POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE FORMATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY

Institutional economics has some useful things to say about government policy-forming processes. It focuses attention on the structural components of government institutions which shape the direction of policy formation and its delivery. In this article, the author discusses how institutional models of government decision-making may be adapted to parliamentary systems of government. This approach has some merit because it rescues analysis of government processes from models based on the US constitutional system.     

a taxi for miss doolittle

Why is it so difficult to get a taxi in London? Robin Jenks is confident that without regulation the service would be greatly improved. Is it really necessary for taxi drivers to have ‘The Knowledge’?     

A theoretical model of the relationship between value added elements and end product

This paper focuses on the development of a theoretical scheme describing the transformation of primary incomes into end consumption and savings in the Russian economy. This scheme is basically a system of interrelated tables reflecting the distribution of primary incomes across the institutional sectors and their further reallocation and use. The scheme makes allowances for the specific features of the Russian economy and existing statistics. In terms of methodology, it is coordinated with the interindustry balance in current buyer prices and, from the theoretical standpoint, describes the connection between Quadrant II and Quadrant III of the balance. Therefore, the proposed system of tables is treated in the paper as Quadrant IV of the interindustry balance. The theoretical scheme is used by the authors as a necessary basis for constructing an empirical model of the relationship between value added and end product, which will be published in the next issue of this journal.     

No Chinese Capitalism without Property Rights

The speed with which communist China has embuaced markets has surprised Western analysis and observers, But Chinese economic progress will founder in corruption and inefficiency, argues Professor Steven Cheung of the university of Hong Kong, untess she insitutes a well-defined system of private property rights to safeguord investment and stimulate trade.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.