File sharing as conditional cooperation: evidence from a framed field experiment

In this project, we investigate downloading and sharing behaviour in a novel ‘piracy game’ modelled after standard public good games. We find that willingness to share correlates positively with the sharing by others. By contrast, actual behaviour in the ‘piracy game’ is not correlated with self-reported behaviour.     

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Educational upgrading,structural change and the task composition of jobs in Europe

We analyze the changes in the task content of jobs in 24 European countries between 1998 and 2015. We link the O*NET occupational data with the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU‐LFS), and use the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor ( 2011 ). We find that the intensity of non‐routine cognitive tasks grew in all countries, while the intensity of manual tasks declined. Workforce upskilling was the major factor contributing to these developments. The intensity of routine cognitive tasks grew in most Central and Eastern European countries, but it declined in Western European countries. This difference is attributed to the contrasting patterns of structural changes in these groups of countries.     

Alternative Demand for University Outreach Services from Georgia's Golf Industry

Recent technological advancements have influenced farmers' growing demand for private information suppliers, a service traditionally monopolized by public outreach programs of land grant educational institutions. This waning appeal for university extension services creates pressure for these institutions to explore other market segments to broaden their audience coverage. This study demonstrates a potential market niche in Georgia's golf industry for university outreach services. Binomial logistic regression results indicate that significant demand ( a ) is negatively influenced by golf facility size; ( b ) is directly related to the level of industry experience of the golf superintendents; and ( c ) could come from facilities that require assistance in growth-, pest-, and employment-related concerns.     

A simple and general solution to King Solomon''s problem

An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the game, all players have weakly dominant strategies. Moreover, if the two highest valuations are common knowledge, the second stage of the game is redundant, and the outcome is implemented in weakly dominant strategies.