Does the evidence on corruption depend on how it is measured? Results from a cross-country study on microdata sets

While much of the existing literature on corruption looks at the effect of corruption on macro variables such as growth rates and income distribution, this study provides a departure by focussing on victims of corruption by using microdata to compare civilian and business corruption. This study finds that businesses face a stronger incidence of bribe demands than individuals. Though there are several differences between the determinants of the two forms of bribe victimization, there are also some similarities. Policies to combat corruption need to take into account both the differences and the similarities.     

Systematic risk estimation in the presence of large and many outliers

It is well recognized that the effect of extreme points on systematic risk estimates is not adequately captured through least squares estimation. This article uses the reweighted least median squares (RWLMS) approach, first proposed by Rousseeuw (1984), which accurately detects outlier presence. Using a large sample of 1350 NYSE/AMEX firms, the article demonstrates that least squares does indeed mask several potentially influential points, that this masking is very pervasive over the sample, and that it may persist even after conventional robust estimation techniques are applied. When these masked points are “unmasked” by RWLMS and zero weights assigned to such observations, the resulting RWLMS estimates of beta are on average 10%–15% smaller. However, a Bayesian treatment of such points (assigning a priori nonzero weights) is possible in both one and two factor market models.     

New product introduction under demand uncertainty in competitive industries

A game-theoretic model is employed to examine the conditions under which firms in a duopoly, faced with a new product introduction opportunity of uncertain profitability (because of uncertainty in demand), choose to enter the market immediately or, alternatively, decide to wait, thereby avoiding the risk of failure. The implications for a firm's strategic behavior are contrasted with situations in which the competitor is believed to be (1) passive, implying that the firm expects to enjoy indefinite monopoly status if it introduces the new product, and (2) committed to a waiting strategy, implying monopoly status for a limited time period, if the new product is successful.     

B2B relationship calculus: quantifying resource effects in service-dominant logic

Increasingly, knowledgeable business-to-business (B2B) customers and evolving customer needs are leading to seismic shifts in vendor–client interactions. Across industries, sellers are changing their business models from a simple goods orientation to a hybrid goods–services model, placing greater emphasis on delivering complete customer solutions. In such an environment, companies must find ways to prioritize investments in resource development. The service-dominant (S-D) logic framework offers significant insights into this challenge; however, these effects have not been tested quantitatively. This study addresses that gap, examining the influence of various seller resources on buyer satisfaction. An empirical analysis of buying organizations that purchased and implemented business intelligence systems finds that “augmented” operant resources that the buyers ascribe to the software’s sellers—resources that go above and beyond expectations—are the most significant predictors of both successful technology assimilation and overall customer relationship quality. In particular, an augmented operant resource reflecting a seller’s ability to see value creation opportunities from the buyer’s perspective (value mindset) has up to three times the effect on relationship satisfaction as “core” operant resources such as product-specific expertise or basic interpersonal service skills. These results can help sellers prioritize resource investments.     

Patent Protection and R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information

When tournament effect is negative, under complete information, whether patent protection increases the incentive for R&D is ambiguous. It depends on the extent of spillover of the new technology. In particular if that amount is less than a threshold value then patent protection increases the incentive for R&D, otherwise it does not. This note considers incomplete information framework where the spillover parameter is private information. In this framework it is shown that there are situations where patent protection unambiguously increases incentive for R&D. This happens if the distribution function of the spillover parameter is sufficiently skewed and the cost of doing research is sufficiently high even when tournament effect is negative.