Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

The effectiveness of fiscal spending in Croatia,Slovenia and Serbia: the role of trade openness and public debt level

Various structural characteristics of economies, directly or indirectly, affect the transmission from government stimuli to economic activity and determine the size of fiscal multipliers. In this article, we expand the standard Blanchard–Perotti fiscal SVAR model by incorporating the public debt and trade openness variables to assess the influence of these structural determinants on the effectiveness of fiscal spending in three selected former Yugoslav countries – Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The results confirmed the main hypotheses, which state that public debt level and trade openness significantly affect the effectiveness of fiscal spending through the means of reduction in size of fiscal effects in all countries analysed. When comparing internationally, this reduction tends to be more evident in countries with a higher degree of average public debt level and trade openness.     

Estimation of zero-intelligence models by L1 data

A unit volume zero-intelligence (ZI) model is defined and the distribution of its L1 process is recursively described. Further, a generalized ZI model allowing non-unit market orders, shifts of quotes and general in-spread events is proposed and a formula for the conditional distribution of its quotes is given, together with a formula for price impact. For both the models, MLE estimators are formulated and shown to be consistent and asymptotically normal. Consequently, the estimators are applied to data of six US stocks from nine electronic markets. It is found that more complex variants of the models, despite being significant, do not give considerably better predictions than their simple versions with constant intensities.     

Endowment Origin,Demographic Effects,and Individual Preferences in Contests

In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely make suboptimal decisions in contests even to the extent of making negative returns. The purpose of this study is to investigate how earning the endowment, demographic differences, and individual preferences impact behavior in contests. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects expend costly resources (bids) to attain an award (prize). In line with other laboratory studies of contests, our results show that subjects overbid relative to theoretical predictions and incur substantial losses as a result. Making subjects earn their initial resource endowments mitigates overbidding and thus increases efficiency. Overbidding is linked to gender, with women bidding higher than men and having lower average earnings. Other demographic information, such as religiosity, and individual preferences, such as preferences toward winning and risk, also influence behavior in contests.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

Social aspirations in European banks: peer-influenced risk behaviour

We test a sample of 3,586 banks from 33 European countries to determine whether performances above or below a social aspiration level (median performance of peer banks) influence banks’ aggregate risk levels. Our results are consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory in that we find that bank performance below a bank’s social aspiration level is followed by increased aggregate risk, i.e. risk-taking behaviour in the subsequent year. Although under-performing banks tend to be risk-takers, large banks and banks with high aggregate risk levels tend to limit the increase in their aggregate risk levels.     

Monetary business cycle accounting

This paper investigates the quantitative importance of various types of distortions for inflation and nominal interest rate dynamics by extending business cycle accounting to monetary models. Representing various classes of real and nominal distortions as ‘wedges’ in standard equilibrium conditions allows a quantitative assessment of those distortions. Decomposing the data into movements due to these wedges shows that distortions generating movements in TFP and wedges in equilibrium conditions for asset markets are essential. In contrast, wedges capturing the effects of sticky prices play less important role. These results are robust to alternative implementations of the accounting method.