion in an economic sense—which consists of converting the various effects into a common denominator: euros. If we can predict the impact of erosion control measures on erosion rates, we can know the benefit of these measures. The cost also needs to be calculated, not in terms of money but in terms of resources expended (which could have been used for other purposes) and in terms of possible negative impacts of erosion control (for instance, increased use of herbicides in reduced-tillage systems).There are important other considerations which economists may study. Firstly, there is the comparison of present versus future costs and benefits: how much can we sacrifice today for higher sustainability tomorrow?Secondly, there is the issue of private versus public costs and benefits: how do the goals of private land users differ from (those of?) the public good, how can this help us to predict land users’ behaviour, and what incentives would be appropriate to make them behave in such a way as to maximize the public good? Thirdly, how do we deal with uncertainty and risk?These problems loomed large in a study to support an extended impact assessment for the EU Soil Thematic Strategy, in 2005. Whereas much research has been done on erosion and its impact, much of this is on a small scale. The extent of the problem on a national, let alone a continental or a global scale, is still poorly known. The paper discusses how these problems were faced, which is not the same as saying they were resolved.     

Residential energy demand analysis: An empirical application of the closure test principle

In this paper a set of ten different single-equation models of residential energy demand is being analyzed, derived by the imposition of linear parameter restrictions on a fairly general autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model. Residential energy consumption is assumed to be explainable by households' real disposable income, movements in the real price of energy, and the temperature variable ‘heating degree days’. In the empirical application, Austrian annual data for the period 1970 to 1992 are used. The main focus of the paper is on the control of the overall significance level of the tests based on the application of the closure test principle, introduced by Marcus, Peritz, and Gabriel (1976). The application illustrates nicely how one can, by defining a closed system of hypotheses, control the significance level α in supporting the search for a suitable specific model. The wide range of estimated elasticities, however, indicates that the estimation results depend strongly on the choice of the model specification.     

Less Government—More Wealth? On the Macroeconomics of a Smaller Public Sector in Europe

In this paper, we analyze the reactions of European economies to a fiscal policy strategy aiming at diminishing the public sector. Within the framework of the MSG3 model, a macroeconomic model of the world economy, we perform several simulation experiments to explore the effects of reducing government expenditures permanently in different phases of the business cycle. For this purpose, we combine the fiscal contraction with negative and positive, Euro Area-wide and global, supply and demand shocks. It turns out that adverse Keynesian effects on output and employment tend to be mostly weak and short-lived, whereas long-run effects on output and employment are favorable. Due to these long-run effects, the fiscal contraction policy raises welfare as measured by an asymmetric quadratic objective function. The size of these welfare effects depends on the initial situation in a non-trivial manner.     

Responding to Digital Transformation by External Corporate Venturing: An Enterprising Family Identity and Communication Patterns Perspective

Digital transformation increasingly requires activities located outside firm boundaries, for example via alliances with start‐up companies. Despite this, German Mittelstand firms, primarily owned and managed by enterprising families and seen as role models of innovation, appear reluctant to place strategic emphasis on venturing outside the firm’s boundaries when it comes to digital transformation. Drawing on the concepts of identity and communication patterns, we theorize on the mechanisms behind this behaviour. Applying structural equation modelling to a sample of 254 members of the next generation in enterprising families from Germany, we find that family communication patterns impact the strategic priority for or against external corporate venturing via identity‐related considerations.